


JPRS-UIA-91-017
10 SEPTEMBER 1991



JPRS Report

Soviet Union

International Affairs
Foreign Relations in Wake of The Coup Attempt

19980112 186

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 6

Soviet Union
International Affairs
FOREIGN RELATIONS IN WAKE OF THE COUP ATTEMPT

JPRS-UIA-91-017

CONTENTS

10 September 1991

ARMS CONTROL

Grinevskiy Calls for More Work at Vienna Talks [TASS, 4 Sep 91] 1

WORLDWIDE TOPICS

Baltic Recognition Continues [IZVESTIYA, 28 Aug 91]	2
World Reaction to USSR Situation Viewed [A. Golts; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 Aug 91]	2
Diplomats' Reactions to Coup Assessed [V. Nadein; IZVESTIYA, 31 Aug 91]	3
'International Observers at the Roundtable' [Moscow Radio, 1 Sep 91]	4
Willi Brandt Invites Shevardnadze, Yakovlev to SI Meeting [INTERFAX, 2 Sep 91]	6
World Repercussions of USSR Developments [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 Sep 91]	6

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Genscher To Attend CSCE Conference in Moscow 10 Sep [TASS, 3 Sep 91] 9

THIRD WORLD ISSUES

Pankin Sends Message to Nonaligned Movement Meeting [TASS, 3 Sep 91] 10

GENERAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Israeli Transport Minister on Improving Ties With USSR [M. Qatzav; PRAVDA, 19 Aug 91]	11
U.S. Terms for Aid to USSR Eyed [A. Shalnev; IZVESTIYA, 27 Aug 91]	11
France's Dumas on Economic Aid, Relations with USSR [Yu. Kovalenko; IZVESTIYA, 27 Aug 91]	12
Japanese Reactions to Coup, Soviet Aid [S. Agafonov; IZVESTIYA, 27 Aug 91]	13
Western Aid Could Benefit Reform Process [Berlin ADN, 1 Sep 91]	14

UNITED STATES, CANADA

Bush Policy Toward USSR Assessed [T. Zhdanova, M. Kozhokin; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 8 Aug 91]	15
NEWSWEEK Cited on CIA Coup Prediction [A. Shalnev; IZVESTIYA, 28 Aug 91]	16
Baker Comment on Russia's 1933 Borders Hit [Vitaliy Pyrkh; GOLOS No 33, 1 Sep 91]	17
PRAVDA on U.S. Reaction to Events in USSR [PRAVDA, 3 Sep 91]	20
U.S. 'Torn' Over Response to Changes in USSR [PRAVDA, 4 Sep 91]	21
Poll of Americans' Views of USSR Cited [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 5 Sep 91]	22

WEST EUROPE

Finland Receives Apology For Washed-Up Ammunition Crates [IZVESTIYA, 15 Aug 91]	23
French Delegation Tells Sharin of 'Alarm' at Coup [V. Yermolin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Aug 91]	23
Rome Charge Defends Actions During Coup [F. Stanevskiy; TRUD, 28 Aug 91]	23
Stockholm Envoy Plays Down IZVESTIYA Coup Allegations [N. Uspenskiy; Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 28 Aug 91]	24
British, Soviet Ships Mark Murmansk Run Anniversary [Moscow TV, 29 Aug 91]	25
FRG Aide Hopeful on Problem of Soviet Germans, Migration [IZVESTIYA, 30 Aug 91]	25
Ambassador to Ireland Rebuts Allegations About Coup Stance [G. Gventsadze; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 31 Aug 91]	25
French Companies Enter Radio Business [INTERFAX, 2 Sep 91]	26
European Reconstruction Bank To Discuss Cooperation [INTERFAX, 2 Sep 91]	26
Lithuanian Official Comments on Cultural Ties [ANSA, 2 Sep 91]	26
German Diplomatic Note Calls for Honecker Extradition [Berlin ADN, 3 Sep 91]	27

Landsbergis on UK Gold, Soviet Withdrawal [Radio Vilnius, 3 Sep 91]	27
More Details on Reuniting of Gordiyevskiy Family [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 3 Sep 91]	27
German Attitudes to USSR Breakup, Aid Examined [PRAVDA, 3 Sep 91]	28
Ambassador Zamyatin's Stance on Coup Reviewed [IZVESTIYA, 3 Sep 91]	28
Pankin Sees 'Brilliant Prospects' for Nordic Ties [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 3 Sep 91]	29
Construction of Gas Pipeline to Greece To Begin Soon [INTERFAX, 3 Sep 91]	29
UK Foreign Ministry Official Arrives in Lithuania [Radio Vilnius, 3 Sep 91]	29
Deryabin Says Coup Showed European Support of Perestroyka [INTERFAX, 4 Sep 91]	30
French Perfumer Opens Moscow Shop [INTERFAX, 4 Sep 91]	30
Firefighters Complain of Humiliation in Greece [TASS, 4 Sep 91]	30
Germany Plans Exports of Railway Wagons to USSR [INTERFAX, 4 Sep 91]	30
Soviet Ambassador to France Recalled [Paris AFP, 4 Sep 91]	31
Dumas Welcomes USSR Reforms, Praises Leaders [TASS, 5 Sep 91]	31
Economic Official Views Ties with Eastern Germany [Berlin ADN, 5 Sep 91]	31
Envoy to Stockholm To Return to Post [Stockholm Radio, 5 Sep 91]	32
Europe Bank Official Cited on Credits [TASS, 5 Sep 91]	32
Spain Postpones Ratification of Treaty With USSR [TASS, 5 Sep 91]	32
Soviet Business Center to Open in Duesseldorf [INTERFAX, 5 Sep 91]	32
French Minister Favors Economic Aid to USSR [TASS, 5 Sep 91]	33
Gorbachev To Meet French Economics Minister [France-Inter Radio, 6 Sep 91]	33

EAST EUROPE

Soviet-Bulgarian Joint Venture To Produce Light Aircraft [Moscow TV, 26 Aug 91]	34
Soviet, Albanian TV Establish Cooperative Links [Moscow TV, 30 Aug 91]	34
PRAVDA Assesses E. European Reaction to Coup Attempt [V. Gerasimov; PRAVDA, 31 Aug 91]	34
Hungarian Consortium Seeks Russian Joint Ventures [Budapest MTI, 31 Aug 91]	35
Agreement Reached With Hungary on Food Deliveries [Moscow TV, 1 Sep 91]	35
Hungarian Consortium Signs Letter on Russian Food Aid [Budapest MTI, 1 Sep 91]	35
Hungary Plans More Food Exports to USSR [INTERFAX, 2 Sep 91]	36
Pankin Meets, Confers With CSFR Ambassador [TASS, 4 Sep 91]	36
Eastern European Ambassadors Cited on Silayev Proposal [TASS, 5 Sep 91]	36
Bulgaria Media Reviews Economic Ties with USSR [DMoscow Radio, 5 Sep 91]	37

LATIN AMERICA

Antidrug Agreements Signed by Argentina, Mexico, Peru [Moscow Radio, 2 Sep 91]	38
Cuban Dissidents To Pressure Aid for Castro [Madrid EFE, 5 Sep 91]	38

CHINA, EAST ASIA

'New Principles' Govern Trade With DPRK [PRAVDA, 20 Aug 91]	39
Japanese Banker Explains Investment Plan [PRAVDA, 21 Aug 91]	40
Japan Sees Baltic-Northern Territory Link [S. Agafonov; IZVESTIYA, 28 Aug 91]	41
South Korea To Send Delegation to Moscow [TASS, 29 Aug 91]	42
Rogachev on Success of Cambodia Talks [TASS, 30 Aug 91]	42
Radio Views Sino-Vietnamese Ties After POW Release [Radio Moscow, 31 Aug 91]	42
Japan Says Favorable Conditions Exist for Peace Treaty [INTERFAX, 30 Aug 91]	43
Retired General Says Akhromeyev Ordered KAL Shot Down [Radio Rossii, 30 Aug 91]	44
ROK To Fulfill Promised Loan of 3 Billion Dollars [Mowcow Radio, 31 Aug 91]	44
Full Clarification of S. Korean Airliner Incident Urged [DMoscow Radio, 1 Sep 91]	44
Rogachev Optimistic on Cambodian Settlement Prospects [TASS, 2 Sep 91]	44
Asia Trading House Wants Regional Hurdles Removed [INTERFAX, 2 Sep 91]	45
ROK Firm Negotiates Central Russia Deal [INTERFAX, 2 Sep 91]	45
IZVESTIYA To Continue KAL Downing Probe [IZVESTIYA, 2 Sep 91]	45
Nuclear Guarantee Needed for Improved DPRK-Japan Relations [Moscow Radio, 3 Sep 91]	46
Asian, American Companies Exhibit at Vladivostok Fair [INTERFAX, 3 Sep 91]	47
Commentator on Suspended South-North Talks [Moscow Radio, 3 Sep 91]	47
Uncertainty Inhibits ROK Credits to USSR [IZVESTIYA, 3 Sep 91]	47
Prospects of ROK-Soviet Economic Cooperation Discussed [Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO, 4 Sep 91]	48
Moscow Views Situation on Korean Peninsula [Moscow Radio, 4 Sep 91]	49

Japanese Liberal Democrats Praise Heroism of Muscovites	<i>[INTERFAX, 4 Sep 91]</i>	49
Kim Yong-sun Says DPRK Will Adhere to Socialist Road	<i>[Moscow Radio, 4 Sep 91]</i>	49
'Gigantic Step' Made for Cambodian Peace	<i>[A. Golts; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Sep 91]</i>	50
Toyota to Open Service Center in Vladivostok	<i>[INTERFAX, 5 Sep 91]</i>	50
Japan's Position on 'Northern Territories' Unchanged	<i>[INTERFAX, 5 Sep 91]</i>	50
South Korean Delegation Heads for USSR	<i>[TASS, 5 Sep 91]</i>	51
Commentator on Japanese Discussions on Providing Aid	<i>[Moscow Radio, 5 Sep 91]</i>	51
Commentary Hails PRC's Cessation of Arms Sales to Cambodia	<i>[Moscow Radio, 5 Sep 91]</i>	52
Moscow Radio Criticizes Japan's Clumsy Response to Coup	<i>[Moscow Radio, 7 Sep 91]</i>	52

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

Ambassador on Talks with Pakistan, Mujahidin	<i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Aug 91]</i>	54
Indian Prime Minister Stresses Friendly Ties	<i>[Moscow TV, 30 Aug 91]</i>	55
Western Agencies Cited on Tehran Talks on Afghanistan	<i>[IZVESTIYA, 31 Aug 91]</i>	55
Afghan Talks in Tehran, Upcoming Talks in Moscow Praised	<i>[Moscow Radio, 1 Sep 91]</i>	56
Andreyev Comments on U.S.-Kuwaiti Defense Pact	<i>[Moscow Radio, 2 Sep 91]</i>	56
Slowdown in Emigration Attributed To 'Problems' in Israel	<i>[IZVESTIYA, 3 Sep 91]</i>	57
Pankin: No Change on Mideast Peace Conference	<i>[Jerusalem Radio, 3 Sep 91]</i>	57
Soviet Oilmen To Help Extinguish Kuwaiti Oil Well Fires	<i>[INTERFAX, 3 Sep 91]</i>	57
Effects Republics' Independence on Afghanistan Viewed	<i>[INTERFAX, 3 Sep 91]</i>	57
Afghan 'Rebel' Delegation to Hold Moscow Talks	<i>[TASS, 5 Sep 91]</i>	57
Firefighting Conglomerate Lands Kuwait Contract	<i>[INTERFAX, 5 Sep 91]</i>	58

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Dep Formin Nikolayenko's Southern African Tour Summarized	<i>[IZVESTIYA, 16 Aug 91]</i>	59
South African National Party Constitutional Proposals Viewed	<i>[Moscow Radio, 27 Aug 91]</i>	59
South Africa Provides Aid to Russians	<i>[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 3 Sep 91]</i>	60
RSA's National Party Constitutional Proposals Viewed	<i>[Moscow Radio, 5 Sep 91]</i>	60
Official Rejects Angolan Accusations on Fishing	<i>[TASS, 5 Sep 91]</i>	60

Grinevskiy Calls for More Work at Vienna Talks

*LD0409213291 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1240 GMT 4 Sep 91*

[By Vladimir Smelov, Tass correspondent]

[Text] Vienna, 4 Sep—A plenary meeting at the talks on measures of strengthening trust and security in Europe, which took place in the Austrian capital today, underlines the need to undertake energetic efforts so that they give fresh dynamism and produce results. This is even more important, it was stressed in the speeches, because the positive moves at the present stage of the talks in which the 35 states of the CSCE are participating, are so far quite small, and it is necessary to reach a solution that satisfies all sides on the outstanding problems without delay.

There are many such problems. Many very important military structures of the armed forces as well as their activities still remain outside the sphere of openness. The Soviet delegation has repeatedly drawn attention to this, and it has put forward the relevant proposals which are on the table at the talks. The problem of limiting military activities, which is acquiring a special significance in the military and political landscape which is being formed in

Europe, is still waiting to be solved. A number of unresolved issues in connection with the communications network of the CSCE have not yet been settled.

In a word, there are enough troubles that need solutions, and the participants in the talks will have to roll up their sleeves and set to work in order not to arrive empty handed at a new European meeting of the "Helsinki-2". March 1992 is not far away. Bearing in mind the upcoming seminar on military doctrines, which is to take place in Vienna in October, and that the talks at the forum of the 35 nations will be suspended for the period of this seminar, the delegations have not got much time for work.

Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation, who spoke at the meeting, told the partners about the most important changes which have been taking place in the USSR since the events of 19-21 August. Having revealed the information about the agreed statement which was issued at the beginning of the congress of USSR People's Deputies by the country's president and the highest leaders of 10 Union republics, the Soviet diplomat especially underscored the fact that this document confirms that the USSR is behaving strictly in accordance with all the international agreements and obligations that the USSR has taken upon itself. This includes the questions of reducing weapons, control over weapons, and foreign economic obligations.

Baltic Recognition Continues

91UN2563D Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
28 Aug 91 Union Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "The Baltics: Ambassadors Are Getting Ready to Go"]

[Text] Ottawa

Canada has announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Baltic republics. Ottawa intends to expand trade with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the immediate future.

Lisbon

Portugal intends to call on the countries of the European Community to recognize the Baltic republics at a meeting of the community foreign ministers in Brussels.

Rome

The foreign minister of Italy stated that there is no need for his country to recognize the three Baltic republics because Italy has never considered their 1940 annexation as legitimate.

Canberra

Australia will establish diplomatic relations with the Baltic republics. The Australian ambassador in Copenhagen will at the same time be in charge of dialogue with Lithuania and Latvia, whereas the ambassador in Stockholm will assume responsibility for mutual relations with Estonia.

Brussels

The government of Belgium has sent its ambassadors in Sweden and Finland to the Baltic republics in order to establish "preliminary contacts" with a view to resuming diplomatic relations.

Sofia

Prime Minister of Bulgaria D. Popov announced recognition of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia as sovereign states. Bulgaria has initiated the process of establishing official diplomatic relations.

Vatican

An official representative of the Vatican stated: "The Holy See intends to consider the issue of unfreezing its missions to Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia very soon."

World Reaction to USSR Situation Viewed

PM0309092391 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*
in Russian 30 Aug 91 First Edition p 3

[Aleksandr Golts commentary under the rubric "Observer's Notes": "Putsch Has Been Foiled. But Instability in the USSR Alarms the World"]

[Text] ...They may not have had a very happy life, but it was a long one. And it appears that they have started dying at the same time. Only a day after the suspension of the

CPSU's activity, the Soviet Union is on the brink of disintegration. I do not think that this displays some inevitable pattern. But there is something interesting here. While the news of the imminent abolition of the Communist Party was greeted with great satisfaction in the West, the declaration of total independence by a number of republics evoked quite different emotions.

Despite all the satisfaction about the collapse of communism, Germany's *NEUE OSNABRUCKER ZEITUNG* writes, the collapse of the Soviet Union entails serious dangers. The disintegration of the USSR, London's *THE TIMES* echoes, will have unpredictable consequences. "Today we find ourselves on the eve of the beginning of a process of great change which promises to redraw the map of Europe and Asia no less dramatically than the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918," *THE WASHINGTON POST* observes.

We could continue indefinitely with such quotes. The situation in the Soviet Union remains the number one subject in the world press. But it is obvious even from the above quotations that Western analysts (statesmen understandably express themselves very cautiously) are seriously concerned about the prospect of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

You would think that there would be no reason for those who predicted this disintegration for decades to be concerned. Particularly since it is obvious to any sensible person that any aggression on the part of the USSR is simply impossible now. "It is clear that from the military point of view the army in the USSR cannot present a danger to neighboring countries," a high-ranking NATO diplomat told a *REUTER* correspondent.

Incidentally, this feeling has not appeared in the West only now. It was there even at the time of the putsch. It seems to me that the home-grown junta also committed an error in rehearsing the foreign policy cover for the coup. They proceeded on the basis of the West's clear interest in maintaining strategic stability and observing the most important treaties in the disarmament sphere. On the one hand, there was a promise to observe these treaties, and on the other hand, there was the statement, filled with a latent threat, that "the State Committee for the State of Emergency will stop any interference in internal affairs." All this, in the opinion of the putschists, should have ensured a restrained reaction to the coup on the part of the West.

This, as is well known, did not happen. The United States and its allies, like most countries in the world, immediately occupied a tough stance with respect to the junta. But this, if American officials are to be believed, did not force the Pentagon to place the U.S. Armed Forces in a state of heightened combat readiness. And even the "chilling"—according to *THE WASHINGTON POST*—story told by our people's deputies that the conspirators had gotten hold of the President's briefcase containing the codes needed to arm warheads and launch nuclear missiles did not in general evoke a noticeable reaction among the American military. U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney made the same assessment as his Soviet colleague Marshal of Aviation

Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, who stated in an interview with LE FIGARO newspaper that "there is no danger of the uncontrolled use of USSR strategic nuclear weapons. This danger was eliminated at the very beginning of the putsch." In my opinion, glasnost in the military sphere and the results of the new political thinking had an effect here. The past few years have inspired the confidence in the Pentagon leaders that the Soviet Union will not use nuclear weapons under any conditions.

While we are on the subject of the foreign policy result of the suppression of the putsch, then it undoubtedly cardinally improved the attitude of all countries to the USSR. And this is not just a question of natural solidarity with people who have risen up against totalitarianism. Despite all the approval of perestroika in the West, it was seen for a long time as "Gorbachev's reforms." The position of Soviet people, who rose to the defense of the legitimate power, showed once again that the changes taking place really are irreversible. And that there are other guarantees of these changes apart from the treaties that have been concluded and the position of the Soviet president.

But now people abroad are making no secret of their concern at the fact that there is a real possibility of a breakup of the Soviet Union. And this concern is primarily connected with the military problems of the appearance of new independent states in the place of the Soviet Union's republics. The possibility, albeit hypothetical, of the transfer of part of the USSR's nuclear potential to the charge of several republics makes American—and not just American—strategists shudder. In that event, they are asking, what is the fate of the signed but as yet unratified START Treaty? After all, the United States would then have to deal with not one, but several nuclear powers. And each of them will most probably have its own approach to problems of reducing "its" nuclear potential.

However, let us suppose that the independent republics refuse on principle to possess nuclear weapons, as some of their leaders are declaring, and declare themselves nuclear-free zones. This idea of unilateral nuclear disarmament might suit the West. If it were not for one obvious circumstance. The following question immediately arises: What is to be done with the nuclear weapons that the republics reject? I do not know whether the republics would want Russia, for instance, to be the only one of the sovereign states to possess this might. Destroy them? But the process of destroying nuclear potential requires enormous resources. I do not have any figures in this regard. But, for the purposes of comparison, I can note that the destruction of chemical weapons, which is an operation on a far smaller scale, will cost several billions. Do the republics have these resources at their disposal?

The emergence of national armies will also confront our partners with complex problems. How will these formations fit in with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe? Remember, according to this treaty, reductions are to take place not just in terms of the quantity of various kinds of weapons, but also in terms of regions. Then there is the problem of stationing the troops that are now being withdrawn from Eastern Europe.

Finally there is the trickiest question. The question of borders may quite easily arise with the appearance of sovereign states. In any case they have already been mentioned. I would note that the recarving of borders would undoubtedly set a precedent in changing the Helsinki accords. And this circumstance alone may trigger a very unpleasant chain reaction. It would be all right if this revision were to take place in a civilized way, by means of referendums among the local population and other generally accepted forms. But what if someone decides on the use of force? The danger of turning our country into an even more terrible bonfire than the one that is now blazing in Yugoslavia is obvious.

Let us add to this the fear abroad of social upheavals in our changing country. There is the possibility of disasters in conditions of unrest at nuclear and chemical plants. Our neighbors are expressing unease at the development of the internal situation in our country. According to THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, these countries do not see events in the USSR as an exciting contest since they are "too close to the ring." Many people wanted to see not Yeltsin "deal a spectacular knockout blow to Gorbachev" but a partnership between them which would make it possible to transfer power to the republics in an organized way while at the same time preserving the existence of some form of central control.

However, the West's position can scarcely be called consistent either. On the one hand, worries are being expressed with respect to the "headlong" disintegration of the USSR, and on the other hand, there is equally "headlong" recognition of the independence of the Baltic states. And this is being done before the Soviet Union resolves the problem itself. Does such an attitude not demonstrate a certain contempt for Moscow's opinion? And however many provisos concerning the historic fate of the Baltic republics the heads of individual states make, it is obvious that in the other republics all this will strengthen the positions of those who are fighting for secession.

One way or another, at present a most paradoxical situation has emerged. Our country was the initiator of the implementation of the principles of the new political thinking. Principles that led to the elimination of confrontation. But in recent weeks a real danger emerged that the Soviet Union might become an obstacle to the implementation of the ideas that it initiated in the first place. The putsch, if it had been successful, would sooner or later have led to a new spiral of "cold war." The putsch was defeated, but instability remains. The threat of disintegration hangs over the Soviet Union. And if this dangerous process continues, it will have tragic consequences not just for our country, but also for the whole world.

Diplomats' Reactions to Coup Assessed

PM0309141791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 Aug 91 Union Edition p 6

[Report by V. Nadein: "Now There Is More Information on the Behavior of High-Ranking Diplomats"]

[Text] With rare exceptions, all the ambassadors and charges d'affaires carried out the instructions of the USSR Foreign Ministry central apparatus in a disciplined manner, handing over to the leaders of the host countries' governments on Monday morning the documents of the "Soviet leadership" and personal messages from Yanayev in the case of some leading countries.

RIA reported that one diplomat, speaking off the record, named a number of Soviet ambassadors whose behavior had certainly gone beyond the bounds of protocol associated with the presentation of documents to presidents and prime ministers.

USSR Ambassador to Poland Yu. Kashlev was one of the four heads of embassies named in the RIA telegram.

Yu. Kashlev has written many articles in IZVESTIYA in defense of human rights, the principled positions of arms cuts, and practically all the ministry's progressive measures under E. Shevardnadze.

Pointing this out in his letter to IZVESTIYA following the article "Many High-Ranking Soviet Diplomats Zealously Carried Out the Putschists' Instructions" and describing the mention of his name as slander, Ambassador Kashlev said: "Here in Warsaw we learned of the coup from Western radio stations. We neither received nor carried out any instructions from the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency]. In fact, on 19 August we received a Foreign Ministry circular instructing us to hand to the leadership of the host country an appeal to state and government heads. But I did not make an appointment with the leadership, seeking to gain time, and I only carried out the instructions when I was summoned to Minister K. Skubiszewski's office.

IZVESTIYA's correspondent in Warsaw L. Toporkov reports that "no one in the embassy collective or among the Soviet specialists working in Warsaw heard the ambassador give directions to obey the committee." Yu. Kashlev also told the editorial office that in a telephone conversation between M. Gorbachev and L. Walesa the Polish president expressed a high opinion of the Soviet ambassador's position at this time, predicting even more fruitful activity by Yu. Kashlev in the future.

According to our source of information in Paris, who is entirely trustworthy, to describe the steps taken by Soviet Ambassador to France Yu.V. Dubinin as "furious activity" in favor of the putschists is an exaggeration. However, the same source believes that the facts prevent one from agreeing with the assessment of the ambassador's behavior as routine diplomacy.

However, this is precisely what Yu.V. Dubinin insists on in his letter to IZVESTIYA: "The implementation of the USSR Foreign Ministry's instructions to hand the notorious message to the Elysee Palace was purely formal. Moreover not a word was said to the employee of the president's apparatus in support of the SCSE."

Yu. Dubinin claims that "the USSR Embassy in France did nothing to carry out the instructions to be "guided in its work by the SCSE documents."

Warning that he was not authorized by the Foreign Ministry leadership to make any statements, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister E. Obminskiy writes: "There is no escaping the fact that the USSR Foreign Ministry's first official reaction to the coup was to fulfill—albeit impasively—of the junta's order to disseminate its documents and use them in Soviet Embassies' work. The assurances of adherence to constitutional principles—they were also reiterated by the putschists—and the steps that were taken after 20 August to dissociate itself from the junta cannot expunge this fact."

Briefly analyzing the Foreign Ministry's activities during the years of perestroika, E. Obminskiy points out that during the years when E. Shevardnadze was minister "there were no reactionary figures in the country who did not revile the Foreign Ministry for its 'unpatriotic' activity—the banishing of the 'enemy' image, disarmament, the liberation of Eastern Europe, its stance on the Near East crisis, and much, much else."

E. Obminskiy cursorily mentioned, without singling out anyone's services, that during the putsch many Foreign Ministry staffers manned the barricades outside the White House. This is confirmed by letters the editorial office has received from private citizens.

E. Obminskiy believes that the ministry's Achilles' heel is its "customary zeal in implementing instructions from the top." Noting the courageous behavior of a number of ambassadors (the present minister, B. Pankin, was not alone in his resistance to the junta), the deputy minister notes that it was zeal rather than conviction that prompted "a number of high-ranking diplomats to take actions that many of them will regret for the rest of their lives."

The analysis of the Foreign Ministry's work during the putsch that the new minister, B. Pankin, is bound to make will take into account instances of resistance to the junta reported by E. Obminskiy.

However, the official investigation will also show the behavior of the by no means few high-ranking diplomats who made just one mistake: They allowed the joy with which they greeted the news of the new "firm hand" to burst to the surface.

'International Observers at the Roundtable'

LD0209203791

[Editorial Report] Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian at 1230 GMT on 1 September carries a 30-minute: "International Observers at the Roundtable" program with All-Union Radio foreign-political commentators Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, Yevgeniy Germanovich Osipovskiy, and Vladimir Georgiyevich Pasko.

Pasko begins by stressing the interrelation of foreign and domestic affairs. He says the coup brought the country to the brink of disintegration, and the West considers the situation in the USSR unpredictable. Indecision over

reform has harmed the Union, but Gorbachev and Yeltsin are trying to clear the way for its acceleration.

Levin discusses Western reactions to the coup and to the breakup of the Union. Many Western states have never recognized the Baltic republics as part of the USSR. The interests of these republics must now be understood. The USSR is a great nuclear power, with huge economic potential, and the West is alarmed at the prospect of its dissolution. Levin says: "If we fall apart, so will the whole world system." This would be a disaster.

Osipovskiy quotes FOREIGN AFFAIRS on the need to revive the USSR; THE GUARDIAN on problems that will arise for the West if the breakup does happen; and the German finance minister on the desirability of the Union treaty being signed quickly, so that the West will know whom it's dealing with.

Pasko notes that many of the republics are not happy that Yeltsin is "interferring in the affairs of the Union." But in fact he has lost no time in involving the republics in his work. Russia has played the leading role, but is not trying to "grab the blanket for itself to a greater extent than the others." The Russian leadership has a strong sense of responsibility and is only trying to save the situation. Its relations with its neighbors "should not become an insuperable problem".

Pasko also says that some of Yeltsin's actions are making the West uneasy. A British political expert said on the BBC that Yeltsin's measures are not necessarily liberal: He has suppressed newspapers he doesn't agree with and some forms of political activity, "the beginning of the emergence of a populist dictatorship." His intentions are good, says the expert, but he seems to be an authoritarian character. Pasko notes that Western leaders are saying much the same.

[Levin] "The surge of emotion that led to those decisions mentioned by that British political commentator has, unquestionably, alarmed very many people, including ourselves. I know that none of us has been subscribing to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA or PRAVDA in recent times. We tended to scan rather than read them because those newspapers took a line which was, I would say, so...."

[Pasko] "Inadequate to the situation."

[Levin] "Yes, inadequate to the situation. It distorted so many facts that it was an unpleasant experience to read many articles. But the closure of these newspapers cannot be described as a democratic act. This is an incorrect move. It is very good that RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA has already reappeared. As far as I can tell, its attitude remains the same. So be it! That's their business. But it must be allowed to publish. And as we're on the subject of PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, I consider that they too should be allowed to publish. The subscription campaign is now in progress. Let the subscribers decide. Then we will see whether these papers have a readership or not. The West is drawing our attention to this. We ourselves are aware of this. So, this must be given attention. This must be heeded.

"People in the West are very anxious to obtain objective information about the Soviet Union, to find out what's happening, to know the whys and wherefores of the situation, and what the prospects are. British Prime Minister Major begins his visit to Moscow today. He will meet Gorbachev; he will meet Yeltsin. On the eve of the visit he paid a visit to the United States and held talks with Bush. After his talks with the U.S. President, he said that he would like to find out from the Soviet leaders whether the central government and the republics have a clear plan of action.

"I believe I was not alone in being horrified by the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It was an endless talking shop. Furthermore, those same people who psychologically and politically prepared the way for the putsch, wasted time trying to distract the Supreme Soviet from the problems that need solutions. They claimed to speak on behalf of the Supreme Soviet, even though they aren't even members of the Supreme Soviet. As the voting showed, they were saying things the Supreme Soviet itself didn't agree with at all."

[Levin] "What we need now are decisions, quick decisions. In this connection, as commentators on international affairs, we really shouldn't overlook the appointment of the new foreign minister. As you know, people in our country, including speakers at the Supreme Soviet and representatives of the Foreign Ministry, have been saying that Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze should be reappointed foreign minister. Here on 'Mayak' and 'Latest News' we have also been advocating this. Even now I am deeply convinced that this would have been the best possible choice in current circumstances. But it seems that Eduard Amvrosiyevich has other plans. These have to be respected. So, Pankin has been appointed. This appointment shows, in my view, that substantial changes are going to take place in the Foreign Ministry."

[Pasko] "They have already started. Many ambassadors have returned. They have been recalled."

[Levin] "Well, these rumors are neither being denied nor confirmed at the moment. But I think the ones that showed themselves to be fervently in favor of the decisions of the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] will be recalled, even though, as now emerges, they acted in accordance with a directive received from the former minister. Pankin took a very clear line. At that moment he was ambassador in Prague, and he immediately declared that this was a putsch. There is absolutely no doubt about his honesty and commitment to democracy."

[Pasko] "Well, for such a post such qualities are not enough on their own, wouldn't you say?"

[Levin] "I agree with you entirely. In my view, he has another very important plus working in his favor. Since 1990, since the beginning of that year, if I'm not mistaken, Pankin has been ambassador to Czechoslovakia."

[Pasko] "That's an extremely difficult post."

[Levin] "Not just an extremely difficult post. He found himself right bang in the middle of a problem which...."

[Pasko] "The velvet revolution."

[Levin] "No, he arrived after the revolution."

[Pasko] "It all had an impact, because the atmosphere counts for a lot, doesn't it?"

[Levin] "Yes, of course. But he coped easily with that atmosphere. I suspect another reason why he was appointed to Prague was the fact that, in the past, he had very good relations with all those people who were excluded from political life in Czechoslovakia but who are now leading the country. He is also very familiar with the problems existing between those whom we used to call our friends and brothers and the Soviet Union. These are immense problems, after all, and I feel that not enough attention has been given to them."

"He has diplomatic experience. He has worked in the Foreign Ministry for almost 10 years. He was ambassador to Sweden for a long time, seven years. But, of course, he still does not have international prestige comparable with that of Shevardnadze, though that may come with time—it all depends on Pankin himself. But, to be honest, I find it hard to imagine that anybody could rival Shevardnadze's international prestige. After all, Shevardnadze was the pioneer. He demonstrated a new Soviet Union to the West. He showed what new thinking was."

[Osipovskiy] "But he was also, I would say, an independent agent. In many ways he was a creative person, unlike diplomats who, it is said, are always restricted by the instructions they receive. Shevardnadze demonstrated that he had a creative mind. That is precisely why he was the object of such anger—if not hatred—from right-wingers."

[Levin] "Well, I think that Pankin's biography contains very encouraging details. He is a journalist, and journalists are not very blinkered people. But I have another question to raise. This is an extremely complicated question. After all, the job of USSR foreign minister involves more than just working with the foreign ministers of other states. An enormous task for him now is to reach mutual understanding and seek consensus—to use a vogue word—with the foreign ministers of Union republics. This is a sphere that Pankin is not familiar with. Here he will have to start from scratch, as they say. Let's hope that this will not be a big problem for him."

The commentators conclude by mentioning the different approaches in the West toward aid for the USSR. They agree that most aid is likely to come from the private sector, and the USSR will have to adopt its economy to private sector investment.

Willi Brandt Invites Shevardnadze, Yakovlev to SI Meeting

OW0209182291 Moscow *INTERFAX* in English
1706 GMT 2 Sep 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] President of the Socialist International [SI], Mr. Willi Brandt, has sent Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze a message describing the latest developments in the USSR as tremendously important for Europe and the whole world. He said he intends to hold a meeting of the Social International's Presidium to discuss the situation in Russia and the Soviet Union and see what particular assistance from the SI the democrats in the USSR may count on.

Mr. Brandt invited Aleksandr Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze to attend this meeting in Berlin on September 20. He also said that a delegation of SI vice-presidents would be sent to Moscow.

World Repercussions of USSR Developments

PM0609093391 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*
in Russian 6 Sep 91 First Edition p 3

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer Manki Ponomarev article under the "World Today: Problems and Opinions" rubric: "More Questions Than Answers"]

[Text] We are continuing to amaze the world. Everyone has still not gotten over the shock caused by the reports of the attempted coup d'etat in the USSR. The euphoria engendered by the collapse of the putschists and the victory of democratic forces in our country has still not subsided. And suddenly there is another striking piece of news: The leaders of 10 republics and the USSR president have published their statement effectively giving the old Soviet Union up for lost. The Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow agreed to this after a stormy but relatively short debate. The country is entering a transitional period.

People in the world are now asking: What next? Nevertheless until recently the situation in the USSR and Soviet policy, however you regarded it, was notable for its certainty and predictability. Today it is hard to guess how events will develop. The wisest analysts in various countries are refusing to make any predictions.

Reading the comments on events in our country, you see clearly that the greatest fears are aroused by the possibility of the uncontrolled disintegration of the USSR. It is paradoxical but a fact. During the long "cold war" years it was the West's secret dream to see the weakening of the Soviet Union (they did not even dream of it disintegrating). But today sober politicians want to see not a conglomerate of virtually independent states with little to connect them on the vast European and Asian territories over which Moscow alone used to have sovereignty but a responsible formation whose actions are completely predictable. "We need," G. Bush said, "a strong partner, a serious partner with whom we can do business."

In other words, without interfering—or without directly interfering—in the processes of the formation of a new state system based on the former Union, our international partners want to see a central leadership in Moscow responsible within the bounds of its competence for a single political, economic, and military-strategic space,

responsible for the Soviet Union's previous commitments and those that it may make in the future.

In actual fact, such a center does exist and so the treaties concluded previously in various spheres, including on such acute problems as the reduction and limitation of arms, above all nuclear arms, are still valid. Such a center does exist, so there is someone to whom to present the bill for the Soviet Union's debts, which have already topped \$70 billion or so. Such a center does exist, so it is clear who retains the seat as permanent member of the UN Security Council. Such a center does exist, so there is someone with whom to cooperate in settling the global problems facing the world community and also the regional problems—the Near East problem, for instance. But without such a center, what then?

People in various capitals of the world are taking care to ensure that there is no catastrophic breakup of the Soviet Union. "We understand the processes under way in the USSR whereby individual republics want to develop in accordance with their own notions," FRG Chancellor H. Kohl said during a session of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union faction in the Bundestag. "But we hope that the republics will unite and form a federation and this will also make it possible for them to act together in international policy." Admittedly, not everyone abroad is voicing this firm hope today. Loud voices of alarm and doubt can be heard. "Yesterday we said 'good-bye' to the Soviet Union. We are witnessing something reminiscent of the European Community—a group of independent states arguing about which part of their sovereignty to give up—coming to take its place," Britain's *THE GUARDIAN* wrote. And it goes on: "The state emerging before our eyes will be more like a confederation than a federation."

As we can see, there are varying opinions. But the sense is the same: At the center of the future union of sovereign states there must be a statutory international law entity with whom everyone can and must do business.

Let me venture to quote another British newspaper—*THE DAILY MAIL*. "A number of highly serious questions remain unanswered," it writes. "Will a unified military structure be created within the confederation? Will Russia control all the nuclear arsenal?" Certainly, these questions are logical in our world, oversaturated and overloaded as it is with weapons. Although the Congress of USSR People's Deputies spoke extremely definitely about this, these questions are still causing alarm nevertheless—not only for governments and not only for political observers. They cause alarm for every one of us. Everyone, since they affect everyone.

They cause alarm because it is a question of the future of a nuclear superpower. It is clear from the official data cited during the conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on Reducing and Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms that the USSR has 2,500 strategic nuclear arms delivery vehicles with a total of 10,271 warheads weighing a total of 6,625 tonnes. What is more, according to figures cited in the foreign press, the Soviet Union has something in the order

of 15,000-20,000 tactical and operational-tactical nuclear weapons. It is not surprising that the future of Soviet nuclear weapons is such a source of worry to the whole world.

It seems that it has now proved possible to dispel the doubts as to how far the Soviet leadership controls its nuclear arms. S. Nunn, the influential U.S. senator who has just paid a visit to Moscow and met with both the president and the USSR defense minister, assured his compatriots that there is no direct nuclear threat to the United States from the Soviet Union. At the same time he stressed the need for the USSR to keep central control over all nuclear arsenals "regardless of what happens as regards the republics gaining independence."

At the same time there are increasingly loud demands in the West, particularly in the United States, for the Soviet Union to eliminate a considerable proportion of its nuclear arms over and above the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. treaty and even create a nuclear-free zone as far as the Urals. In effect this idea is also shared by President Bush, who, speaking at a news conference in Kennebunkport, expressed the hope that "after all the changes in the Soviet Union... they will stop targeting missiles on the United States."

However, there are far more questions in the world than answers. For instance, this one: Who, what body in Moscow will have the right to ratify the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty and will this treaty be submitted for ratification at all? After all, as some people in the West are claiming today, it was signed on the Soviet side by the president of a state that virtually no longer exists. And who will be responsible for implementing it, who is to be held accountable? The center, which will probably no longer have its former authority and former powers? The republics that were members of the USSR when the treaty was signed but have now declared their independence and are seeking nuclear-free status? Russia, which alone seems to intend to be in charge of [rasporyazhatsya] the entire Soviet arsenal? These are indeed questions worthy of Hamlet.

To be fair I must note that events in our country have put on the agenda problems of a kind that seem to have no direct bearing on the Soviet Union. But the foreign mass media are discussing them in an extremely vigorous manner. Many observers believe, in particular, that the alignment of forces in Europe is changing. The role of the united Germany and its influence on all European affairs is growing appreciably due to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the recognition of the Baltic states' independence, and a number of other recent events. People in both France and certain other countries are voicing misgivings about this.

The *WASHINGTON POST* voiced quite definite opinions on this. "Kohl may have a better understanding than Bush of how far the collapse of the Soviet Union is transforming Europe. Moscow's influence will lessen, but U.S. influence will also weaken." This is a reference to influential German political and economic circles, whose interests H.

Kohl expresses above all, seeing the horizons of the new Europe more clearly than anyone else. They know that a tough competitive struggle lies ahead for hegemony on the continent and feel ready not only to take part in it, but also to gain the upper hand. That will automatically reduce the U.S. role in European affairs. Including particularly military affairs since people across the ocean are now beginning to demand increasingly loudly that the administration cut military spending and armed forces, particularly overseas. This cannot help but affect the United States' role in NATO.

Certainly, these questions worry the world community. Today there is no unequivocal answer to them. Events are developing so rapidly and so unpredictably that no one can be so bold as to provide definitive remedies. Undoubtedly time will set everything in its place. However, the crux of the matter is to ensure that this process of alignment is accompanied by the minimum of problems. Things are up to us here. It is a matter of seeking a reasonable way out of the situation that has taken shape, a way out that seems to have been found at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies that completed its work yesterday.

Genscher To Attend CSCE Conference in Moscow
10 Sep

LD0309174191 Moscow TASS in English 1429 GMT
3 Sep 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Sosnovskiy]

[Text] Bonn September 3 TASS—FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher will arrive in Moscow on September 9 to attend the CSCE conference on human dimension that opens on September 10.

The TASS correspondent received confirmation of that report at the German Foreign Ministry.

Pankin Sends Message to Nonaligned Movement Meeting

*LD0309191391 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0927 GMT 3 Sep 91*

[Text] Moscow, 3 Sep (TASS)—USSR Foreign Minister Boris Pankin today congratulated the participants in the Nonaligned Movement's conference of foreign ministers, which is meeting in Accra, on the 30th anniversary of that organization.

In his message, the Soviet minister expressed the conviction that the Nonaligned Movement's ministerial forum will make a substantial contribution to the further enhancement of the organization's role in international affairs and will promote the combining of efforts by all states to strengthen peace and to shape a comprehensive system of security and cooperation in all spheres.

For its part, says Boris Pankin's message, the Soviet Union is willing to deepen constructive interaction with the Nonaligned Movement and engage in joint action through the UN's universal mechanisms in the interests of a better future for civilization on earth.

Israeli Transport Minister on Improving Ties With USSR

*PM1908115691 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
19 Aug 91 Second Edition p 6*

[Interview with Israeli Transport Minister M. Qatzav by unnamed PRAVDA correspondent during visit to Soviet Union "last week"—precise date, place not stated: "Relations Have Improved"]

[Text] Israeli Transport Minister M. Qatzav last week paid a visit to the Soviet Union, where he held business meetings with USSR Minister of Civil Aviation B.Ye. Panyukov and other Soviet colleagues.

Mr. Qatzav answered a PRAVDA correspondent's questions.

[PRAVDA] How fruitful have your talks with Soviet colleagues been?

[Qatzav] I am satisfied with the first practical agreement at ministerial, that is, government level (this is the memorandum with the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation), and I believe that the implementation of this agreement will open a new period in Soviet-Israeli cooperation. I hope that the time is close when diplomatic relations will be restored between us, and although this has not yet happened, the growing business ties between the USSR and Israel indicate convincingly that our relations are better than ever before.

[PRAVDA] What avenues of economic cooperation between the two countries look most promising? What would it be desirable to do to enrich mutually advantageous business ties?

[Qatzav] Experience offers practical answers. Our peoples' needs, our countries' requirements—there is the source of expanding cooperation. Both our countries are interested in better serving our countries' interests, people's interests. The opening up of markets and support for free, bold initiatives could produce very good results. I know that many private enterprises in Israel are very, very interested in establishing close business ties with potential Soviet partners. I am convinced that many Soviet enterprises will find splendid opportunities in Israel for improving, expanding, and increasing business contacts in various spheres. We now have firm ties—cultural, scientific, in the spheres of education and transport. But that is not enough. The economic potential of mutual cooperation is great, and we are, of course, far from using it 100 percent.

[PRAVDA] What do you think, in broader terms, about the prospects for Soviet-Israeli relations and the possibility of an all-embracing Near East settlement?

[Qatzav] First of all, I want to repeat what I said to my Soviet interlocutors, in particular Minister Panyukov. Israel will never forget the Soviet Government's support in 1948 for the UN decision on granting independence to the Jewish state. For us this was a turning point, a historic decision. We believe that the Soviet leadership adheres to a very serious, responsible stance. Unfortunately, until

recently the Soviet Government was unable to make an appropriate contribution to the Near East settlement process. Diplomatic relations do not exist between us. But I believe that if the Soviet Union uses its prestige in the Arab countries, that could open a window of opportunity in the conflict between Israel and our Arab neighbors.

We are extremely interested in the conclusion of peace treaties between Israel and Syria, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Lebanon. In my opinion the compromise formula should be based on several principles. First and most important is to deliver Israel from the sense of danger and ensure its security. Second is to grant the Palestinians the opportunity freely to organize their own life within a framework of complete autonomy. And I mean complete. And third is to open borders, establish good relations, and promote tourism, trade, and links in the sphere of culture, education, and other areas. That would be good for all the Near East countries and would have a substantial effect on people's living standard and prosperity.

U.S. Terms for Aid to USSR Eyed

*91UF1108A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Aug 91
Union edition p 4*

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent A. Shalnev, New York: "There Will Be Credits if There Is Economic Reform"]

[Text] United States Secretary of State James Baker issued a statement on Sunday from which it follows that Washington is ready to assist the Soviet Union without waiting until Moscow adopts measures for the realization of economic reform.

In an interview on the ABC Television Network program "This Week with David Brinkley," the secretary of state made us to understand that the primary criterion is the Soviet Union's resolve to carry out reform and that USSR Supreme Soviet approval of a concrete, specific plan of action may become a demonstration of this resolve.

In J. Baker's words, "the pace of political reform is obviously exceeding the pace of economic reform but we are extremely inspired by some of those appointments that occurred last week to the committee which will be involved with the issue of reform in the economy. As soon as we see the Soviet people's precise adherence to the cause of advancing reform, we will be able to do more (in the context of rendering assistance—A.Sh.), in all honesty, I believe in this resolve but what is required is a specific plan to which everyone adheres."

While talking about aid, the foreign policy department head had in mind, as I understand it, not only humanitarian aid which will be called upon to smooth over the acuteness of the very serious food crisis in the USSR. Baker said, "We will not allow people to starve." The secretary of state talked about aid on an incomparably greater scale that is specifically directed at balancing the balance of payments and creating a stabilizing fund that is necessary to transform the ruble into a convertible currency.

Now American economists and politicians have once again begun to talk about precisely this type of aid. They are naming a specific figure—\$25 billion per year. The United States's share should total nearly \$3 billion.

The fact that Washington is already no longer insisting on specific actions as a condition for assistance but is talking only about the demonstration of resolve—this is certainly a serious step forward. It seems to me that to an enormous degree it is dictated by the well-founded fear that the approaching winter will turn into anarchy, chaos, and social unrest. "We must not permit that," says Richard Gephardt, Democratic majority leader in the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress.

However, it would be naive to think that there is unanimity with regard to further steps in those American institutions of political power where decisions of this type are made. That same Gephardt in a CNN Television Network interview on Sunday insisted on Moscow's specific reform measures in contrast to the secretary of state. Senator Robert Dole, Republican minority leader in the upper chamber of Congress, also spoke about the fact that there should not be aid "until reform progresses further." By "progress," he specifically meant certain foreign policy measures, primarily, termination of Soviet aid to Cuba.

It seems that Senator Dole and those Washington politicians who occupy similar positions were satisfied with the statement that Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev made on the "This Week with David Brinkley" program. He stressed that one of our priority tasks is "fundamental change of the Soviet Union's foreign policy, in order to thereby openly admit that the Western democrats are our best friends" as the events of the past week have shown.

The minister advocated that the West grant humanitarian aid to our country but stressed that in contrast to the aid that was sent last year, right now "mechanisms and forces that are actually capable of reform must be" the channels for its realization. A. Kozyrev noted the importance of the fact that the procedures for rendering aid be "open and subject to inspection. We request that you render assistance through channels that are jointly controlled by democratic institutions in the West and in Russia and in the other republics."

If we talk about whether America, which is undergoing far from the best economic times right now, can permit itself to help the Soviet Union, there is absolutely no unanimity among politicians or among experts. Some say categorically: the federal administration, which has been compelled to refuse money to the American states, simply does not have any available resources. But they foresee, others object: as Senator Dole thinks, \$3 billion may be extracted from United States military budget reductions.

Things are really difficult with federal government money but how is it in the private sector? Secretary of State Baker's opinion: "We as before do not know in whose hands economic power rests in the USSR. It seems to me that we will witness the devolution of this power and its

transfer to the republics. We will encourage this process. And as soon as it occurs, private business will be ready to invest money in the Soviet Union."

The anticipated devolution of power causes not only satisfaction but also concern in America. It is not rare these days to hear comments on this score that accelerated decentralization, multiplied by very serious economic difficulties which, in the words of an ABC Television Network commentator, "are worse than during the time of the Great Depression in America," can turn out to be the emergence of a situation similar to the current situation in Yugoslavia: This is first of all and second of all: the question is also being actively raised about in whose hands the nuclear arsenals are. "Nuclear weapons security causes concern in our country," says Senator Dole, while stressing that there is "a need for some sort of central government—for defense functions."

Concern about the Soviet Union's excessively high rate of disintegration and the emergence of accompanying problems may be one of the reasons why the Washington administration is still refusing to do what the European states are already doing—recognize the independence of the Baltic republics and establish diplomatic relations with them.

But it seems to me that the Bush Administration will do what the politicians and society are increasingly insistently demanding that it do in the next few weeks—it will recognize the independence and secession of the Baltic republics from the Soviet Union. Judging by everything, Washington is now waiting first of all for Gorbachev himself to recognize the independence of these republics: Bush would not want to inflict one more crushing blow on the man whom he considers to be his personal friend and for whom he feels quite a bit of empathy and respect.

France's Dumas on Economic Aid, Relations with USSR

91UF1108B Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 27 Aug 91
Union edition p 4

[Article by *IZVESTIYA* Correspondent Yu. Kovalenko, Paris: "Immediate Assistance and Without any Conditions"]

[Text] The August revolution in the Soviet Union caused an earthquake of unprecedented force, as a result of which not only the Communist system, but also the Party, ideology, and even the very "house named the USSR" collapsed.... This is how the Paris press assesses the events in our country.

Commentators note that the decline of the Soviet Union, which you already cannot glue back together using any sort of new treaty, may plunge the former superpower into nightmarish chaos and have catastrophic consequences for the entire world.

This is the end of an entire period in history, stated Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas in an interview: existing structures in the state are collapsing and

a vacuum is being formed as a result. In the minister's opinion, two real political figures exist under these conditions—M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin, who must cooperate in the interests of the state.

Paris's approach to the Soviet Union, which until recently emphasized the need to preserve its territorial integrity, is undergoing substantial changes as events develop. So, France, stressed R. Dumas, which has never recognized the annexation of the three Baltic republics, intends to recognize them, establish diplomatic relations with them, and even advocate the acceptance of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the UN. Paris is sending its emissaries to the Baltic republics for this purpose. However, it would like to coordinate its actions with the other EC [European Community] member-states beforehand.

On the banks of the Seine, they are insistently proposing to their Western allies that they develop a "new approach" to the question of rendering assistance to Moscow. In contrast to the United States, France insists that this aid must be granted immediately without any conditions and should not in any way be linked to the process of carrying out reform. An urgent plan of action is needed, stressed R. Dumas, that would provide for, on the one hand, replenishing stores with food products and necessities and, on the other hand, the creation of new economic structures.

Such a plan, noted the foreign affairs minister, must consider the new realities and provide for rendering assistance both at the union and at the republic levels. R. Dumas favors the development of a special reform program for Russia by the West.

While analyzing the situation in the Soviet Union, the newspaper *LE MONDE* proclaims the "end of Communism" in our country which signifies both the death of ideology and the disappearance of the Party which held the country's entire life and its citizens under its control.

Today *perestroika*, whose task consisted of transforming the existing system, has lost any meaning, stresses the magazine *ZHURNAL DU DIMANCHE*. At the present time when a new moment has arrived in the country's history and when communism as a whole has been rejected, *perestroika* has already been deprived of any goal, serves no one, and only causes suspicion. Therefore, it is doomed to die its own death. But what will arrive to replace it?—the magazine poses the question.

Events in the USSR will have an enormous impact on the communist movement in the entire world, will strengthen the crisis that the communist parties are going through, and will further weaken their parliamentary positions. In France, a group of prominent CPF [French Communist Party] figures, including three former ministers who are in the opposition with regard to the current leadership of the communist party, condemned their position during the attempted putsch in Moscow and demanded that the Party Central Committee be convened. Some CPF figures have demanded the resignation of CPF General Secretary G. Marchais.

Japanese Reactions to Coup, Soviet Aid

91UF1108C Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
27 Aug 91 Union edition p 4

[Article by *IZVESTIYA* Correspondent S. Agafonov, Tokyo: "The Japanese Will not Give Money" to Either Gorbachev or Yeltsin"]

[Text] A week has passed since the initiation of the failed coup but the three days of the apparat revolt and the grandiose consequences of its failure as before are not leaving the front pages of local newspapers and take up quite a bit of time on television screens. And appeals to extract lessons from what occurred this past week are just as popular here as they are in the Soviet Union. Just what are these lessons for the Japanese?

If we digress from the official wording of the Japanese government's position, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs commentaries to it, several factors are becoming obvious for the majority of serious commentators and specialists who have the capability to influence public opinion. First of all, recognition of the fact that the "Gorbachev Era" has ended in the Soviet Union. The USSR President's belated decision to quit his post as CPSU General Secretary and his appeals to disband the ruling Party structures were perceived without ecstasy as a forced (if not dictated) political maneuver that was made clumsy by its frontal direction. In the opinions of a number of serious analysts, President Gorbachev, while locked up in a dacha in the Crimea, turned out to be the victim of General Secretary Gorbachev, who bears political responsibility for everything that occurred during the period of the putsch. It is also being noted that the coup's failure is not the automatic "restoration of Gorbachev" but the emergence of a qualitatively different situation in which neither the initiative nor the deciding voice in drawing up political decisions belongs to the "father of *perestroika*."

The next factor upon which emphasis is being placed during the analysis of the situation in our country is recognition of the fact that the process of disintegration of the USSR has shifted from the sphere of theory in its previous form to the phase of "active practice." The coup not only struck leading personnel at the union level—it discredited the very concept of the "Center" and all the symbols of central power, including the President. In the opinion of Japanese Sovietologists, here the resuscitation of former structures is simply impossible and maybe that is precisely why official Tokyo, which is usually slow to make decisions, has already recognized the independence of the Baltic states. In this regard, it makes sense to note one more nuance—if prior to the putsch, they were discussing the question of whether or not to extend credits and aid "to Gorbachev," now—they are discussing not extending credits and aid to "either Gorbachev or Yeltsin." In today's understanding, the USSR is rapidly losing "state integrity" and it is unclear to anyone at the time being how local "sovereign leaders" will get along with their acquired

freedom. Specifically, there are many fears concerning whether they will erect new monuments to replace the ones being torn down and if the process of settling scores with history will become an element to which it is not worthwhile to feed credits.

Maybe that is why the Japanese are discussing our weak points while being in the favorable position of an outside observer and it is more obvious to them while things are not totally clear to us—that the failure of the putsch does not represent the ultimate victory of democracy over totalitarianism and does not provide guarantees that henceforth new attempts to encroach upon constitutional structures have been excluded. These guarantees provide not so much the legal formation of democratic institutions as economic stabilization and social protection. The severity of the USSR's economic situation commits the future new leaders to unpopular decisions of which there will be many and their consequences will be dragged out for an extended period of time. Will public harmony be preserved for that time? Many in Japan define this as the key issue.

On the whole in their assessments of the situation in the USSR, the Japanese are not taking the risk of long-term predictions while justifiably thinking that the primary changes still lie ahead and none of our numerous presidents knows what they will be. We can end with this but we still need to talk about the latest news of the "Soviet colony" albeit briefly—the Partkom's parting session took place today; it has ceased its activities in Soviet institutions in Japan. That is how things are.

Western Aid Could Benefit Reform Process

*LD0109074291 Berlin ADN in German 0556 GMT
1 Sep 91*

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—In the view of Vladimir Fedorov, deputy foreign minister of the Russian Federation, financial aid from the West would no longer fall into a bottomless pit. It would now benefit the process of reform in the Soviet Union, Fedorov told ADN in Bonn. It is a matter of raising people's standard of living as quickly as possible. Democracy cannot survive in a hungry country. Fedorov said he also told Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher this. He described expanding the infrastructure in agriculture and industry quickly as one of the most important tasks. However, this is not possible without German aid. The Soviet Union would have a "very hard time" anyway without aid from Germany.

Fedorov suggested jointly considering where the money could be most effectively used. This could take place at both union and republican levels. At the same time he called for strict controls on the use of the money.

The Russian deputy foreign minister also made it clear that the Soviet republics should not be regarded as "poor relations". "We need help now, but we are not beggars," he said.

Fedorov conceded that the loans given hitherto had merely served to maintain the old command system. Fears that the money would be wasted are unfounded. Now "the forces who have won know that there is no turning back." It is now a matter of constructing a system comparable with the West, Fedorov said.

Bush Policy Toward USSR Assessed

*91UF1134A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 Aug 91 p 4*

[Article by Tatyana Zhdanova and Mikhail Kozhokin of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute: "Postdeterrence—Bush's Soviet Doctrine: Professionalism and Pragmatism"]

[Text] The treaty on strategic offensive arms has pushed into the background more general problems of the bilateral relations of the USSR and the United States. The celebratory and laudatory words concerning the historic event have eclipsed fundamental changes in the Bush administration's approach to the Union—a union of how many states and of what kind it is not known.

The historical era of the policy of deterrence is over, and it has come to be replaced by postdeterrence.

The basis of this doctrine is support for reforms in the USSR geared to the establishment in Soviet society of a market economy and the democratic principles and values of Western civilization. An absolute majority of American politicians shares the proposition concerning the relationship of democracy and a peaceable foreign policy and the unlikelihood of wars between states with a democratic form of government. Whatever the case, the Western democracies have not engaged in direct armed operations against one another since World War I.

The political class of the United States as a whole is not apprehensive about an inordinate military strengthening of the USSR as a result of economic transformations: under the conditions of the high interdependence of the economy and policy characteristic of Soviet society liberalization in one sphere could not fail to entail liberalization in the other. The result should be the greater predictability of the USSR's actions in the international arena.

The systemic rearrangement of the Soviet Union will limit its assertiveness in international affairs in the coming decades. Having changed internally, the Soviet Union will be a long time getting used to the new rules of the interaction of civilized states in the international arena. At the same time, however, the return of the Soviet state to within its own province will inevitably be accompanied by a new quest for an external enemy, not now under the flag of communism but to the slogan of defense of the exclusiveness of its historical destiny.

Postdeterrence takes account of the new quality of interdependence between the United States and the USSR: The USSR is ceasing to exist as a great power, but remains part of the international system.

The USSR has simply lost on the scale of the United States' foreign policy priorities the place of partner-adversary in the global game for two. Under no circumstances does the United States wish to be directly involved in the internal conflicts of the Soviet Union but the events on one-sixth of the earth are of such great significance for the world that the United States is not in a position to

"wash its hands" and retreat to the sidelines. Postdeterrence combines within it an attempt to secure for itself if only elementary levers of influence on the process of disintegration of the empire with an endeavor to lay the foundations of new relations with what comes to replace the USSR.

Back in the summer of 1990, the G. Bush administration made the decision to diversify its policy in respect to the USSR. This was recorded publicly in a statement by U.S. Secretary of State Baker concerning the White House's plans to establish contact with the opposition to the central leadership. The process of diversification of relations has progressed in two directions—horizontally and vertically.

The horizontal section is formed by relations with the republics. In the new approaches of the U.S. Administration priority is assigned to the republics which are asserting their independence or themselves pursuing internal democratization at the republic level. Economic and technical assistance to the Soviet Union is being reoriented accordingly away from the center to the republics, and the direct investments of American private companies is being encouraged.

Policy is differentiated distinctly by region. A particular place is occupied by the Baltic republics. The United States has never recognized the legitimacy of the Baltic's entry into the Soviet Union, but this question had not for many years been on the agenda of Soviet-American relations. The intention to secede from the USSR declared by the freely elected parliaments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia combined with the extremely short-sighted policy of the center has pushed Washington in the direction of a more assertive position. A decision to raise the question of the independence of the Baltic states to the level of an international problem is, by all accounts, maturing in the U.S. Administration.

But the center of gravity in the United States' relations with the republics of the USSR is already distinctly shifting to Russia. The majority of American analysts believe that, even given the disintegration of the USSR, a union of Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan will exist and that Russia will preserve its leadership therein. The Americans are now trying to establish the best possible relations with Russia, while affording no pretext for charges that it is assisting the disintegration of the USSR. And it was by no means fortuitous that Boris Yeltsin's visit to the United States was formalized—for the first time in the history of the republics of the USSR—as the visit of a head of government of a sovereign state.

The problems of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia occupy a peripheral place as yet in Washington's current policy: one region harbors the threat of a new "Lebanese option," in the second, a most complex set of problems of Islamic fundamentalism is emerging distinctly. The United States is afraid as yet to open another Pandora's box obviously containing a further source of international instability.

Diversification vertically is being exercised by means of "multilevel diplomacy," when relations with the new

public movements and political parties in the Soviet Union are being established not only by the embassy and officials but also former presidents, AFL-CIO unions and various public organizations and foundations. The purpose of these contacts is, while "keeping a finger on the pulse" of public life in the Soviet Union, to have a working relationship with all who are capable of playing an essential part in the political transformation of the USSR, in whatever direction it proceeds. The blunders of American postwar policy in China, when Washington deprived itself of freedom of maneuver, gambling exclusively on one man—Chiang Kai Shek—are remembered very well in the United States.

Postdeterrence is a policy of professionalism and pragmatism. The United States is doing everything to prepare itself for any changes in the structures of power in the USSR, be they the victory of the democrats or the triumph of the conservatives. But White House strategy will, in any event, be geared to assisting, within the framework of what is possible, the consolidation of the democratic transformations which have been achieved.

A change on the agenda of Soviet-American relations has become an integral part of the policy of postdeterrence. Questions of arms control are becoming part of a broader set of problems of international security.

The tasks of the building of a new system of international security are revealing extensive opportunities for the cooperation of the USSR and the United States in the sphere of combating the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and other types of weapon of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and limitation of the arms trade. After all, the Soviet Union is, as before, one of the biggest arms traders in the world.

The U.S. Administration also has an interest in cooperation with the Soviet Union in the solution of regional conflicts with their roots in the era of the global opposition of the two superpowers. The USSR's effective cooperation with the West in this sphere is for the United States the most important indicator of the absence in the Soviet Union of aggressive foreign policy aspirations. It is a question merely of the full association of the USSR with the discussion of regional problems in the United Nations and its abandonment of the tactic of obstruction of all proposals emanating from the opposite side.

Postdeterrence has done away with the open confrontation in the relations of the USSR and the United States. The alternatives facing the Soviet Union are very simple: to withdraw into itself and accord each proposal of the stronger party a hostile reception or build itself into the common channel of world politics, choosing between Asian and European traditions here. The second version signifies recognition of the United States' role of leader of the modern world. These words now grate on the hearing and demean the national pride of many people. But the world at the end of the 20th century is different, and increasingly less dramatic significance is attached therein to division into "leaders" and "outsiders." The main thing

for each nation is finding its own path toward stability, prosperity and harmonious development.

NEWSWEEK Cited on CIA Coup Prediction

91UF1134B Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 28 Aug 91
Union Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent A. Shalnev: "In Politics You Cannot Rely on One Man": The CIA Predicted a Coup d'Etat in the USSR on 17 August"]

[Text] New York—On 17 August, the day before the attempted coup d'etat in the Soviet Union, the U.S. CIA predicted that "Kremlin conservatives are ready to move against President Gorbachev."

According to information of the weekly NEWSWEEK, the prediction was made in the weekly summary of news and analytical material which the department in Langley prepares for distribution among the highest figures of the administration. But, the magazine goes on, "as long as there were no tanks on the streets of Moscow, the White House and the State Department argued that Gorbachev was capable of handling any challenge that came his way.... The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research insisted that Gorbachev was secure."

The readiness of the White House and State Department to airily brush aside the CIA forecasts is explained by at least two factors: First, the fact that CIA had for at least a year regularly been predicting the possibility of Gorbachev's removal from office, and for this reason the administration officials whose status authorizes their familiarization with intelligence summaries and who, by virtue of this same status, participate most directly in the formulation of the foreign policy decisions of the White House had become so accustomed to these forecasts that they had ceased to take note of them.

And, second, Bush himself, according to NEWSWEEK, perceived all these predictions through the prism of his personal devotion to Gorbachev. In its highest echelons, with the rarest exceptions, Defense Secretary Cheney and Vice President Quayle, for example, the administration was not prepared and was reluctant to believe that the man around whom Washington's Soviet policy had in fact been built could one day find himself out of a job.

Now, it would seem, a similar process is starting to mature in the depths of the administration: Quite manifestly, although gradually, the White House, reorienting itself from Gorbachev toward Yeltsin, once again intends putting the emphasis on an individual, a specific person. There are many American observers who, having spotted this trend, are already warning about its flaws. The basis, they say, of the new American policy in respect to the Soviet Union—or in respect to what remains of the Soviet Union—should be primarily principles. And who realizes and implements these principles is immaterial. This thought was expressed by, *inter alia*, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, with whom I had an opportunity to talk briefly a few days ago.

The former secretary of state is one of very many American political scientists and politicians who have already supplemented—or replaced even—the euphoria which arose after the failure of the coup with a more pragmatic—and for this reason, most likely, somewhat skeptical—vision of how the situation is developing in our country. A further skeptic is Admiral William Crowe, former chairman of the chiefs of staff. He was asked last Monday on ABC's "Good Morning, America!" program to comment on the plans for the radical—80 percent—replacement of the top command personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. Is it possible, the admiral was asked, to ensure the power and credibility of the military given an 80 percent change in its leadership?

Admiral Crowe: Very difficult—there is a precedent in Russian history, incidentally, when, in the Stalin times, the military leadership was purged. The Soviet Union paid dearly for this in '41....

And one further basket, as we will call it, of skepticism: It is being expressed in connection with the pace of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Condoleezza Rice, who in the first years of the Bush administration was in charge of the Soviet Desk in the White House's National Security Council, believes that not all the republics which are currently seceding from the USSR can be viable, from the economic standpoint, independent state formations inasmuch as they have for many decades been most closely connected with the rest of the country.

It is perfectly obvious that the secession of republics from the USSR is only the first step of a highly complex process, which presupposes also the creation of particular power structures qualitatively different from those which existed earlier. And the stage of the creation of these structures could, a commentator of NBC television believes, in the short term "result in mass chaos." It is this which is the primary fear of American investors, who are preferring to wait for the chaos to subside and for stability to set in. But there then arises the question: Will there not be something akin to a vicious circle—chaos prevents investments from America, without which the process of acquiring genuine independence and the process of the establishment of the new authorities will be made extraordinarily complex.

The WALL STREET JOURNAL, referring not only to the breakaway republics but also the remaining Soviet Union, writes, "Much will depend on whether the political leaders can avoid anarchy and ensure the rapid transition to the new power structure which will fill the vacuum formed as a result of the collapse of the Communist Party." "If," the newspaper continues, "this is successful, the foiled conspiracy could be the catalyst of a transformation far more rapid than many people might imagine. If, on the other hand, the political leaders cannot accomplish this, and this is a probability, economic and political chaos and, it cannot be ruled out, one further attempt to seize power by the supporters of a hard line may be anticipated."

I am almost sure that one of the daily intelligence summaries which the CIA prepares for the top officials of the Washington administration contains such a forecast. Fear

of chaos is one further reason, it would seem, why Washington is not yet prepared to follow the example of a number of European countries and proclaim ultimate recognition of the independence of the Baltic republics. Circles close to the White House are making it understood that they would like to avoid a situation where recognition of the Baltics creates a precedent by reference to which the recognition of other republics, the Ukraine primarily, would be demanded of the White House. Washington is, understandably, simply not yet prepared for this.

Baker Comment on Russia's 1933 Borders Hit

91UF1138A Moscow GOLOS in Russian No 33,
1 Sep 91 p 5

[Article by Vitaliy Pyrkh: "Friends and Foes"; or, "How Modern Political Processes are Seen from Far-Off Siberia"]

[Text] KRASNOYARSK. Once again, the borders on the west and east are cut off—as if in the history of the 20th Century there had been no great and devastating war; as if the signatures of American Presidents on normative documents which determined the course of world history after Teheran, Yalta and Potstdam, count for nothing!

"Within the 1933 borders"—means that not only the Baltic Littoral, which our American "friends" have always striven to separate from the territory of the Soviet Union, but also the western regions of the Ukraine and Belorussia, and Bessarabia which has suddenly become "disputed" territory, and significant tracts of land on the border with Finland, which must also either receive their freedom, or must go to their former owners; to this we must also add the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands....

Thus, truly, before it's too late, perhaps we should face Baker and take up our positions in a forest which has thus far been spared? Otherwise, who knows what will happen? Perhaps the soft-hearted Americans, who are so concerned about our welfare, will return the Russians to the age of buckskin money... How will we get along without Siberia, without our native Volga Basin? After all, you see, even Tatarstan is openly declaring that it never was a part of Great Russia, in its haste to please Baker.

I would like to see the face of our newly-declared American "friend," Secretary of State Baker, should our President say to him in response, "And we recognize the United States as its borders were at the beginning of the present century and not a centimeter more—less Texas and Louisiana, and the other territories which the high-handed Yankees deftly took from their neighbors as a result of wars of plunder and treachery. And as far as Alyasochka [Dear Little Alaska], as the Russian Tsars used to say, goes—we'll have to take another look..."

Incidentally, what am I going on about? Such things have taken place and are taking place on our Earth every day and every hour. In Panama, for example, or in Grenada, or in the Malvinas (Falklands) Islands. It is only our state that has until now survived the ordeal, for it was accepted as a great power. As it turns out, it is no longer taken as such... And so, will we get used to that?

And nevertheless, it was not at all for the purpose of stirring up the patriotic feelings of the Russians that I have taken up the pen. Never yet has the country been on the brink of such a precipice. But what kind of patriots would we be if we sat quietly while our great state is toppled, as our present and former "friends" are beginning to trample it down and divide it into pieces? Listen to the other "voices." There is nothing gratifying in such a picture. The last empire on Earth is ceasing to exist, but very soon manna from Heaven will begin to pour down on the Russians...

But it is for them that it is an empire; for us, however, our land—unhappy and long-suffering—is our Motherland. In the cruel and calculating modern world, you don't get anything for nothing. Even the "splendid" American war in Iraq, which television showed to us every day, even it was paid for not only by the Kuwaitis thirsting for their freedom, but also by the taxpayers of dozens of countries. But what can we count on, at a level of production and living facilities, relative to those Western specialists, of the Stone Age? For permanent charity? For continual handouts? Is it as simple as that, without rhyme or reason?

Well, it's just that no one in the world is fed...

When one delves into the history of our state, like it or not we are faced with rivers of blood, flowing across the long-suffering Russian land. As S. Soloviev affirms, from the year 800 to 1237 an armed attack on Rus took place one year in every four. What sort of people could bear this? Between 1240 and 1460 alone, the Slavs were forced to take up arms instead of the plow 200 times, in order to fend off incursions. And in a 525-year period, from 1368-1893, Russia was at war for 329 years; that is, for every two years of war there was only one year of peace.

Is that not why even now there are so few stone houses, built by the "slaves of Rome"?

Re-alignment of borders, whatever you call it, is war once again, and we must call a spade a spade. I like, for example, the position of Sakhalin "governor" Fedorov, who declared to the entire country a year-and-a-half ago, that Far-Easterners would seek the resignation of any Union government that would sell the Kurile Islands to the Japanese. And here it is not just a matter of great power ambitions! Suffice it to recall the several dozen labor transports coming from bloodshed in the unequal battle with Fascism, which were sunk by "neutral" Japan, in order to understand that the "northern territories" are not simply cliffs in the sea...

With our present-day backwardness, our terrible muddle in administration under socialism, which has driven the people into poverty, only the vast territorial space which we inherited from our forefathers is our chief and irreplaceable heritage. One may relate in various ways to the existing regime in the country, love or not love communists, believe or not believe in Christ; one thing, it goes without saying, is indisputable: parties come and go, but the Fatherland remains. And we do not have the right, having inherited such a country, to leave it to our children in fragments.

Here one has to turn once again to our ideology. How much bitterness and suffering can fall to a people's lot in one human lifetime? Even Albania, the last of our Eastern European "friends," has removed from the title of the state the symbol which has cheated and not fulfilled the hopes of the people. Even Mongolia has "darted" ahead toward a more just and more humane society. Only we are still clinging as before to our ideals, and we do not want to part with that which humanity has rejected. Are we not the wisest people on earth? Or is that now our life-long cross to bear? Well, all right; if there were a full cup at home, there would be something to defend, like in Hungary, for example, or in Czechoslovakia; but that is not so... We have lines which stretch for kilometers; our rivers are ruined; our forests cut down; and there is complete disarray in the country...

We are dying, but we will not let go of our conquests!

Come, come now! Don't be in such a hurry to die... Look how many things have accumulated in battered and bent Russia! It will take decades to return the defiled land to its past fertility, in order for a person to feel normal, firm ground beneath his feet. And how can we get along without re-evaluating the well-known right of nations to self-determination!

I don't suppose there is any bigger bombshell in the most recent Russian history, embedded in its foundation, than that one. The practical Americans excluded such a possibility for themselves right away. If you want to become a part of the United States—don't even think about ever leaving them later! The entire military machine would be cranked up to full speed! Regardless of public opinion, or the positions of other states...

But what about our situation? Whence came this huge vastness of the Russian state, which so excites the imagination, which gives no peace to our foes? Did it really come about only as a result of rapacious wars, which the Russian autocrats and Tsars waged? Hardly. Page through the history books and you will be convinced that the increase in lands came about by another route altogether. The grandiose territory of the Russian Empire came to pass to a greater degree because the freedom-loving Russian people were running away from their state, in every direction. They were running away from the injuries and oppression, from social disorder and injustice. And stockade towns sprang up on the new lands, and exile settlements, where one could be one's own master... But whenever the state found them again, they were forced to move on...

Thus it turned out that there were tens and hundreds of nations within the bounds of Russia; and no matter what they say there now about the empire which ceased to exist at the beginning of the century, the Russian Tsars knew what they were doing. In any case, in Russia there were, for example, no privileges for rich people to receive a higher education in the universities or vocational-technical schools, and representatives of dozens of the non-Great Russian nationalities have written a number of the pages of our native and world culture.

Let us not, however, idealize tsarism—the tsar held back the development of productive forces, and the intellectual emancipation of mankind. But after all, we have already been separated from the tsar for nearly a century!

However, having declared the great multinational state a “prison of nations,” those world re-builders who seized the power consciously pushed the people into a fratricidal war. And ever since then, many people have seen each other mainly through their gun-sights.

One can, of course, understand the leaders of October. With all their dreams of a worldwide brotherhood of man, they would not for one second allow any possibility for the proletariat to choose any path other than the one which they had set for the Russian people. You remember that like the catechism: The teachings of Marx are eternal, because they are true...

When you begin to delve into all these ideological capers and absurdities, you cannot help being astounded at their hypocrisy and duplicity. Well, the fact of the matter is—what kind of self-determination for Poles could one speak of if future Marshal Tukachevskiy had applied pressure and had captured Warsaw by storm as had been planned? Or how is it that Finland received her independence, while Armenia had to bid farewell to it? Was it not because there were White Guards in the north at that time, but the Caucasus was seething with desperation, just like now?

No, I cannot reproach the Russian autocracy for its limited mind. You can say what you want, but it understood full well that only in a unified state can one preserve one's natural distinctiveness. And it did not especially interfere with the lives of the nomads and the Taiga hunters... And the borders were there to defend itself only from external enemies.

But having included in the Constitution the right of each nation to create its own state, we have voluntarily doomed ourselves to the torments of Tantalus. For one will always find people whom the present order does not suit! And self-determination of nations means changing borders again. And that means—war, once again.

Well, who, for example, will “release” Kazakhstan from the Union, if a good half of its territory is a former Russian possession? Or Lithuania, the present borders of which have been drawn and redrawn by Stalin's satraps? Or the Ukraine, the eastern portion of which was “captured” from Russia without a battle—where the ancient lands of the Don Cossacks lie.

I've not even spoken of the economic side of this process yet! For decades they have been trying to persuade the Russians—to have patience for awhile yet... Look, we are restoring the backward hinterlands; we will raise them up to the Russian level, and then we will begin to live... We have begun!

However, one cannot reproach Russia for self-destruction. She toiled as best she could: both when the people perished in the ruins of the Tashkent earthquake, and when the

disaster struck at Chernobyl... She not only toiled, but helped her friends as best she could.

Not long ago western specialists made known the following conclusion: if the Soviet Union were to sell its oil to its Eastern European “friends” for currency, the treasury would receive an additional 12-15 billion rubles a year. Multiply this figure by 10, 15 or 20 years and compare the result you get with the pitiful and humiliating crumbs that all sorts of benefactors were throwing at our President during his foreign tour, and it will become clear where our Tyumen “wonder” would go, and much, much more.

And what about our “friends;” would they also be using ration cards to get soap? Not likely! “If only we had their cares,” as the saying goes...

Or take Afghanistan... For the money that our state plunked down for a decade-and-a-half in a fratricidal war, we could have not only fed and clothed our veterans, but could have given each of them a private house and automobile for free.

And so, I cannot justify the disintegration of our great state with any democratic slogans or any appeals to perestroika.

Not the right of certain nations to self-determination, right down to the creation of an independent state; but the rights of man, in their entirety, as written in the international Charter—that is what should be in our Constitution. Does it really bother the Americans to co-exist on their territory with various ethnic groups, Slavs included, the numbers of which amount to millions of people? No, not at all. This only enriches a country, and brings to it uniqueness and versatility.

All people are equal—both before the law and before their own consciences. Therefore they must also have equal rights with everyone, regardless of where they live; the right to their own culture, and to their own language. And the fact that the republics are now “running away” from the Union does not at all signify that they are running away from exploitation by the Russians. What kind of exploitation is there here? How can a southerner exploit a Siberian if the southerners trade in fruits on the Siberian market and not the other way round? Or what—to sell the Baltic nations oil from Tyumen in their markets, or Siberian timber?

No, the republics which have lost their faith are not fleeing the Russians, but the socialism which thrust itself upon them by force, by the bayonet. They are fleeing the queues, the hopelessness of their lives, and the evil which the socialist “paradise” has become...

I understand how far the disintegration of the state has come, and the kind of tragedies that yet await us on this path. The central authorities are already trying to preserve at least something from the former Union, and the “9 + 1” treaty is seen not as an achievement, but as a white flag, held up by our despairing helmsman. And a thousand-year-old country flies away to a nebulous future. Perhaps our “friends” of yesterday will come to their senses, and will follow us.

But I do not want to surround myself with imaginary "friends." I am for the restoration of our desecrated and humiliated power, which has already suffered without measure from an absurd ideology, trampled under both its own and foreign feet; a great country, in which all the nations dwelling in it could live in peace; and one which would welcome not only the 21st, but certainly the 22nd Century! After all, justice must triumph some day!

I would even propose a name for this country, which stretches from the Kuriles to the Baltic, from the cold northern icebergs to snowless and hot Kushka: a name which has been carefully removed from our memory for all these 73-odd years. And let the Lithuanians or Latvians, Georgians or Moldavians not reproach me for great-power chauvinism—to hell with chauvinism; for my father and mother have even deeper roots—being pure-blooded Ukrainians, from the Zaporozhye Cossacks...

But it is not the country that fights that grows rich, but the one that works.

Honestly, we have nothing to be ashamed of in the name, that of a country which never in its history stained it honor, the name of which is—RUSSIA.

PRAVDA on U.S. Reaction to Events in USSR

PM0309161191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Sep 91
Single Edition p 3

[Correspondent V. Linnik report: "Everything Has Gotten Mixed Up... How the United States Assesses Events in Our Country"]

[Text] New York, 2 Sep—Everything has gotten mixed up in the cascade of information about the USSR which has been raining down upon the U.S. reader and television viewer over the past two weeks: perspicacity and stupidity, sympathy and schadenfreude, restraint and overt superficiality. Not that it is difficult to single out the dominant leitmotiv. It is this: Communism is dead, the Union has passed away, and the old order has collapsed. The arrangement of these themes is most varied. The events which have occurred and are occurring in the Soviet Union are so monumental that we ourselves sometimes cannot get to the bottom of them. It is a consolation, albeit it a poor one, that the West's understanding of them is still more complex.

Without any hope of systematizing the avalanche of news in any way, I will endeavor to provide the most characteristic excerpts. Incidentally, the extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which has just ended, might have struck some of my compatriots as a protracted talking shop on inconsequential matters. But the U.S. CNN television company provided live coverage of the session sittings for five days in succession. One of this company's producers told me: "Our rating rose 25 percent thanks to the relay from the sittings. They are of far greater interest to Americans than the sittings of our own Congress."

So, what are they writing and saying? In clear contrast with the optimistic assessments of events in the USSR made by

G. Bush, U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney declared in an address to the American Political Science Association: "The euphoria following the failure of the putsch in the USSR could give way to hunger, the emergence of refugees, civil war, and the dispersal of control over Soviet nuclear weapons."

Cheney was the first in Bush's entourage to openly express doubt that the prospect of stability and economic recovery is henceforth opening up before the USSR. However, Cheney's reasons are quite transparent: He says there should be no hurry to further reduce the U.S. military budget and curtail the U.S. military presence in the world. The defense secretary's words show that the victory of the democratic forces in the USSR by no means signifies the Soviet Union's automatic inclusion in the family of civilized peoples. Many people here still speak of the USSR and the United States as "them" and "us." A difficult time is coming for the United States to part with its bipolar view of the world, the very well known U.S. political scientists J. Nye and B. McColm remark in this regard. For the past half-century the country's entire political life revolved around contrasting "capitalism and communism." But tomorrow students will enter universities for whom this division will already be history.

It is interesting, however, that Cheney's views do not differ very much from the opinion of residents of Moscow and Leningrad. USA TODAY familiarizes readers with the data of its telephone poll among the residents of these cities. Some 55 percent said that they are more concerned about their future today than they were a week before the coup. At the same time 87 percent came out firmly against the putsch and in support of democracy. Some 77 percent approve of Yeltsin's activity, and just 15 percent approve of Gorbachev's. The newspaper points out that the people of Moscow and Leningrad are more liberal in their views than the rest of the country. But even they do not give unconditional preference to a particular social system. Some 27 percent replied that capitalism is the very best system, 23 percent named socialism, and a further 27 percent said that the very best option would be a combination of both.

It seems that the business of giving the USSR economic aid is becoming increasingly complicated. How is it possible to deal with 25 leaders pulling in different directions?—G. Bush said in perplexity in this regard, meaning the news from Moscow every day on one more republic's declaration of independence. You can only sign a contract when you know who will be responsible for what, the U.S. President summed up.

"Give the Soviets in dollars what West Europe received under the Marshall plan after the war, and they will most likely spend this money on industrial goods," WASHINGTON POST commentator W. Raspberry argues in this connection. Of course, they need consumer goods, he continues. But they have still greater need of a system to encourage the production of these consumer goods. Money by itself will not bring the Russians to a market economy, he sums up.

The United States, incidentally, also differs somewhat from West Europeans in its approach to giving us financial aid because, for understandable reasons, it cannot share their fears in the face of a massive influx of Soviet refugees in the event of a sharp deterioration in the economic situation in the USSR. It is significant that in this, too, the U.S. position is not very different from the opinion of Moscow and Leningrad residents. According to the data of the aforementioned poll, just 16 percent prefer financial aid to technological.

R. Gephardt, leader of the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives, expresses himself very definitely: "The economic situation today, a week after the coup, is, to all appearances, worse than it was a week before it. In giving humanitarian assistance, it is important for Washington to show the Soviet people who were fighting for freedom that their courage will be rewarded... But our slogan must be 'rewards only on results.' Aid must be tied to political and economic reforms in the USSR." Congressman L. Aspin's proposal to grant the USSR \$1 billion by means of a reduction in the Pentagon budget has been rejected as "frivolous." "We ourselves have somewhere to spend this money"—this is the general purport of the objections to this idea.

It is natural that the question of control over nuclear weapons (and there are 27,000 nuclear warheads at the USSR's disposal) is a topic of the greatest concern to the U.S. authorities and mass media nowadays. Whereas the question of control over strategic nuclear forces will, to all appearances, be resolved, so people here believe, the far more involved problem of tactical nuclear weapons remains.

The first issues of U.S. magazines since the failure of the putsch have come out with B.N. Yeltsin's portrait on the cover. Yeltsin is a courageous man who has managed, moreover, to impart to Russian nationalism the hue of the movement for democracy, television commentators argued in a recent broadcast. Will he be able to govern the country as well as he behaved on the barricades during the days of the putsch?—people here are asking. The enthusiastic commentaries of the first victorious days after the triumph of democratic forces in the USSR are gradually being replaced by an analysis of the new Russian leadership's first steps.

To what extent can the democrats in the USSR be considered democrats if it is now safer to be a Communist in America than in the Soviet Union?—THE NEW YORK TIMES asks. The press and television are reporting the rapid growth in the number of all kinds of commissions to investigate the putschists' support at all levels, the bans on the CPSU's activity, the appointment of plenipotentiary "commissars" to Russia's krays and oblasts with extraordinary but very vague constitutional powers, and searches of Communists' homes. CNN has shown the telephone number reported by Russian television to inform the authorities of what neighbors did during the putsch. "How can this fact," a correspondent asked, "be reconciled with the promises of new KGB head Bakatin not to allow any more informing?"

A lot of material has been devoted to the week-long ban on our newspaper's publication. The correspondent's center has received innumerable calls during these days from friends, acquaintances, and strangers expressing support, sympathy, and indignation at this action. However, I do not wish to reduce the U.S. reaction just to these feelings. "PRAVDA's present grumbling about victimization of civil rights in the Soviet Union may be considered the height of hypocrisy," the well known conservative reviewer R. Novak told me in a joint television appearance. "PRAVDA supported the repressive regime in the Soviet Union for decades. It cannot complain now." Nevertheless, the prevailing assessments are different. Reprisals against Communists on the part of former Communists seem to be gathering momentum in the USSR—this is the conclusion drawn by THE NEW YORK TIMES. This tactic, the newspaper believes, increases the likelihood of civil war being unleashed in the USSR.

U.S. 'Torn' Over Response to Changes in USSR
PM0509154391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Sep 91
Single Edition p 3

[V. Linnik report: "Where Will They Find a Yardstick—or Will the United States Be Left Without a Rival in the Military Sphere?"]

[Text] New York—The shift of power in the Soviet Union presents the United States with a fundamental choice in the sphere of ideology and defense policy. This is the conclusion toward which official circles and an increasing number of commentators and political experts have inclined in recent days.

The fear of communism and the Kremlin has affected all aspects of American life—literature, theater, cinema, television, and the everyday life of ordinary people. For decades the USSR was for the United States the yardstick whereby Americans measured their successes and failures and defined their place in the world. THE NEW YORK TIMES notes that anticomunism was the unifying force of the modern conservative coalition, which regularly sent Republicans to the White House. Now all this is history.

B. Makkolm [name as transliterated], one of the leaders of the "Freedom House" organization, notes: "There has been a collapse of ideology. The United States no longer has a true religion which you must either profess or, if you refuse to do so, risk excommunication." The liberation of the intellectual climate in America will be extremely salutary. "For someone who grew up in the Cold War years, it is hard to imagine a world which is no longer divided into two blocs," E. Foner, eminent historian from Columbia University, notes with wonder and perplexity. For years arguments have raged in Western intellectual circles over which is better—Western-style political democracy, or the socioeconomic democracy which was the basis of the socialist states' experience. On this score V. Navasky, editor of the weekly NATION, says: "The fact that Soviet totalitarianism proved a disaster does not mean that economic democracy is no longer of any value."

So what are the first conclusions from the monumental changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union? E. Rosenthal notes that the coup in Moscow immediately complicated the central task of American foreign policy over the last two years, which has been to preserve American influence in Western Europe. "It was already difficult to do this after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact," one administration staffer admitted. "Now it will be even more complex to do this."

All the indications are that the administration is torn between the idealistic and pragmatic dimensions of its foreign policy with regard to the USSR. The idealistic dimension necessitates support for the movement for national self-determination on USSR territory, while the practical interests of the United States inspire a wish for the center to retain military and economic control.

How will people here answer all these difficult questions which are emerging more swiftly than answers can be found to them? The immediate future will show.

Poll of Americans' Views of USSR Cited

*PM0509114391 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Sep 91 p 7*

[TASS report: "No Return to Communism"]

[Text] "The dramatic events in the Soviet Union have put an end to the fear of communism which has determined political life in the United States for the past 75 years." Those are the conclusions of a public opinion poll conducted by THE WASHINGTON POST.

As a whole the poll and subsequent interviews give grounds for believing that the Americans' opinions of the Soviet Union and international communism have undergone a profound change in just the few past years. Some 10 years ago 72 percent of Americans viewed the USSR as the country presenting the greatest threat to peace. In the recent poll 25 percent stated that they support that opinion. Moreover, the majority of Americans believe that the democratic transformations now taking place in the Soviet Union are irreversible. Some 63 percent of those polled stated that there is a negligible danger or no danger at all that the USSR may return to the "former conservative communism."

Assessing the actions of President George Bush with regard to the events in the USSR, 76 percent of those polled stated their support for the course of the head of the administration and only 15 percent stated their disagreement with his approach.

Finland Receives Apology For Washed-Up Ammunition Crates

PM2808092391 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
15 Aug 91 Union Edition p 2

[Yevgeniy Solomenko report under "Direct Line" rubric: "What Was there Has Been Washed Up"]

[Text] Leningrad—Our Finnish neighbors have received presents from the sailors of the Leningrad Naval Base about which they are none too happy.

Some 64 wooden crates have been washed up on the shores of the land of Suomi. Several of them turned out to contain artillery shell firing mechanisms—and although they were obsolete, they were still lethally dangerous. A Leningrad Naval Base representative made an official apology to the Finnish Consul General in Leningrad, Markus Lyra, and assured him that this would not happen again and that the culprits would be punished.

How on earth did such an emergency come about? The Leningrad sailors should have destroyed the obsolete, decommissioned ammunition. It was deemed to be dangerous to destroy it on shore. But the crew, when carrying out an order to jettison the ammunition in our territorial waters, violated an official instruction: The firing mechanisms should have been jettisoned without the crates. As a result, part of the dangerous cargo did not sink and was washed up on a neighboring state's shores.

As a result of talks conducted in recent days an accord has been reached—Finnish border guards will hand over the dangerous "parcels" to their senders, and the Soviet sailors will destroy the ammunition in the agreed manner this time.

French Delegation Tells Sharin of 'Alarm' at Coup

PM0209150791 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian 21 Aug 91 First Edition p 3

[Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin report: "Meeting with French Parliamentarians"]

[Text] A delegation of the French National Assembly Defense and Armed Forces Commission has been in Moscow on a working visit since 19 August. That evening the French guests met with Soviet parliamentarians in the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee.

Mr. J.-M. Boucheron, delegation head, pointed out that the events now taking place in the Soviet Union cannot fail to arouse definite alarm in the delegation members, but they believe that a dialogue is necessary in any situations, both in the USSR and in Western countries.

L. Sharin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee, informed his colleagues from France that USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Lukyanov had passed to the committee a package of documents connected with the announcement of a state of emergency

in the country for examination on the subject of their legality. It is proposed to submit the findings within a three-day period.

Then there was a dialogue on questions of a defense nature. The Soviet side pointed out, in particular, that the USSR's steps aimed at easing military tension in Europe are accompanied by a dangerous buildup of the NATO bloc's forces. Mr. J.-M. Boucheron emphasized that France was and still is opposed to any NATO interference in intra-European affairs.

Great attention was devoted to the course of conversion in the Soviet Union during the conversation.

The French delegation's visit will continue through 26 August.

Rome Charge Defends Actions During Coup

91UF1110A Moscow *TRUD* in Russian 28 Aug 91 p 3

[Article by *TRUD* correspondent P. Negoitsa: "The Position Was: Rejection of the Coup"]

[Text] Rome—The coup did not make heroes out of Soviet people working in Italy. But their civic position did not leave them during those days which were so difficult for the country.

"One can," USSR Charge d'Affairs in Italy Feliks Stanevskiy told your correspondent, "criticize oneself and analyze what else could have been done to help democratic forces at that critical moment. But the fact remains: As early as 19 August the position of workers at the Soviet Embassy in Rome was clearly defined—the documents of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] which came from Moscow were not to be distributed in Italy, they were not to be discussed in interviews, and no comments were to be made regarding the idea that USSR foreign policy was supposedly unchanged, as the putschists who seized power had declared. This was a manifestation of our refusal to accept the military coup."

True, there were exceptions. The Soviet consul in Genoa actually supported the "eight" conspirators and shared their intention to "bring order into the country." One had to see the reaction of the Genoese, especially the representatives of the city divisions of the largest trade unions in Italy, the CGIL [General Italian Confederation of Labor], CISL [Italian Confederation of Trade Unions of Workers], and the UIL [Italian Union of Labor], which sent the consulate a strong protest and, along with other organizations, managed to get the "iron consul" sent back to Moscow.

In Rome there was his colleague, who, in an interview with the Turin newspaper *STAMPA* at the height of the tragic opposition to the tanks by the Russian leadership and the Muscovites who were defending the "White House," could find nothing to say about the leader of Russia except that he "talks a lot and does nothing." But these, I repeat, are individual exceptions.

While they did not circulate the GKChP documents in Italy, the leaders of the embassy in Rome nonetheless responded immediately to the initiative of the head of the Italian Government Giulio Andreotti.

"On 20 August," said Feliks Stanevskiy, "we received a call from the Chigi government palace and were told that Giulio Andreotti was ready to fly to the Crimea immediately to meet with Gorbachev. An urgent telegram regarding this was sent from the embassy to Moscow through diplomatic channels. We were in a hurry. A couple of days after that the European Council at the level of heads of states and governments was to meet to discuss the situation in the USSR after the coup. By arranging a meeting between a respected Western politician and the president of the Soviet Union we hoped to exert pressure on the GKChP and to force its members to release Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev from his confinement. But, alas, the telegram was left unanswered..."

One must hope that someday this page in the history of the days of the coup will also be clarified.

"Now," continued F. Stanevskiy, "the embassy has concentrated its efforts on solving financial and economic problems in Italian-Soviet relations. We must complete the large projects we have started and encourage Italian entrepreneurs to a certain degree. For the financial channels are open: Through the state system alone Italy has offered the Soviet Union credit for a sum of \$6.5 billion. And the government has agreed to accelerate putting it into circulation.

"A special problem," concluded F. Stanevskiy, "is the approach to the republics. A good deal will have to be changed not only in the USSR but also in the West. Our embassy has already raised this problem before the Italian authorities. But up to this point Italy has been circumspect and has focused on relations with the Soviet Union as a whole and not individual republics."

To what has already been said one might add this line: The embassy structure is henceforth de-party-ized.

Stockholm Envoy Plays Down IZVESTIYA Coup Allegations

PM3008150091 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 28 Aug 91 p 6

[Report on 27 August interview with Soviet Ambassador Nikolay Uspenskiy by Omar Magnergard]

[Excerpt] In an interview with SVENSKA DAGBLADET yesterday evening Nikolay Uspenskiy admitted that he feels worried about his future as Soviet ambassador to Sweden.

"But it is not my own situation which worries me most," he stressed. "I am much more worried about the Soviet economy, the harvest, and the situation with regard to the union between the republics."

Uspenskiy said that he has not received any official reaction from Moscow to his statements after the coup.

"But I know that an investigation into everyone's behavior is going on."

[Magnergard] Do you regret any of what you said?

[Uspenskiy] No. I said nothing that could be interpreted as welcoming the coup. I expressed my admiration for Gorbachev the whole time. The fact that now with hindsight some phrases appear a little strange is due to the fact that I was misinformed at the time of the interview. [Uspenskiy ends]

IZVESTIYA writes that on the morning of the first day of the coup Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh sent a telegram to all missions throughout the world in which he ordered all diplomats to follow the directives from those in power.

"We received instructions, but I cannot say from whom."

[Magnergard] Why not?

[Uspenskiy] That is something to do with my diplomatic ethic. According to the law, I do not have the right to say who signed the instructions. That is a secret.

[Magnergard] You are pointed out by IZVESTIYA as one of five named ambassadors—the others are the ambassadors in London, Bonn, Warsaw, and Paris—who are said to have given the putschists their support.

[Uspenskiy] That makes me sad, not so much for my own part, but for my skillful and dedicated colleagues. They all fought in the front line for perestroika. But this is not the first time that IZVESTIYA has indulged in rumors and generalizations.

[Magnergard] How do you think the Soviet Foreign Ministry will react?

[Uspenskiy] All honest diplomats and Foreign Ministry officials must realize that the article is an attack on the Foreign Ministry as such.

[Magnergard] IZVESTIYA quotes our previous interview at length and makes comparisons between your behavior and that of your predecessor, Boris Pankin.

[Uspenskiy] I see no moral sense in the comparison.

[Magnergard] How do you view the coup today?

[Uspenskiy] It has done great damage to the Soviet Union. It is good that it is over, and that we can now solve the problems. We have an endless list of difficulties to tackle.

[Magnergard] How is the situation at the embassy?

[Uspenskiy] Good. We sometimes have heated discussions between people. That is the way it should be in a democracy. [passage omitted]

British, Soviet Ships Mark Murmansk Run Anniversary

PM0309130391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 29 Aug 91

[From the "TV Inform" newscast: Report by G. Sedov, V. Anuchin, A. Ivanov, and A. Uchinin, identified by caption]

[Text] [Announcer] The anniversary sailing of the Dervish '91 convoy is continuing in the Barents Sea. Our correspondents have the story.

[Reporters] They have come hundreds of miles. The rendezvous point with the British ships between North Cape and Bear Island is coming closer. This was the traditional meeting point where, during the war, our naval escort would begin protecting the allied convoys. But before the ships could reach this point the convoy sailors had to repeatedly run the gauntlet, as they put it. Today the wartime situation is being reproduced along the anniversary convoy's route. Submarines and, so to speak, "enemy" aircraft are operating to discover the convoy. Mines are being torpedoed. Naturally, our side is repulsing the attacks. This isn't just a celebratory show—everything you can see is part of a combat training program. The convoy includes one of the Navy's most modern ships—the escort ship Gromkiy. It is named for one of the Northern Fleet's famous wartime minesweepers. After two days' sailing, ships from the Royal Navy joined our convoy. The frigate London was welcomed by former convoy members aboard the Svir. They had received a greetings telegram from Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. The ships took up sailing formation. The convoy included six cargo vessels from the Northern and Murmansk Steamship Lines. And they're not empty! The orders were: speed 12 knots, course 106 degrees, direction Murmansk. We filmed these shots at the very last minute—just before docking at our destination. Murmansk was welcoming the anniversary convoy Dervish '91.

FRG Aide Hopeful on Problem of Soviet Germans, Migration

PM3008135391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Aug 91 Union Edition p 6

[Report by Ye. Bovkun: "Will Germans Stay on Volga? New Aspect of Problem of Emigrants to Germany"]

[Text] Bonn—Every cloud has a silver lining! Bonn politicians are expecting the liquidation of the right-wing putsch in Moscow to contribute to some—maybe even a substantial—reduction in the flow of emigrants from the Soviet Union to Germany. We are talking about people of German nationality, of course.

Federal Chancellor H. Kohl and other figures in the ruling coalition had already advocated providing proper conditions of existence and the development of the ethnic customs and culture of Germans wherever they live. Germany is not elastic and it would be unable to take in

everyone at once if there were a mass exodus of their kinsmen from the countries of East Europe.

It is obliged by law to accept them: Any German who comes to the FRG from another state to take up permanent residence automatically receives citizenship. But the federal government is already encountering various problems over the integration of the migrants.

Bonn is hoping that, with the failure of the coup, the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution on restoring Soviet Germans' rights will at last be implemented. Horst Waffenschmidt, FRG Interior Ministry parliamentary state secretary and representative for migrants' affairs, is confident that the chances of this have increased. He is expecting specific, fundamental measures to be taken this very year.

The federal government did not waste time in entering into contacts with Russian President Boris Yeltsin's experts. At the beginning of July Waffenschmidt had talks with them in Moscow, conveying through them his government's hope that the republic of Volga Germans would be restored. In September an official Russian commission is to go to Bonn for further consultations. Yeltsin's agreement to participate in a congress of "Russian" Germans in Moscow in October is seen here as a promising factor.

As a result of numerous initiatives by the federal government via the FRG Embassy in Moscow various regional projects for the Volga area are being agreed with official representatives in the Soviet Union, taking into account the interests of Germans and Russians. Above all, we are talking about assisting the development of agricultural structures and encouraging the spread of building trades.

"The German ethnic minority and in particular a new republic of Volga Germans would serve as an important bridge of cooperation, which would help solve the urgent problems of Russia and of the Soviet Union as a whole," Waffenschmidt said the other day. "Since many 'Russian' Germans are capable, assiduous specialists, they could take on the job of fulfilling the most difficult orders in construction."

If the successes in creating new structures are obvious and concrete, Bonn government circles believe, they will prompt many Germans to remain in the Soviet Union, and particularly in Russia.

Ambassador to Ireland Rebutts Allegations About Coup Stance

PM0309110791 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 31 Aug 91 p 5

[Letter from G. Gventsadze, USSR ambassador to Ireland: "Ambassadors Write to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA"]

[Text] Esteemed Editorial Office

I received copies of your newspapers today containing charges against me. Since they have the gravest consequences for me, I ask you to tell your readers the following.

By force of circumstance I did not give REUTER but Irish radio and television an interview. The interview was distorted as it was passed from hand to hand. A clearly biased interpretation has been put on what I said. I did not defend the legality of the coup, as your newspaper claimed. I only spoke of the possibility in theory of transferring the powers of the USSR president to the vice president in the event of real illness.

Despite the claim that I held a "special position" as regards briefing the center on reaction to the coup, my information from here was totally objective and reflected the extremely negative attitude toward the coup in Ireland.

The coup came as a great shock to me. In that situation the only reality for me were the successive instructions from the USSR Foreign Ministry—you are aware of their thrust—and the need for a Soviet ambassador to carry them out within the shortest possible time. What is more, I have been in Ireland less than two months and did not know the morals and methods used by local journalists.

With respect,

G. Gventsadze, USSR ambassador to Ireland, 28 August 1991.

French Companies Enter Radio Business

OW0309013491 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2155 GMT 2 Sep 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "Europe Plus" is the first Soviet commercial radio station to have gone on the air. It was founded by the French company Europe Plus France and the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting (currently the All-Union Company for Television and Radio Broadcasting). In Moscow, the station broadcasts 19 hours a day and is based entirely on play-lists sent in from Paris.

Another music station to have started broadcasting in the same year on medium waves was "Radio Nostalgie", established by the French station Nostalgie and the All-Union Company for Television and Radio Broadcasting. The station is on the air in day-time and relaying a French program received via satellite.

Another independent radio station, "Ekho Moskvy" (Echo of Moscow) has focused on newscasts. It was founded by the Moscow City Council, the association "Radio" (uniting various branches of the Ministry of Communications), "OGONYOK" magazine and the Journalism Department of the Moscow State University. It is on the air from 8 AM in the morning on weekdays and from 9 AM on weekends.

The Stas Namin Music Centre has established the SNC Radio Station broadcasting both foreign and Soviet pop and rock music. This radio station has been in operation since January 4, 1991 in the medium waves 22 hours a day.

The All-Union Company for Television and Radio Broadcasting and the French corporation Becom have founded "Radio M", broadcasting in the ultra-short range.

European Reconstruction Bank To Discuss Cooperation

OW0309024691 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2155 GMT 2 Sep 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Board of Directors of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] is going to discuss the strategy of cooperation with the Soviet Union on Tuesday.

The USSR Foreign Ministry has said that the session is likely to discuss both direct loans and technical assistance to the Soviet Union under agreements achieved in the course of the EBRD President's recent visit to the Soviet Union.

Lithuanian Official Comments on Cultural Ties

AU0209115191 Rome ANSA in English 1014 GMT
2 Sep 91

[Text] (ANSA) Vilnius, September 1—While Lithuania looks towards Western Europe and the United States for greater cooperation for its political and economic development, Italy, by itself, can play a major role in the field of developing cultural relations, the deputy speaker of the Lithuanian parliament, Bronislawas Kuzmickas told ANSA here at the weekend.

"Our bilateral ties have always been intense in the past," Kuzmickas said, expressing himself in Italian, "even if this has been perhaps more evident here than in Italy. One needs only walk the streets of Vilnius to recognize the influence of Italian architecture. This, however, cannot be separated from the fact that we share the same Catholic religion and that we are the northern-most of European Catholic countries."

Kuzmickas, who is also a philosopher and president of the Lithuanian Italian Studies Association, went on to affirm that "for various reasons, the three Baltic republics are politically, economically and culturally closer to Scandinavian countries. However, in the medium-term, we hope to strengthen ties with English-speaking countries and the United States."

"But I do not want" he added, "that Lithuanian young people become too Americanized. Thus I favor a role for the part of Italian culture to help us keep our feet firmly in Europe."

During his recent visit to Vilnius, to deliver the documents re-establishing diplomatic relations between Italy and Lithuania, Italian Foreign Undersecretary Claudio Vitalone announced how Italy, keen on boosting bilateral cultural relations, will offer scholarships to young Lithuanians who wish to attend Italian universities.

Italian literature is very popular in Lithuania with, for example, seventy-five thousand copies sold of the translated version of Umberto Eco's "In the Name of the Rose." [title as received]

German Diplomatic Note Calls for Honecker Extradition

LD0309094991 Berlin ADN in German 0921 GMT 3 Sep 91

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—The German ambassador to the USSR, Klaus Blech, today made clear the Federal Government's interest in the extradition of the former state chief of the GDR, Erich Honecker, to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. He gave USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy a diplomatic note reiterating the call for Honecker's extradition which was made on 14 March. A spokesman for the embassy told ADN that Petrovskiy had already told the German side that he agreed to an investigation of the matter.

Landsbergis on UK Gold, Soviet Withdrawal

LD0309212191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1610 GMT 3 Sep 91

[Editorial report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian at 1610 GMT on 3 September carries a 28-minute poorly-received live broadcast of a news conference given by Vytautas Landsbergis, who first makes a brief statement describing his visit to Hungary and that country's recognition of the independence of the Baltic States.

This is followed by his replies to journalists' questions, most of which are asked in English. Asked about his hopes concerning the visit by Douglas Hogg to Lithuania, Landsbergis replies: "We hope that Great Britain, too, will resume diplomatic relations with Lithuania. This is natural and necessary. We also hope that Great Britain will help us to solve the problem of the embassy in London. Of course, Great Britain could take a step which is already being proposed by some high-ranking persons in London—to compensate the loss of Lithuania's gold. Because that was an incorrect step taken by the government of Great Britain of that time, under Harold Wilson. We have so far not raised this issue in specific form, but it is pleasant that it is already being raised in Great Britain by British politicians themselves."

After an indistinct passage, Landsbergis is heard to continue: "He who can help us is our friend. We wish to cooperate with all countries. Great Britain used to support Lithuania in the past, it has been supporting us during the struggles for independence, and in the times of the Republic of Lithuania up to 1940. We have no doubt about its stand at present, too."

Asked about Lithuania's gold, Landsbergis says: "Great Britain is very well aware of how much gold there was. I visited Great Britain last year and had a talk with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. We also discussed this issue, and said that it would be raised. I then wrote a letter to Mrs. Thatcher and received an exhaustive reply from her on when, how and why it was done. She and the Conservatives did not support it at that time. She was in favour of solving this issue. Of course, nobody then and she, too, could imagine the course or events, the recognition of

Lithuania's independence and the restoration of diplomatic relations by Great Britain. And the quantity of gold and the sum of gold which it would be now valued are well known, I do not have it at hand, but they are noted somewhere."

Landsbergis further stated: "We wish to take part in the European organizations. We want Europe to help us to solve the primary and basic issue of consolidating independence: the start of the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Lithuania. Of course, not only Europe can contribute to this, we are expecting assistance from the United States too. President Bush has said in his statement that the United States is ready to do everything to realize the independence of the Baltic states. I understand this as a support for our already stated demand that the Soviet army should leave because this means the realization of full independence. But Europe is here, it is close by and it must be interested that the zone of peace and trust is as large as possible. We expect that in raising this issue in various European Organizations, we will be met with goodwill and approval."

Poor reception precludes further processing.

More Details on Reuniting of Gordiyevskiy Family

PM0509143191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Sep 91 p 5

[Report by A. Vasilyev: "Leyla Gordiyevskaya Allowed To Join Her Husband"]

[Text] Last Sunday British Prime Minister John Major paid an official visit to the Soviet Union. Aside from other important matters—problems of economic aid for the USSR, the future of the independent Baltic states—the prime minister's program contained yet another item: The question of reuniting the Gordiyevskiy family. Remember that we are talking about Oleg Gordiyevskiy, who, while a high-ranking employee of Soviet intelligence, at the same time worked for many years for British intelligence as well, giving it USSR state secrets and betraying his colleagues to it. The British managed to get their valuable agent out in the trunk of a diplomatic vehicle via Finland. Be that as it may, his wife Leyla and his two daughters remained in Moscow. A long struggle began to reunite the family. But there is still much that is unclear concerning the whole story, about which KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA wrote in detail on 23 October 1990.

Let us start by saying that the Gordiyevskiy family are officially divorced. Leyla Gordiyevskaya claims that the KGB forced her to marry him, and she filed for divorce because she feared for her children and herself. The KGB of the pre-SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] era has a different version. Suffice it to say that the day after the aforementioned item the writer of these lines received a personal call from... former USSR KGB chairman V.A. Kryuchkov, who reported, among other things, that Leyla Gordiyevskaya had decided on divorce after the KGB informed her that her husband had "other

women." There is no need to point out that this conflicts with basic standards of morality.

Be that as it may, the principles of humanity have triumphed: Husband will soon be embracing wife and children. And that is as it should be: The daughters are not responsible for their father and the wife is not responsible for her husband, and they must be able to enjoy all civil rights, including the right to leave the country. The rout of the SCSE had to occur for this principle to be implemented in relation to the Gordiyevskiy family. But because the "White House" conquered the black junta, black does not become white and vice versa. Treachery is still treachery—under Gorbachev, under the SCSE, and under Yeltsin.

German Attitudes to USSR Breakup, Aid Examined

PM0309123791 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 3 Sep 91
Single Edition p 3

[Correspondent Al. Stepanov report: "Daily Life After the Victory, or Will Chancellor Kohl Collect the 'Gorbachev Tax' With Cap in Hand?"]

[Text] Berlin, 2 Sep—Many people in Germany see the complete and hasty disintegration of the Soviet Union's power and managerial structures as a big threat. Here I will particularly emphasize the word "hasty," as virtually no one here believes in the possibility of the continued existence of the unitary USSR. They see the problem as lying elsewhere: Will it be possible to make this breakup peaceful and, as far as possible, bloodless? Is there a threat that the process will acquire "Balkan" features? For, given our scale, this would be disastrous not only for the peoples inhabiting our country but also for the whole of Europe.

This is why the Russian leadership's very tough statement, speaking of the need to revise certain existing borders in the event of the republics' secession from the USSR, has not gone unnoticed here. Some have compared it with the effect of bombshell, while others believed that the republics would be intimidated by the threat of new Russian hegemony.

The subject of aid for our country is being discussed in a very lively manner here. No, no one in Germany doubts that our economy, which resembles a jaded nag taking its last steps before falling forever, is in dire need of aid. But what must be the nature and size of the aid? What the terms for providing it?

By the way, I do not know about anyone else, but Germany, albeit for quite obvious political reasons, was not sitting on the fence before but, as the saying goes, was giving full measure. The FRG has invested almost 60 billion marks in aid for our country—who else has done anything at all comparable on an economic plane for the USSR? But it must not be forgotten that the Germans, in addition to our worries, also have their own problems. So they are not capable of making new infusions of "Bundesmark wine" into our holey wineskins. And they do not wish to do this almost on their own and are inviting—increasingly persistently—others to share the heavy

burden with them. Of course, it is a question of financial magnates on a world scale—the United States and Japan.

In order to find the funds themselves, the Germans must raise taxes—a measure which has not increased the popularity of a single government in the world. It is not for nothing that mocking cartoons have already appeared in newspapers: Chancellor Kohl collects the "Gorbachev tax" with cap in hand... In general, I believe that the German authorities will not now, after all, make a supereffort for our sake.

Ambassador Zamyatin's Stance on Coup Reviewed

PM0409100591 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
3 Sep 91 Union Edition p 4

[V. Skosyrev article: "Why L. Zamyatin Took Umbrage at the British Press"]

[Text] Our ambassador to the United Kingdom, L.M. Zamyatin, came under fire from the mass media in London. If you recall the cold war era, that kind of thing was not infrequent. But why was the Soviet state's senior representative in the British Isles favored with such an honor today?

It stemmed from a letter which Zamyatin himself wrote to THE INDEPENDENT in which the ambassador protested the way the British press described his attitude to the putsch. Rumors about my wavering during those difficult days are absolutely false, the letter stated.

So it was all nothing but rumormongering, if you are to believe Zamyatin. However, British reporters did not believe him. Television retransmitted footage of a press conference held after the start of the putsch, and the newspapers carried quotes from it. We were not lucky enough to see this broadcast in Moscow, therefore we telephoned the Soviet Embassy in London and asked what Zamyatin had said. Three points stood out at the press conference: First, the actions of the State Committee for the State of Emergency were described as a constitutional act; second, it was claimed that those who supported Yeltsin's strike appeal were Yeltsin supporters; and third, it was said that Gorbachev was really ill.

But a single piece of evidence is perhaps insufficient? Let us cite then a UPI telegram. "Zamyatin said that the attempted coup is lawful and supported the coup leaders' claims that Gorbachev is ill and cannot run the country," the agency transmitted.

That is the way things stand regarding the "rumors." Incidentally, it would be difficult to expect a different response from an ambassador who under Brezhnev used to run our international propaganda from Old Square [CPSU Central Committee Headquarters]. But, fortunately, Zamyatin's opinion proved to be far from the same as the opinion of the Embassy staff. I remember that on the morning of 19 August, wanting to find out what was being said abroad about the tragic events here at home and listening to the BBC, I heard that Golitsyn, counselor at the Soviet Embassy in the UK, had condemned the coup.

At first I did not believe it, could this happen? And then I telephoned London, got through to Counselor Aleksandr Ivanov-Golitsyn (the BBC did not give his name correctly), and asked how things had been.

"I learned about the coup back home from a British television broadcast," Ivanov-Golitsyn said. "I drove up to the Embassy at around 0900 hours, and reporters were already on duty there. They hemmed me in and asked me what I had to say? 'I am stunned by what has happened... I am against the same method being used against Gorbachev as was used against Khrushchev'—I responded. And I added that 'our people will not accept this and will resist, since a new generation raised on democratic traditions has already grown up in the country.'"

"And how was your step taken in the Embassy?"

"It was taken well. Although the atmosphere in the Embassy, like in our country, was anxious, the majority of the diplomats supported me"...

It is not the job of a newspaper to hand out prizes. The official investigation in the Foreign Ministry will end, we hope, with an objective assessment of the conduct of its senior officials at the time of the putsch. But at any rate the actions of B. Pankin and A. Ivanov-Golitsyn do show that there are quite a few decent people in our diplomatic corps.

Pankin Sees 'Brilliant Prospects' for Nordic Ties

*PM0409133091 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 3 Sep 91 (Section 2) p 6*

[TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA report: "Finland Is an Example for the Baltic Region"]

[Text] Moscow—New Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin said in a TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA interview that he has still not decided whether he will replace the Soviet ambassadors in the Nordic countries.

In response to TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA's question of whether Pankin intends to make efforts to bring about clarification of the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, Pankin said:

"Yes, I am involved in the matter. We will do our best to solve the puzzle.

"But, as I have said many times, unfortunately I am quite sure that he died a very long time ago. But we can at least hope for some new details."

Boris Pankin, who for most of the 1980's was the ambassador in Stockholm, believes that the "Swedish model" could be of use when the country's new foreign policy is shaped.

Pankin said that he would really like to visit the Nordic countries—and soon.

"I see brilliant prospects for future relations between the Soviet Union and the Nordic countries. Given my 'Swedish period' I probably have very good reason to say this," Pankin said.

[TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA] Do you now intend to recognize the Baltic states?

"That is a matter for the congress, but I am an optimist."

Pankin was also asked how both the Soviet Union and the republics can be members of the United Nations if the presidential program is voted through.

"I do not know today how that is to be done, but we will have to wait and see. There is a completely new situation."

Pankin also commented on the special relationship with Finland:

"I believe that the relationship will embrace the warmest good-neighborly relations as in the past, also in the economic field.

"In my view Finland could also come to be a very good example for the Baltic states."

The problems in the special trading relations with Finland were also raised:

"As far as can be judged, in the future we will follow the market economy in our foreign trade with the privatization of industry and agriculture. I do not think that Finland will take offense at this.

"Once these mechanisms start to work relations too will blossom," the Soviet foreign minister said.

Construction of Gas Pipeline to Greece To Begin Soon

*OW0409013791 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1830 GMT 3 Sep 91*

[From "Business"; following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Construction on a gas main to supply Soviet natural gas to Greece is expected to begin this autumn; total project price tag: \$1.3 billion.

A contract signed last December between the State Gas Corporation of Greece and an international consortium composed of the Soviet association Machinoimport; the I-C-E, a Soviet-British company; and the Greek company Viocat provides for the construction of a 510-km long gas line from Bulgaria's border to Greece. Upon completion, Greece will be getting 1 billion cubic metres of gas annually, but supplies are planned to rise to 2.4 billion cubic metres in the subsequent years.

UK Foreign Ministry Official Arrives in Lithuania

LD0309222891 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 3 Sep 91

[Text] Douglas Hogg the state minister for foreign affairs of Great Britain [as heard], arrived in Vilnius this evening.

His meeting with Parliament Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis is to take place tomorrow.

Today at a news conference, the parliament leader said that he expects Britain's decision to establish diplomatic relations with Lithuania. He also hopes that the meeting with minister Douglas Hogg will speed up the return of the Lithuanian embassy buildings in London.

Deryabin Says Coup Showed European Support of Perestroyka

OW0409192091 Moscow *INTERFAX* in English
1645 GMT 4 Sep 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "The Baltic republics' recognition by European and other Western countries is a reality to be taken into consideration. Not only the West but we ourselves are close to recognizing realities of this kind," said the newly appointed Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Deryabin in his exclusive interview for IF [INTERFAX]. Mr. Deryabin is in charge of the "European direction" in Soviet foreign policy.

Despite the complexity of the present internal situation, Y. Deryabin does not think the Soviet Union is posing any military threat to European stability. In his view, the USSR's policy toward Europe will be marked by still greater openness to partners and an increasingly strong desire to promote the Helsinki process.

The main conclusion to be drawn from the August coup is that practically all nations, including those belonging to NATO and the EC, reaffirmed their solidarity with Soviet perestroyka, Mr. Deryabin said.

The full text of Yuri Deryabin's interview with IF will be featured in the September 5 issue of DIPLOMATIC PANORAMA.

French Perfumer Opens Moscow Shop

OW0509042291 Moscow *INTERFAX* in English
1900 GMT 4 Sep 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] France's perfumer maker, Yves-Rocher, opened a beauty saloon and a perfume shop in central Moscow, both of them run by Florana partnership set up jointly by the French firm and Mosbyt company. Florana charges both hard currency and rubles for its services and goods.

A Mosbyt official said Yves-Rocher was planning to open its branches elsewhere in the Soviet Union.

Firefighters Complain of Humiliation in Greece

LD0409131591 Moscow *TASS* in English 1152 GMT
4 Sep 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Malyshev]

[Text] Athens September 4 TASS—"We demand that money we earned under contract in Greece be paid to us

without delay. Otherwise we shall start protest action and refuse to leave Athens," a group of Soviet specialists in putting out forest fires said in a statement handed over to TASS on Tuesday.

A group of 132 Soviet specialists, including firefighters and crews of seven specially equipped MI-8 helicopters, arrived in Greece in early August to help extinguish forest fires which caused huge damage to the country's economy and ecology. All terms of their participation in the action were fixed by contract signed by the Soviet Sojuzvneshles foreign trade firm and the German intermediary firm Flugzeugwerft Dresden, which in turn signed a contract with the Greek side.

According to the helicopter crew commanders Vladimir Vorobyov, Viktor Klusov and Ilya Ryzhov, the group put out ten forest fires over several weeks in Greek mountains.

Despite this, the firefighters—some of whom had taken part in the clean-up operations in Chernobyl—we put up in tents under the burning sun on a military airfield surrounded by rows of barbed wire. The pilots enjoyed slightly better conditions in a hotel, but none of them got a penny in advance payment.

All this time, Vorobyov and Ryzhov said, the Soviet crews found themselves in a humiliating situation as they were unable even to pay for a pack of cigarettes or a glass of water. However, they worked well from morning till night, and sometimes got no sleep at all. Local people came to thank them and brought grapes.

On the first of September, the Greek and German sides announced the contract was to be terminated, the head of the group of firemen, Gennadiy Shchedrin, said. No money was paid.

According to a Sojuzvneshles official, Deputy General Director of the Avialesokhrana Association Vladimir Shchetinskiy, "the main reason for the dramatic situation is the failure of the German firm to fulfil contractual obligations. But the German firm cannot pay Soviet specialists because no money had been transferred to it by the Greek side. The announcement of the contract termination, signed by Greek Government officials, makes clear they do not intend to pay at all. We cannot understand it. Work has been done and it must be paid for. I notified Moscow..."

Germany Plans Exports of Railway Wagons to USSR

OW0509041791 Moscow *INTERFAX* in English
1900 GMT 4 Sep 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Soviet Union's Vneshekonombank and a consortium of German banks led by Dresden Bank are discussing a \$800,000 mn [million] credit line to cover the cost of Soviet imports of railway containers and passenger carriages from what used to be East Germany, once a net exporter to this country.

Moscow-based business newspaper *Delovoi Mir* says German manufacturers are expected to deliver 100 refrigerator wagons and more than 1000 passenger carriages.

Soviet Ambassador to France Recalled

*AU0509074591 Paris AFP in English 2354 GMT
4 Sep 91*

[Text] Paris, Sept 4 (AFP)—The Soviet Ambassador to France, Yuriy Dubinin, has been recalled to Moscow for consultations and left here for the Soviet capital on Wednesday, the embassy said.

Asked if Dubinin would return to his post in Paris, a Soviet Embassy spokesman said, "The question remains open."

On August 19, the day the coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was announced in Moscow, Dubinin took French authorities a message to Western leaders from Gennadiy Yanayev, Gorbachev's vice-president and one of the coup leaders.

French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, when questioned about the recall of Dubinin, said it was "an affair which concerns the Soviets."

The unofficial Soviet news agency Interfax on Tuesday said four Soviet ambassadors were being recalled from abroad in connection with their actions following last month's failed coup.

Interfax said Dubinin might be among the four.

Dumas Welcomes USSR Reforms, Praises Leaders

*LD0509093191 Moscow TASS in English 0833 GMT
5 Sep 91*

[By TASS correspondent Georg Mikhailin]

[Text] Paris September 5 TASS—The endorsement of a reform of the country's state structure by the extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies seems to be an extremely important event and a big personal success of President Mikhail Gorbachev, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas told Radio-Tele-Luxembourg On Wednesday night.

"We are witnessing manifestations of deputies' genuine conscientiousness in the face of a threat of the Soviet Union's break-up," Dumas emphasised. This is an illustration that Gorbachev is right and is his big personal success, he added.

The French leadership has always believed Gorbachev to be utterly essential for the Soviet Union, Dumas said, giving due credit at the same time to Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

The French foreign minister believes the reform contemplated by Soviet leaders really opens the way for republics to secede from the USSR.

If some of them embark upon this road, France will attentively study the possibility of their diplomatic recognition," Dumas stressed.

However, France, just like other Western countries, is worried, perhaps most of all, about the problem of who will control the huge nuclear potential in a hypothetical situation of a general chaos in the USSR, Dumas said.

His opinion is that this is why it is necessary for Soviet leaders to show level-headedness as never before and take emerging realities into account.

Economic Official Views Ties with Eastern Germany

*LD0509090991 Berlin ADN in German 0800 GMT
5 Sep 91*

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—Arkadiy Volskiy, deputy head of the Committee for the Operational Management of the USSR Economy, regards the renewal of direct relations between enterprises in the USSR and in the new Federal Laender as the most effective short-term German aid for the stabilization of the situation in the Soviet Union. Volskiy, who is effectively acting as industry minister, and who is also president of the Scientific-Industrial Association, proposes that there should be an agreed transitional period with a system of accounting under which the factories can pay for their mutual supplies independently.

"At the moment, we are coping with two stupid things still left over from the Ryzhkov government," Volskiy said in an interview with ADN. Even before German unification there had been an agreement to move to trade on the basis of hard currency. The worst thing, however, is trying to conduct trade on the basis of world market prices. At the very least, this would have called for products of at least average world quality to be on offer. As a result of CEMA specialization, the USSR acquired 56,000 items of plant and equipment for metal processing from eastern Germany. These Soviet plants are now without spare parts because of the lack of hard currency.

"Therefore, I repeat my proposal for a transitional period to be agreed upon between enterprises in the former GDR and in the former Union," Volskiy said, "perhaps for the next two years." During this time trade should be dealt with as barter deals, as a clearing agreement, according to the principle of "who can do it best in the circumstances". In the past, annual contracts worth over \$1.5 billion had been concluded in the machine-building industry, but this year only \$160 million. Both countries will lose through this. In the freightcar construction industry a solution satisfactory to both sides has been found, albeit with difficulty.

Therefore, there are ways, Volskiy says, of resolving these questions soon. But this depends on the two governments. He said that he has already spoken about this with (Otto) Wolff von Amerongen [chairman of German industry's committee dealing with the East] and with North Rhine-Westphalia Premier Johannes Rau. He will come back to his proposal to seek new paths for a transitional period

during forthcoming talks with representatives of German industry, including Heinrich Weiss from the Confederation of German Industry (BDI). The Soviet side is ready for close cooperation in the future, above all with Germany.

Envoy to Stockholm To Return to Post

LD0509202791 Stockholm Sveriges Radio Network in Swedish 2000 GMT 5 Sep 91

[Text] The Soviet ambassador to Stockholm, Nikolay Uspenskiy, will return to Stockholm after having been recalled to Moscow for consultations. Foreign Minister Boris Pankin says that he will personally talk to Uspenskiy about his attitude toward the attempted coup and his actions during the days of the coup. Uspenskiy is the fifth top diplomat to have been recalled home to Moscow for similar reasons.

Europe Bank Official Cited on Credits

LD0509223791 Moscow TASS in English 1358 GMT 5 Sep 91

[by TASS correspondent AleKSEY Golyayev]

[Text] Rome September 5 TASS—Vice-president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Mario Sarcinelli has called for the lifting of restrictions on credits to the Soviet Union. In an interview with the newspaper "IL SOLE-24 ORE" he expressed the hope that "all those who have still not realised the need to lift restrictions on credits to the USSR, will have to understand this shortly". In the meantime, according to the rules in force, the Soviet Union can obtain credits from this bank that do not exceed its initial contribution, that is 6 per cent of the overall capital.

"As long as these restrictions remain in force," Sarcinelli noted, "all our actions will be purely theoretical and will not yield any concrete results. There is still time to pool the Soviet Union's internal efforts in order to promote radical economic reforms, capable of switching it over to market conditions."

The bank's vice-president believes it is very important for the Soviet Union to save its common economic space. The union's domestic ties are stronger than its relations with the former socialist states of eastern Europe, "Sarcinelli said, "but if disrupted, the country will be faced with very grave consequences, much graver than those in Eastern Europe—the collapse of its gross national product and trade paralysis.

"We have checked whether the programmes of aid, drawn up by our experts, are applicable or not in the present Soviet conditions," he continued. "I believe it is today unnecessary to revise cardinally our plans for technical aid to the Soviet Union and assistance to the USSR private sector. We may be compelled to eventually reshape somewhat our strategic line, depending on whom we will have to deal with. We have decided to open our bank's office in Moscow shortly in order to make our efforts more concrete and prompt.

The bank council, which is called upon to facilitate the integration of the former East European socialist states into the world economic space, has recently sent its representatives to the Baltic republics in order to probe the possibility of their membership in the bank for reconstruction and development. "I think this will be inevitable," Sarcinelli said. "Of course, we will welcome this. I believe we will have little to object to if they apply for membership".

"The Baltic republics will possibly want to have their own currency. However, it would be desirable for the other republics of the USSR to go on using the rouble," Sarcinelli said. "This is one of the main requirements for their common economic space to remain intact."

Spain Postpones Ratification of Treaty With USSR

LD0509122591 Moscow TASS in English 1007 GMT 5 Sep 91

[By TASS correspondent Robert Serebrennikov]

[Text] Madrid September 5 TASS—Spain has decided to put off the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR until the situation in the Soviet Union becomes clear, Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez told the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission on Wednesday. He said the postponement was an "elementary precaution" after the abortive coup d'etat in the USSR.

The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed between the USSR and the Kingdom of Spain in July 1991 by President Mikhail Gorbachev and Chairman of the Spanish Government Felipe Gonzalez during the latter's official visit to the Soviet Union.

The Spanish foreign minister also said the guaranteed Spanish credits of 150 billion pesetas, granted to the Soviet Union for purchasing Spanish goods and foodstuffs, have been suspended "for technical reasons". At the same time, he noted that Spain was prepared to render every possible assistance to the Soviet Union.

Soviet Business Center to Open in Duesseldorf

OW0609001591 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2102 GMT 5 Sep 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] German Fay Industrie und Wohnbau KG has joined forces with Soviet partners to build a Soviet business centre in Duesseldorf, capital of the northern Rhine-Westphalia, a region that has strong economic ties with the Soviet Union.

Construction is planned to start this autumn and to be completed by May 1993.

A joint venture will be established to carry out the project, whose estimated cost is 150 million dm. The Soviet partners will be Moscow's State Ball Bearings Factory

No.1 and the Rotor Factory in the Ukraine, both traditional suppliers of engineering equipment to Germany.

The center will have exhibition and trading premises, office space, and even a training center for Soviet managerial personnel. Space at the center will be available on long-term lease, at a probable annual cost of some 480 dm. per square metre.

French Minister Favors Economic Aid to USSR

*LD0609024891 Moscow TASS in English 1455 GMT
5 Sep 91*

[By TASS correspondent Georg Mikhailin]

[Text] Paris September 5 TASS—"The West must help the Soviet Union produce more high quality goods and promote its quick integration into the world economic system," the French Minister for the Economy, Finance and Budget Pierre Beregovoy told TASS here today before his visit to the Soviet Union.

The minister believes a version of the "Marshall Plan" should be drawn up under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund and a stabilisation monetary fund set up for the Soviet Union. He stressed that France would call on other Western states to grant the USSR membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as quickly as possible, as soon as the status of the central Soviet government and its relations with republican authorities become clear.

"As a matter of fact, this remains after the London G-7 conference the only serious obstacle to the granting of extensive aid to the USSR," Beregovoy noted.

"Democracy has triumphed in the USSR and it is necessary to accelerate the Soviet Union's switchover to a

market economy. The world's seven most developed countries and the world community as a whole bear historical responsibility for this. Of course, I am referring primarily to financial aid.

"It is most important to render the Soviet Union technical assistance and food aid, to stimulate direct Western investment in its economy," the minister believes. "For this purpose the USSR must maintain economic and financial alliance with the single currency recognised by the world community, which will allow the Soviet Union and each state included in it to organise free exchanges with the outside world. But all this is for the Soviet leaders to decide," Beregovoy noted.

This is why he plans to acquaint himself in detail during his visit to the USSR with their views on this score, to clarify their attitude to the latest Western initiatives, to grasp the meaning of the events in the Soviet Union. He also wants to discuss with the federal and republican leaders the problem of government and bank guarantees in order to prompt Western businessmen to quick and massive investments throughout the entire territory of the USSR.

Gorbachev To Meet French Economics Minister

*LD0609095391 Paris France-Inter Radio Network
in French 0900 GMT 6 Sep 91*

[Text] Pierre Beregovoy is due to meet President Gorbachev this afternoon. The French minister for the economy arrived in Moscow yesterday evening within the framework of aid for the Soviet Union decided upon at the G-7 summit in London in July. This visit will also make it possible to examine the economic effects caused by the new structures of the Soviet Union, which is to maintain a monetary union built around a common, healthy currency, Pierre Beregovoy said.

Soviet-Bulgarian Joint Venture To Produce Light Aircraft

PM0209110591 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1536 GMT 26 Aug 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Report by A. Paulyus, identified by caption, from Plovdiv, Bulgaria]

[Text] [Paulyus] What we saw in Plovdiv may appear to have nothing in common with the theme of our report. Yet this structure which is making children so happy [video shows water slides at a swimming pool] was produced at a defense industry enterprise. Plants of the Bulgarian Defense Ministry are currently producing some 500 types of civilian goods. In accordance with the government's conversion program, defense enterprises are to produce such goods worth almost 19 billion lev by 1995.

Bulgarian specialists have concluded that it would be expedient to pool efforts with similar enterprises on the Soviet side. And so the Bulgarian "Metalkhim," the Lyakhovtsy machine building plant and a number of other Soviet and Bulgarian enterprises have agreed to set up a joint venture—"Aviatekhnika"—to be built here on the outskirts of Plovdiv.

It will produce civilian light aircraft. The Soviet side has assumed responsibility for training staff for the new production unit.

[I. Ivanov, deputy director general of the "Aviatekhnika" company, identified by caption] The new aircraft will be produced in several versions. There will be a sports version, a version for businessmen, an air ambulance, and several other versions which will essentially be produced in parallel.

[Paulyus] The first aircraft will take to the air at the beginning of next year.

Soviet, Albanian TV Establish Cooperative Links

LD0109044391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 30 Aug 91

[From the "Television News Service" Program]

[Text] Cooperation between Soviet and Albanian journalists, broken off thirty years ago, is being renewed. Today signatures have been placed on something that destroyed the wall of silence that for long decades separated the peoples of both countries. The document will help in the creation of new links in the present situation, extremely complicated for both countries, in the tortuous collisions which the USSR and Albania are experiencing, and in the end will help the process of creating a new Europe.

Once again we are witnesses of the fact that despite any collisions the movement of people toward each other is continuing and it cannot be stopped.

PRAVDA Assesses E. European Reaction to Coup Attempt

PM0309104591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Aug 91 Single Edition p 5

[Vladimir Gerasimov commentary under the "Opinions and Commentaries" rubric: "They Crossed Themselves. Is That All?"]

[Text] Once again there have been nervy rallies outside Soviet embassies, a "run on gasoline," the reinforcement of border guards (the Czechoslovak Federal Interior Ministry, for instance, has set up a special security staff), and—and this is the main thing—there has been an "upsurge" in all right-wing sentiments, nationalist tendencies, and emotional appeals: "Faster to Europe!"

At the height of the extraordinary events in Moscow representatives of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia gathered for an urgent meeting in Warsaw. The subject? To discuss the possible consequences for Eastern Europe of the actions of the State Committee for the State of Emergency. The day before the meeting many politicians once again began to raise the question of immediately strengthening ties with NATO. It was suggested that NATO representatives attend meetings of East European countries. This comes as no surprise. "The danger of a return to 'cold war' times is a real one," Hungarian Foreign Minister G. Jeszenszky said. While in Prague, although reassuring the public that the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federal Republic] was in no direct danger, V. Havel also remarked: "In the long term we cannot rule out certain complexities in international relations and international security." Summing up the results of the Warsaw meeting, L. Walesa said that Gorbachev's overthrow confirmed the need to retain a strong U.S. and NATO presence in Europe.

It can be noted that the regional cooperation between Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia that emerged in the city of Visegrad on the Danube has now been cemented by common concern. An all-European security system headed by NATO and the idea that the United States will remain an important element in it gained new arguments in their favor. President Zh. Zhelev in Sofia discussed with the commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet the state of and prospects for military cooperation between Bulgaria and NATO. That is, quite purposeful practical steps are being taken. And political scientists are preparing the ground "with the same seeds" for the future "harvest." The Bulgarian Social Democrats' SVOBODEN NAROD published an interview with Z. Brzezinski 20 August. He thinks that it is exceptionally important for the new democratic systems and countries of Eastern Europe to stabilize themselves on the basis of a free market since this will enable them in time to enter the Western defense perimeter. Although, needless to say, this must happen in a fairly well thought-out way so that the Soviet Union does not feel vulnerable.

As for Eastern Europe, the reflex for defensive action and wariness helped create a definite crack in the as yet fragile and still in many respects unclear new ties and relations being created with difficulty by the Soviet Union. Our

neighbors were seriously alarmed. Perhaps everything will go back to the old ways? Some Hungarians and Czechs crossed themselves: "Thank God the Soviet troops have already left!" Polish politicians in turn will now step up pressure on the Soviet side to most speedily withdraw its troops and will press for a "formula" in the new Soviet-Polish treaty that would enable Poland, if necessary, to have military links with a third party.

The coming to power in Moscow of the State Committee for the State of Emergency also caused the economic compass to "tremble." "A threat hangs over our difficult reforms," L. Walesa said over the telephone to F. Mitterrand, asking him for support in Poland's efforts to join the European Community. Assessing events in Moscow as the "death throes of a system," Czech politicians also issued statements saying that it is necessary to turn more rapidly toward Europe in the economic context too. Let me cite something that CSFR Foreign Minister J. Dienstbier said: "On the basis of strategic goals, we must rapidly complete our physical union with Europe—build oil pipelines, highways, and telecommunications."

The perception of recent events in the Soviet Union was reflected in fresh propaganda discrimination against socialism and left-wing forces and movements or just persecution. I must be blunt and say that the State Committee for the State of Emergency put many socialists in a difficult position: It seemed impossible to welcome what had happened, but, on the other hand, an attempt had been made to defend the unified Soviet Union and take steps to consolidate socialist forces. And as a result a fresh campaign against all left-wing parties is now getting up in Eastern Europe in order to oust them from the political arena.

Hungarian Consortium Seeks Russian Joint Ventures

*LD3108183291 Budapest MTI in English 1635 GMT
31 Aug 91*

[Text] Moscow, August 31 (MTI)—Talks about the sale of 100 million dollars' worth of Hungarian food products have been launched in Moscow by leaders of the New Bank Management, a consortium uniting prestigious Hungarian ventures. The delegation, unofficially joined by representatives from the parliamentary parties of the Alliance of Free Democrats, the Hungarian Socialist Party, the Federation of Young Democrats and the Independent Smallholders' Party, offered a 20-tonne relief food supply to the Russian leadership. Hungary has been the first country to offer a food aid to Russia following the attempted coup of last week. The 20-tonne consignment of canned and other non-perishable foodstuffs arrived in Moscow on Friday evening. Russian officials said that other countries were also preparing for similar charitable actions. After the Friday talks with Russian Foreign Ministry officials, the Hungarian delegation conferred with senior businessmen on Saturday. They also visited the Russian stock exchange and discussed possibilities for intensifying business links.

Agreement Reached With Hungary on Food Deliveries

PM0309143191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2123 GMT 1 Sep 91

[From the "Television News Service" newscast: Report by I. Istomin and O. Mezhennaya, identified by caption]

[Text] [Istomin] It's sad but true that people are often more willing to trust not the government that is more democratic but the government that feeds them best. According to rumors, once the putsch had succeeded, the plotters had been intending to swamp Moscow with previously stockpiled food in order to supply citizens with bread and sausages. But the legitimate authorities triumphed, and they are the ones who will now have to solve the food problem. Despite their own difficulties, our former friends in the socialist camp have already started helping the Russian Government in this area. Hungary was the first. A group of businessman and Hungarian parliamentary deputies have brought 20 tonnes of canned food to Moscow, thus making their contribution to the cause of political stabilization. An agreement has also been drawn up for food shipments worth \$100 million on preferential credit terms. Union ministries' monopoly on foreign trade has been broken, and we can now look forward to rapid growth in economic relations between the government of democratic Russia and the countries of Eastern Europe.

Hungarian Consortium Signs Letter on Russian Food Aid

*LD0109194191 Budapest MTI in English 1745 GMT
1 Sep 91*

[Text] Moscow, September 1 (MTI)—A letter of intent on the delivery of 100 million dollars' worth of food products has been signed by the New Bank Management consortium of influential Hungarian entrepreneurs and its Russian partners. The delegation was unofficially joined by representatives from the Alliance of Free Democrats, the Federation of Young Democrats, the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Independent Smallholders' Party, who conducted political talks with Russian leaders. In an interview with MTI's correspondent, the businessmen said that the first consignment of about 20 tonnes of food, mainly tinned, had already been put on sale in Moscow. Meat, as well as meat and grain products are to be supplied later on. Mihaly Varga, MP for the Federation of Young Democrats, was of the view that Hungarian private entrepreneurs should make more frequent visits to the Soviet Union to obtain first-hand impressions on the situation within the country. He said that penetrating talks had been held with leading officials from the Russian Foreign Ministry and members of several democratic organizations. Dr Tibor Abraham, MP for the Alliance of Free Democrats, warned that it would be a mistake not to harness the opportunities offered by the Soviet market, even despite their payments difficulties.

Hungary Plans More Food Exports to USSR

*OW0309012791 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2155 GMT 2 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Delegates from the Hungarian consortium New Bank have had talks on selling food to Russia, including no less than \$100 m. worth of grain and canned meat at prices 5

lower than those offered by West European and U.S. firms. A treaty of intent with a nongovernmental business, which has preferred to stay anonymous for the press has been signed.

The Hungarian consortium, uniting tourist, electronics and farm produce processing firms is ready to accept payment in metals, fuels, Soviet cars, and spare parts. New Bank is going to provide foodstuffs for the Soviet Armed Forces in exchange for the transportation of Hungarian goods to the USSR by Soviet Air Force transport planes.

Hungary has had a record-high wheat harvest this year and granted the USSR a credit to buy 500,000 tonnes of grain. The foreign trade association "Exportkhleb" has told IF [INTERFAX] that the possibility of additional purchases is being explored.

Pankin Meets, Confers With CSFR Ambassador

*LD0409190791 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1446 GMT 4 Sep 91*

[Text] Moscow 4 Sep (TASS)—Boris Pankin, USSR minister of foreign affairs, today received Rudolf Slansky, ambassador of the CSFR to the Soviet Union at the latter's request.

During the friendly conversation, an exchange of opinions took place on the main aspects of the Europe-wide process, and a number of international and regional problems, including the situation in Yugoslavia. Topical issues regarding bilateral Soviet-Czechoslovak relations were also discussed.

**Eastern European Ambassadors Cited on Silayev
Proposal**

*LD0509182791 Moscow TASS in English 1714 GMT
5 Sep 91*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow September 5 TASS—The creation of a new state formation on the territory of the Soviet union, the name for which has not been found yet, will be based on economic grounds.

The proposal of Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev to create such a community with participation of East European countries may attract the attention of the neighbouring states.

According to the Russian premier, this economic union should be open for all wishing to participate. Although it is too early now to give specific estimations of prospects for

a possible broad economic union, TASS correspondents called on some foreign diplomats in Moscow and asked their personal opinion on Silayev's proposal.

The response of Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow Rudolf Slansky was laconic and clear.

He said that the proposal requires a close analysis, and, it will take some time. The analysis will be done only after Czechoslovakia receives this proposal officially.

The ambassador noted that the current Czechoslovak political priority is the country's entry into the European economic communities. Silayev's proposal may attract Czechoslovak interest as much as it does not contradict this aim.

In the ambassador's opinion, the proposal should also be viewed in light of GATT provisions.

Slansky noted that Czechoslovakia is interested in close economic relations with the Soviet Union and the creation of a mechanism for such relations. This is also one of the decisive factors when estimating Silayev's proposal, the ambassador stressed in conclusion.

Considering the proposal of Ivan Silayev, Poland's Ambassador Stanislaw Ciosek stressed that, in his opinion, it could be viewed only in the context of East European countries' striving to become EEC members. The final aim should be the creation of such Europe that is not divided into competing parts.

Poland is very interested in the expansion of cooperation with the renovated Soviet Union. This striving was clearly expressed by Polish President Lech Walesa in his recent telephone conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev.

However, there have not been so far any specific proposals to the Polish leadership in connection with the creation of common economic structures. Deputy Chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers Leszek Balcerowicz confirmed this fact during his recent visit to the USSR.

It would be a misunderstanding to believe that any steps have been made in this direction. An active search for new ways of economic cooperation, equally desired by both sides, is still on the agenda, the ambassador said.

Plenipotentiary Minister of the Bulgarian Embassy Valentin Radomirsky willingly expressed his opinion on this issues. He said that the proposal certainly deserves attention, although, some details will, possibly, provoke specialists' questions.

The very idea is promising, since it takes into account the fact that countries that can be offered to participate in this economic union, are on approximately the same level of the development of productive forces.

All of them, more quickly or more slowly, are moving towards the same aim—the market. This important aim will help them to determine the forms of interaction. The

fact that certain relations have been established between East European countries over the recent years should be also taken into account.

All the best of these connections should be preserved as much as it will be acceptable.

Each country should, probably, analyse all pros and cons and take an acceptable decision, the ambassador stressed.

Bulgaria Media Reviews Economic Ties with USSR

LD0509090891 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0630 GMT 5 Sep 91

[Excerpt] And now about the forecast uttered by Ivan Stepanovich Silayev at the extraordinary USSR Congress of People's Deputies, saying the new economic community of our sovereign republics will be of interest to other CEMA member countries. This forecast seems to be

coming true even before this community takes on real shape. Here is Viktor Samarin, our correspondent in Bulgaria:

[Samarin] Although no official statements on this score has yet been heard here, today's leading papers, in their reports from Moscow, single out Ivan Silayev's words to the effect that Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland may join the new voluntary economic union if they so wish, but it is not a question of any revival at a new level of the ties which existed under the CEMA system. The first commentaries by Bulgarian economists, whatever the range of opinions, boil down to this, that Bulgaria has an objective if not vital interest in stabilizing its position in the Soviet market, and that fundamentally new forms of cooperation between sovereign entities in this market will awaken all of its boundless potential and put it into motion. [Passage omitted]

Antidrug Agreements Signed by Argentina, Mexico, Peru

PY0509192891 Moscow Radio Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 2 Sep 91

[Report by Aleksandr Grapov, Radio Moscow correspondent in Lima, Peru, for the "Latin America in Focus" feature]

[Text] Argentina and Peru and Mexico and Peru have signed separate agreements on cooperation in the struggle against abuse of and illegal trade in narcotics and psychotropic substances as well as to classify crimes against health in the field of drug trafficking and addiction. These actions will be carried out through their respective—appropriate—organizations and national services, which will implement technical-scientific assistance and will frequently exchange information on these subjects.

Concerning the agreement with Argentina, in order to achieve their goals, the sides will form a joint Peruvian-Argentine commission made up of representatives of the appropriate organizations and national services of the two states. This commission will be the mechanism for cooperation in the prevention and control of drug abuse and the repression of illegal trade in narcotics and psychotropic substances.

The commission will recommend appropriate actions to achieve the goals proposed in the agreement. It will make the necessary recommendations for changing the agreement to the respective governments.

The commission's work will be coordinated through reports by the foreign ministries of the two countries. There will be alternating meetings in each country and diplomatic channels will also be used.

Concerning Mexico, the allocation and application of human, financial, and material resources required for the implementation of concrete programs will be individually defined by the sides in order to meet their budget possibilities.

The agreement seeks to reduce the illegal demand for narcotics and psychotropic substances through activities involving prevention, treatment, and public conscience. It also seeks to eradicate illegal narcotics crops and, where appropriate, to implement substitution programs. The agreement seeks to stop or suppress the development of activities linked to drug trafficking or addiction.

A Peru-Mexico cooperation committee, made up of both operative and consultative coordinating officials, will be established.

Cuban Dissidents To Pressure Against Aid for Castro

PA0509181391 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1054 GMT 5 Sep 91

[Report by Enrique Ibanez]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Sep (EFE)—Dissident Cuban exile leaders, who are in Moscow to learn of the Soviet Union's intentions regarding Cuba, told EFE on 5 September that they want to pressure the USSR to economically "smother" the regime of President Fidel Castro.

"Cuban-American Foundation" Director Francisco Hernandez stated during an interview with EFE that the group's objective is "to try to get the USSR to suspend all the aid economic and military aid it provides Cuba."

The Cuban dissidents are using for their own purposes the failure of the 19 August coup, which has prompted the acceleration of the reform process within the USSR and to a large degree entail a change in its relations with some countries owing to the CPSU's loss of influence.

Hernandez, who arrived in Moscow along with Foundation President Jorge Mas Canosa, said "we came to know about the situation in the Soviet Union, which seems extremely uncertain, and to know what its policy toward Cuba will be in the future."

Cuban dissidents, as well as the U.S. State Department, regard this situation as the most appropriate moment to again pressure Soviet authorities to reduce and even suspend all aid to the Cuban regime.

Recent statements by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, supporting the total suspension of "aid in exchange of nothing" to countries regarded as "friends" until a short while ago, are bolstering the dissidents's wishes.

Those remarks, interpreted as a warning to the Castro regime, were made before the coup and have gained greater significance since Yeltsin has become a key figure with great power in the future of the USSR.

With the new situation that has arisen, Cuban dissidents abroad and the U.S. administration, which has always made the possibility of granting assistance to the USSR contingent on Moscow's suspension of aid to Havana, have rushed to remind the Soviet leaders of their stances.

"We want to influence to the extent possible the decisions Russian and Soviet authorities may make regarding their future relations with Cuba," Hernandez indicated.

In specific terms, he added, "we would want a confirmation from Moscow that it is suspending all economic and military aid to the Fidel Castro tyranny."

With that same purpose, Human Rights Committee Chairman Ricardo Boffil sent a letter to Yeltsin, stating that the "economic assistance your nation provides the Cuban Government is largely used to prolong the rule of Stalinist terror that has consumed Cuba for over three decades."

As its leaders admit, the difficult Cuban situation can grow worse if the USSR suspends or reduces its assistance, estimated at approximately \$4 billion for this year.

The Cuban dissidents' views will receive renewed backing with the visit U.S. Secretary of State Baker is scheduled to conduct next week to attend a forum on "the human dimension" that is organized by the "Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe."

The ultimate objective of the Cubans who have come Moscow to discuss the topic of Cuba is to get the USSR to give "the final blow" to the Castro regime by suspending its economic aid.

'New Principles' Govern Trade With DPRK

*PM0309114591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Aug 91 Second Edition p5*

[Correspondent S. Tikhomirov article: "Not From Scratch"]

[Text] Pyongyang—Just over a century has passed since two countries, Russia and Korea, embarked on the path of building official trade relations.

After the formation of the DPRK, ties between the two neighbors naturally became qualitatively different. Until very recently, for example, annual Soviet-Korean trade amounted to approximately 1.5 billion rubles [R]. As far as North Korea was concerned, we were not only a major consumer of its exports but also an economic "donor." Until very recently, hundreds of Soviet specialists in all kinds of professions worked here....

But what about now?

Now we have admitted that what we called dynamic, mutually advantageous cooperation for many years was not quite that, to put it mildly. After all, what really happened? Well, for example, our State Planning Committee would issue the latest five-year plan for the USSR. A five-year plan of "cooperation," including the Koreans, would immediately be tacked on. With one sweep of the pen by a senior official, enterprises would be forced to make deliveries to the DPRK which often did not even feature in their contracts and were not to our advantage.

Were all agreements implemented?

Certainly not. Neither on our side nor on the Korean side. Sometimes, entire enterprises in the Soviet Union were forced to "take a break," whether they liked it or not. Finally, the DPRK's debt snowballed. Incidentally, according to official statistics, it now stands at R2.7 billion.

Under the new intergovernmental agreement on trade and economic cooperation for 1991, signed at the end of April, the Korean side has pledged to reduce its debt by R500 million, in particular by supplying consumer goods, electronic appliances, and light industrial goods. But, to be frank, it is precisely this clause in the document that arouses misgivings in me. After all, that was the estimated total for all the DPRK's exports to our country last year. And, according to people who took part in the talks, our partner's mood does not inspire any great optimism. The situation in our country is difficult, the Koreans said. So it is possible that we will not be able to supply everything.

It will take months to sort out the rest of the debt.

The new bilateral agreement is fundamentally different from all previous agreements in providing unequivocally for a transition to freely convertible currency and world prices in mutual accounts.

One of the participants in the talks told me that the signed document has put everything in its place. Any illusions the Korean partners may have had about reverting to the old

forms of cooperation have been dispelled. He added: I would call this agreement an agreement on new principles.

Perhaps for the first time ever, our country has outlined the situation and its understanding of the situation extremely frankly and, despite attempts to give the discussion ideological overtones, has insisted that it is only concerned with a businesslike, mutually advantageous partnership. But what used to happen in the past?

Well, for example, the R1.5 billion at which our trade with the DPRK last year was estimated was reckoned in clearing rubles. That meant that the Soviet supplier had only Soviet currency. Generally speaking, it is more true to say that the system of trading with the aid of clearing "bonds," practiced until recently, was to the Koreans' advantage and our disadvantage. Under this system, real payments for deliveries were carried over year after year—in different proportions, of course—to the end of the next year. The result: billions in unclaimed debts.

"About five years ago," I was told at the Soviet Trade Mission in Pyongyang, "our country began its so-called regulation of goods, which often had amazing results. Perhaps the DPRK would fail to fulfill the plan to supply the USSR with zinc, selling it to third countries for dollars or yen instead. Offended, we would reduce the plan to supply the DPRK with oil (we used to supply it with more than 500,000 tonnes of this raw material every year) and sell the barrels thus saved to the West for hard currency—in order to buy Korean zinc on the Western market. The conclusion was obvious: We had to give up this mythical clearing system and switch to freely convertible currency."

The new agreement has another important feature. For the first time, Soviet enterprises and associations will work directly with Koreans on established lists of goods. They will decide for themselves what is profitable and what is not.

The only project with which our state "saddled" under the new agreement is to think seriously [dovedeniye do uma] about the construction of the East Pyongyang Heat and Electric Power Plant. This has been done in response to the Koreans' urgent requests to complete what we started together and thereby partially help to resolve their serious energy problems. We have pledged to supply \$15 million in credit, to be used solely to pay for the necessary equipment from the Soviet Union: Not a cent will go toward Soviet personnel's wages. The Koreans still have an acute need of our specialists, it will be said to their credit. So they will have to pay.

The fate of other cooperation projects is still unknown. Although, immediately after the agreement was signed, things started moving at talks on continuing a comprehensive study of the site of a future nuclear power plant, construction of which was on the point of being axed. If we are talking about new plans, we should obviously mention the project under which the Koreans will build 20,000 apartments for Soviet fishermen in the Far East: in Nakhodka and Vladivostok, to be precise. A plan to make

more extensive use of the Koreans' ship repair facilities must also be of mutual benefit.

In other words, there is a desire to cooperate. All the same, a century is quite a long time for these two neighboring countries to gain experience of trading together, you must agree. During this time, we and the Koreans have adapted to one another and learned how the other side operates. The most important point is that both sides have apparently come to realize that the USSR and the DPRK have an objective interest in one another and in a mutually advantageous partnership.

Japanese Banker Explains Investment Plan

PM0309120191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 Aug 91 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with Ryutaro Omori, president of the Niigata Chuoginko Bank, by PRAVDA correspondent I. Latyshev in Tokyo in August: "We Are Prepared to Cooperate, But..."]

[Text] Ryutaro Omori, president of the Niigata Chuoginko Bank, is a well-known name in the Japanese business world. He is the man responsible, incidentally, for introducing a unified computer system in Japanese banks.

R. Omori's activity has recently drawn the attention of local businessmen again. The reason is that in March this year he set up a new joint-stock firm: the Company to Accelerate Investment in the USSR. As chairman of the board, R. Omori has begun to tackle one of the most complex, important tasks of Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation: Attracting Japanese capital to play an extensive role in the USSR's economic development.

Our conversation with R. Omori took place during a scheduled visit to Tokyo, where he had been taking part in a Japanese-Soviet symposium on cooperation issues.

[Latyshev] Could you tell us why you have set up the Company to Accelerate Investment in the USSR?

[Omori] Considerable opportunities for expanding Japanese-Soviet trade have now appeared. The port of Niigata, which lies close to Soviet shores, can play an important role in this.

Major investment is a risky business, of course: The political situation in your country is still unstable and the economy is in crisis. In these conditions, you are not likely to find many Japanese companies that would agree to take such risks alone. It is another matter when several dozen firms set up a common fund, pay a comparatively small proportion of their capital into it, and use it to promote investment in the Soviet economy. With this kind of option, the risks are not so dangerous: Even if a deal falls through, the material losses of each of the partners involved will not be so great. Within the framework of our newly formed company, the cost of exploring possibilities for investment in the Soviet economy will be jointly borne by 60 Japanese firms, including major firms like Kawasaki Seiitetsu, Fujitsu, Oji Seishi, Obayashigumi, and others. In

any case, all of them are very interested in taking part in the development of Japanese-Soviet business cooperation.

[Latyshev] Are there any specific ideas as to what form this cooperation should take?

[Omori] Take Oji Seishi, for example. With our assistance, its specialists are studying the possibility of modernizing paper enterprises on Sakhalin. We have quite close contacts with Intourist. Here our aim is to invest in building hotels in Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, and Vladivostok. Several initial agreements connected with our involvement in building and equipping hotel complexes have already been signed. We are also holding talks with Khabarovsk Television on taking part in setting up a center to service the Japanese mass media.

[Latyshev] Why are you confident that Japanese capital invested in our economy will benefit both sides?

[Omori] When setting up a company to accelerate Japanese investment in the Soviet Union, I worked on the basis that, first, the general situation in the Soviet Union will certainly stabilize in the future. Second, our business needs prospects: The Japanese economy's future is not totally unclouded, after all. We can say with certainty that there are going to be shortages of raw materials and manpower. Siberia has vast natural resources, however. And as far as manpower is concerned, the USSR is going to find itself with a surplus as a result of defense conversion and other economic reforms. All this as a whole creates favorable preconditions for close collaboration between our two countries' economies.

[Latyshev] It is well known that some Japanese businessmen feel it would be ill-advised to invest capital in developing Siberia and the USSR Far East, because there is no adequate infrastructure. Do you agree with this theory?

[Omori] The poorly developed infrastructure of the Soviet Union's eastern regions certainly puts off a lot of people. For example, could a Japanese businessman arriving in Khabarovsk efficiently conduct affairs with his firm's board if he had no fax machine to hand or even a reliable telephone line? Establishing a good communications system and other infrastructural elements will require major capital investment. It would be most helpful if the Japanese government were to give your country substantial targeted credit. No such credit is foreseen at present, however. So what is the solution to this situation? At this stage, I think the Soviet Union should involve equipment which the Soviet Army possesses in large quantities—including transport aircraft, helicopters, tow trucks, and so forth—in laying the foundations of an infrastructure.

[Latyshev] How does the Japanese government feel about what you are doing?

[Omori] The whole point is that the government attaches paramount importance to resolving the controversial territorial problem. For this reason, it will not take steps to give your country credit until the problem has been

resolved. For all that, however, it does not stand in the way of private firms' activity in this direction and even encourages it.

[Latyshev] What kind of difficulties do Japanese businessmen encounter in the Soviet Union?

[Omori] Perhaps one of the greatest difficulties is the lack of clarity as to who is in charge of land in your country. We encountered this problem during talks on building hotels in Khabarovsk. The chairman of the Khabarovsk City Soviet Executive Committee allocated a site on which we could build, but three months later we were informed that residential buildings were to be erected on this same site in accordance with the city plan. Under this system, there is no guarantee that the land on which our firms build hotels will not suddenly be taken away from them. A new man could assume leadership of the city administration, for example, and abolish the decisions of the previous authorities. Consequently, in my view, if the rights and interests of foreign firms building on Soviet territory are to be protected, a law must be adopted that will guarantee the payment of compensation if authorities make unforeseen changes to the terms of land use.

[Latyshev] As a businessman, how would you like to see the Soviet Union in the future: As a single federative state or a confederation of individual states?

[Omori] First of all, we businessmen would like to see clarity on this matter as soon as possible. At the moment, it is often hard to make out whether something comes under Union or republic jurisdiction. Take Intourist, for example. This institution would seem to be under Union jurisdiction. We are told, however, that from next year it will be under the authority of the republics. What will happen to our firms with all their agreements to build Intourist hotels in various cities and republics? No one knows. I also am not sure that there will not be confusion in distributing powers between Union and republic authorities, and also the authorities of autonomous formations. This is fraught with undesirable consequences for us as far as banking activity is concerned. Who will know which ruble we should base our transactions on: the Georgian ruble, the Russian ruble, or some other ruble? In my view, the USSR State Bank should stand up for a single monetary unit for the whole country and the Union government should firmly regulate the ruble exchange rate in relation to foreign currency. Without this kind of Union control, foreign businessmen could find themselves in a difficult position.

It will also be hard for us to do business with your country if the present Soviet embassy in Japan is replaced by 15 separate embassies. Consequently, in my conversations with Soviet people I say that perestroika is a good thing but must be carried through purposefully. I remind them that the most important factor behind the rapidity with which the Japanese economy was reorganized and rebuilt in the postwar years was the presence of a strong, centralized authority in the shape of the occupying U.S. Army staff led by General MacArthur. MacArthur's staff used its authority to freeze investments and accounts whenever

necessary and ruthlessly eradicated the country's black market mafia. The occupying authorities implemented economic reforms with equal determination. That is why it took only five-six years to reorganize and completely rebuild the postwar Japanese economy. Unfortunately, local authorities in the Soviet Union far from always implement the decisions of the center.

[Latyshev] How do you see the future of Japanese-Soviet relations?

[Omori] I think that in the future Japan will be more oriented toward cooperation with the Soviet Union's eastern regions, including Siberia. Incidentally, Japanese business circles have been discussing more and more often lately ideas for a future zone where Japan's economic interests predominate. Some have put forward the idea of creating a "Sea of Japan zone," while others are in favor of forming a "north Pacific zone," which would include not only the USSR's eastern regions but Alaska and Canada as well. At the moment these are just idle projects. As far as our company is concerned, we intend to cooperate with any region of your country.

Japan Sees Baltic-Northern Territory Link

91UN2563B Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
28 Aug 91 Union Edition p 5

[Article by *IZVESTIYA* correspondent S. Agafonov: "Japan Links Recognition of Baltic Independence to the Return of 'Northern Territories'"]

[Text] In Tokyo they continue to comment vigorously on a statement made last Monday by the chief of the chancellery of the prime minister, according to which Japan expressed its readiness to recognize the sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and establish relations with them. This is an extraordinary step for Japanese diplomacy, notwithstanding the fact that "the declaration of intent" was made during a period of so-called "barrage" of recognition of the independence of the Baltic republics by leading Western countries and, consequently, cannot be classified as a diplomatic sensation. At any rate, the interpretation of this step offered to the general public by officials and mass media cannot be called ordinary.

The reason for this diplomatic peculiarity is found in the fact that calculations of a different nature colored by opportunism became the main motive compelling Tokyo to undertake the Baltic maneuver, rather than an effort to support the three republics in their struggle to become independent and secede from the Union or a desire to encourage democratic processes under way in the USSR through the fact of recognition. A parallel between the annexation of the Baltic area and the seizure of the South Kurils is being clearly drawn and emphasized in statements by Japanese officials; in the process, both acts of Stalinist diplomacy are bracketed together in a category of equally significant mistakes of the past which are in need of adequate historical correction. The identity of the situation in the Baltics and the issue of "the Northern Territories" affirmed in Tokyo injects a new element into the context of relations between our countries—"Baltic

linkage." The fact that the gaining of independence by the Baltic territories is defined by the Japanese as a point of departure for solving the problem of "the Northern Territories" indicates that this is for real and for the long term.

Our fellow countrymen may have difficult considerations in this regard, at the very least because the history of the two problems and the circumstances of their emergence differ. However, in the final count, evaluations and assessments of someone else's diplomatic ingenuity are beside the point. As I see it, the issue of consistency and logic in the sphere of historical linkage is far more important.

Let me explain what I mean. First of all, following the Baltics the Japanese may turn to the Black Sea and recognize the independence of Moldova because its appearance on the Soviet map, incidentally, as well as the acquisition of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia by the USSR, are links of the same chain. Apparently, a Japanese embassy in Kaliningrad (formerly Koenigsberg) may come next. After this, it is logical to move on to issues of the more remote past and link "the Northern Territories" to the struggle for the independence of and against the annexation of the Crimean Khanate, the Golden Horde, and the Bukhara Emirate...

The main point of this entrancing exercise is not to stop halfway through, and not to be afraid of difficulties. There will be difficulties indeed, because it is difficult to "keep history in parallel." On a serious note, I have considerable doubts as to whether the Baltic linkage will help solve the problem of "the Northern Territories." The issue of ownership of the South Kurils should be resolved, but not at all on the triumphant wave of Baltic sovereignty.

Finally, one more essential point. So, Tokyo would not have recognized the independence of the three republics had there been no "Northern Territories?" This is a rhetorical question, but it is unavoidable if there is to be linkage...

South Korea To Send Delegation to Moscow

LD3108185891 Moscow TASS in English 1323 GMT
29 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Kuchko]

[Text] Tokyo, August 29 (TASS)—The South Korean Government has announced it will send a delegation to Moscow to discuss the further improvement of bilateral relations. Among items to be discussed will be a three billion dollar credit to the Soviet Union, a Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson said today.

The delegation is expected to meet Russian President Boris Yeltsin and make an official invitation for him to visit South Korea.

During the visit, the Korean delegation hopes to receive first-hand information on the fast-changing situation in the Soviet Union.

Political aspects concerning the official recognition of the independence of the Baltic republics by the South Korean Government will also be discussed at the meeting, the official said.

It was pointed out there are numerous good examples of mutually beneficial Soviet-Korean economic cooperation.

The Korean chemical corporation unveiled plans to set up a joint venture in Kyrgyzstan to produce rare-earth elements widely used in electronic, optical and metallurgical industries.

The Korean side will grant a forty five million dollar loan for construction of the plant producing scandium, yttrium and lanthanum. It will be put into operation by 1993.

The well-known Korean company Goldstar produced its first batch of Soviet made colour tv sets this year.

Rogachev on Success of Cambodia Talks

LD0109084391 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1550 GMT 30 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Viktor Zatsepin]

[Excerpt] Phatthaya, 30 August (TASS)—[passage omitted: general information on completion of Cambodia talks] After the agreement on cease-fire and suspension of international military aid, which the Cambodian groups reached two months ago here in Phatthaya, an important stage in the process of settlement of the situation in Cambodia has been reached and, in the opinion of many participants in the meeting, historic results have been achieved, USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Rogachev stated.

A good chance for "concluding the Cambodian problem within the next two or three months has now been presented itself," he noted.

I. Rogachev stressed "the flexible position" taken by the Cambodian delegation in the course of the session. Its government, he said, with the aim of the rapid settlement of the situation in the country, has made a whole number of substantial compromises which have in many ways speeded up decisions on a whole series of important questions. The USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs also noted that the PRC-Vietnam talks on the situation in Cambodia which took place before this were very important for the success of the Phatthaya meetings.

However, the Soviet diplomat warned about "euphoria, because participants in the negotiations still face many complicated questions in need of solution," including general elections which are to be held in Cambodia.

Radio Views Sino-Vietnamese Ties After POW Release

BK0109125091 Moscow Radio Moscow in Vietnamese
1200 GMT 31 Aug 91

[Station commentary]

[Text] Yesterday [29 August], an important event took place along the Sino-Vietnamese border. After saying good-bye to Chinese border defense troops at an outpost at the Friendship Border Gate, a group of 23 Vietnamese returned to Vietnam. The following are comments by our station commentator:

It can be said that those scenes covered by the Chinese television networks are of historic significance. This is the last batch of Vietnamese prisoners captured by China in the 1979 conflict. All other Vietnamese prisoners have already been returned to Vietnam. Is this a gesture of friendship? Of course it is!

However, this is not all. In fact, this event means that one of the gloomiest chapters of Sino-Vietnamese relations has been closed. Apparently, both Hanoi and Beijing do not want to recall the incidents that happened 12 years ago. According to some witnesses, even Chinese movie theaters no longer screen films containing anti- Vietnam themes with scenes of Vietnamese troops dropping dead amid the flames and gunfires mounted by Chinese cinematographers.

Sino-Vietnamese relations are on the threshold of full normalization. According to diplomats of both countries, this may take place this coming October or November. The Vietnamese foreign minister is expected to visit Beijing next month to discuss preparatory work for a summit meeting. The agenda of discussions will also include the opening of the Sino-Vietnamese border to promote economic and trade exchanges as well as to facilitate contacts between the two peoples.

The cold relations between Hanoi and Beijing have begun to thaw immediately after the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in May 1989. Of course, this event is also the result of the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in September of the same year. At the same time, those countries involved in the Cambodian conflict have made joint efforts to work out a quick solution.

Though everything has not proceeded as quickly as expected, all parties involved have finally reached the last step leading to the settlement of the Cambodian problem. One does not rule out the possibility of reconvening the Paris conference by the end of this fall to end this conflict.

In the meantime, China and Vietnam have taken new steps aimed at resolving bilateral issues and at helping the Cambodian parties achieve reconciliation.

Japan Says Favorable Conditions Exist for Peace Treaty

*OW3008175991 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1628 GMT 30 Aug 91*

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" program; following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] As "INTERFAX" reported yesterday, 29th August, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev found time, in spite of his heavy work schedule, to receive the Japanese Deputy

Foreign Minister, Mr. Saito. A high-ranking official of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Pacific and South East Asia Department said in an interview with a "DP" correspondent that the meeting was very brief, lasting only 15 minutes. Mr. Gorbachev was therefore able to familiarise himself with the contents of a personal letter from Japanese Premier Kaifu, delivered by the Deputy Minister, only by the latter's words.

The Soviet leader was informed that Prime Minister Kaifu very much welcomes the democratic changes taking place in the Soviet Union which, says the letter, "are being greeted with enthusiasm in Japan". The letter also said that the G-7 nations, including Japan, were ready to help the USSR implement its economic and political reforms. Japan says that support is conditional on the continuation of the reform process and also the extension of the Soviet foreign policy of "new thinking" to the Asian-Pacific region.

Explaining the content of this last condition, the Foreign Ministry official said that Japan was referring primarily of the "Northern Territories" issue and the reduction of the Soviet military presence in the Far East.

At the meeting the Japanese side told the Soviet President that they thought that favourable conditions were being created for break-throughs in bi-lateral relations, including the conclusion of a peace treaty and the development of mutually beneficial cooperation "on a very broad scale".

The Soviet diplomat who spoke to "DP" said that Gorbachev and Saito did not discuss concrete issues, nor did they discuss possible dates for the visit to Moscow by the Japanese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Neither was the question of future relations between the centre and the republics touched on at the meeting.

Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Ministry told "DP" that this was actually the main purpose of the Japanese visit. On Wednesday (28th August) the Japanese diplomat had been received by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who was also handed a personal letter from Mr. Kaifu. According to a senior official at the Russian Foreign Ministry the contents of the letter, like the meeting itself, were of a confidential nature and concerned future relations between Russia and Japan, as two neighbouring sovereign states. Nevertheless, concrete questions, such as territorial issues, were not discussed.

As far as possible dates for the visit to Moscow of Japanese Premier Toshiki Kaifu and Foreign Minister Nakayama are concerned, the Soviet Foreign Ministry told a "DP" correspondent that everything depended on the Japanese side. They confirmed that the invitation to the Japanese leaders to visit the Soviet Union still stood. The Foreign Ministry also suggested that the first official contact between newly-appointed Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin and his Japanese counterpart take place at the new session of the United Nations General Assembly, due to open in late September. "The future agenda for Russo-Japanese contacts" will probably be determined there.

Retired General Says Akhromeyev Ordered KAL Shot Down

*LD0109040591 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0600 GMT 30 Aug 91*

[Text] It is well known that one should either say good things about the departed or say nothing. But this is the information which we have received from the NOVOSTI AGENCY. [Name indistinct], a high-ranking retired general, told [words indistinct] witness [words indistinct] Korean airliner during the night of 1 September 1983. A group of top officers, including Marshal Akhromeyev, this general states, were in the office of Marshal Ogarkov, the chief of the general staff late in the evening. The collective preparation of his speech to the forthcoming CPSU plenum was under way. One of numerous telephones started ringing. Marshal Akhromeyev lifted the receiver. He listened and told Ogarkov that an unidentified aircraft was flying over Kamchatka and Sakhalin. Ogarkov replied that everything should be clarified. However, to the surprise of those present, Marshal Akhromeyev ordered that the aircraft be shot down and put down the receiver. The retired general thinks that a special investigation into this matter could easily establish the truth.

ROK To Fulfill Promised Loan of 3 Billion Dollars

*SK0109100791 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1100 GMT 31 Aug 91*

[Text] ROK President No Tae-u said that the Seoul administration will provide the Soviet Union with the promised 3 billion dollar loan in accordance with the bilateral agreement.

President No Tae-u, known as the head of the ruling Democratic Liberal Party [DLP], in his meeting with DLP Chairman Kim Yong-sam, expressed his confidence that, in spite of the difficult situation in the USSR, Seoul-Moscow relations will constantly develop.

Full Clarification of S. Korean Airliner Incident Urged

*LD0109101691 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 0630 GMT 1 Sep 91*

[Viktor Levin commentary]

[Text] I should now like to draw your attention to a sad date. Eight years ago, on 1 September 1983, a South Korean civil aviation aircraft flying in our airspace was shot down near the island of Moneron by a Soviet fighter interceptor aircraft. Our observer Viktor Levin recalls this tragic event and the lessons stemming from it.

[Levin] The approach of the Soviet Union to this tragedy has undergone a colossal change. This year for the first time in eight years a large group of relatives of those who died have arrived on the island of Moneron, which is situated 70 km from Sakhalin, and will be able to hold a requiem mass for the dead. The pieces of the aircraft and obviously the people aboard it who died are at rest in the

vicinity of the island. There were 267 people in all, including women and children.

It was a terrible tragedy about which everything is still far from clear. Much has been clarified, and in this regard one should praise IZVESTIYA journalists who conducted a very profound investigation. One should also now especially take note of the promise by Marshal Shaposhnikov, the new defense minister, to open up the archives and for our part to completely clarify this incident. This would be very good, since there are still gaps to be filled in the description of the situation on our side. However, there are also secrets that are still being stubbornly kept by the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The International Civil Aviation Organization could also clarify matters. This needs to be done. Complete clarity is needed to see that such a tragedy can never occur again. This is of course a painful and agonizing process, but cleansing oneself of the dirt is an indispensable condition for making progress. This needs to be done, and on this sad anniversary I wanted to say so.

Rogachev Optimistic on Cambodian Settlement Prospects

*LD0309042191 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1920 GMT 2 Sep 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vasiliy Titov]

[Text] Moscow, 2 September (TASS)—If we manage to put out the hotbed of armed conflict in Indochina by the end of this year, and there are already encouraging signs of just such a development in the process of a Cambodian settlement, this will certainly lead to a significant improvement of the situation in southeast Asia and better prospects for strengthening peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. This is the opinion of Igor Rogachev, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR. He headed the Soviet delegation at the recently concluded meeting in the Thai town of Pattaya between representatives of the UN Security Council permanent member countries.

In an interview to a TASS correspondent today, Igor Rogachev said that both the atmosphere of constructive discussion of the issues, created by the efforts of all those attending the meeting, and the noticeable progress in the matter of achieving agreement on the key problems of a Cambodian settlement between the four Khmer groups, are the basis for these optimistic appraisals. The latter has to do with the conclusion of an understanding for a 70 percent cut in the armed forces of the opposing sides and the stationing of the remaining 30 percent in locations strictly allocated for this and monitoring of their weapons by special UN representatives. The Khmer sides reached this decision during a session of the Supreme National Council (SNC) of Cambodia held in Pattaya immediately before the meeting of the "Five".

Another important factor, in Igor Rogachev's opinion, is the fact that it was possible to merge the two formats for the Cambodian talks process—the international and the inter-Khmer—and hold a joint session of representatives

of the "Five", the Supreme National Council and Indonesia, which is the co-chairman of the Paris peace conference on Cambodia. This made it possible to discuss practically all questions connected with the preparation of the final part of the conference, the deputy minister noted. Only one problem remained unresolved: the mechanism for organizing national elections.

Igor Rogachev said that the next steps in preparing an all-embracing Cambodian settlement will be meetings between representatives of all the countries that took part in the Paris conference on Cambodia this September during the routine session of the UN General Assembly, and a session of the SNC in Bangkok in October. If this stage is successful, attainment of the concluding stage of the settlement will be a reality, and a coordinating committee for holding the conference could be set up as soon as the end of October.

"If the spirit of cooperation and coordination which ran through all the talks held in Pattaya is maintained, all the essential work on completing the conference, including the signature of the concluding documents, could be ended by 14 November, the date on which the SNC headquarters opens in Phnom Penh," Igor Rogachev said in conclusion.

Asia Trading House Wants Regional Hurdles Removed

*OW0209011691 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0001 GMT 2 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Asia Trading House [ATH] set up by the Soviet government last week is planning to help clear trading difficulties between the Soviet Union and former socialist countries of Asia. Experts say apart from China, their combined debt to the Soviet Union runs at more than Rb1 [Rubles] 30 bn[billion], and bilateral trade slumped to 10-15 percent on the same period last year because of a shift to account-settling in hard currency.

ATH experts believe the implementation of a number of international projects can help ease the existing tension, including the employment of Soviet experts in projects in Mongolia and South East Asia, with a possible attraction of third countries.

ROK Firm Negotiates Central Russia Deal

*OW0209011891 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0001 GMT 2 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] South Korea's giant, Kolon, which opened its office in Moscow a year ago, will probably set up a production line for the assembly of TV-set and car tape recorders at Bryansk electrical engineering plant, central Russia.

Kolon's blueprint provides for the manufacture of tape recorders to equip its export cars to Europe. Under the proposed deal, some components and units will be manufactured by the local plant, which also specialises in the

production of tape recorders. However, the remainder is to be imported from South Korea either on credit or barter.

Plant officials are also keen to get South Koreans help with the production of TV-set for domestic consumers.

IZVESTIYA To Continue KAL Downing Probe

*91UF1125A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Sep 91
Union Edition p 6*

[Article by Andrey Illesh: "The Mystery of the Korean Boeing- 747"]

[Text] On the night of 31 August-1 September 1983, in the sky over Sakhalin, a gigantic passenger airplane of the South Korean airline was shot down by a Soviet fighter-interceptor. All 269 passengers and crew members died. Over 30 reports in the investigative series on this tragedy have been published in IZVESTIYA under the heading "The Mystery of the Korean Boeing-747." This publication by our newspaper has caused serious reverberations in the mass media in many countries. On this anniversary of the sad date, we are returning to this topic: Aleksandr Shalnev in IZVESTIYA's New York bureau has received a letter from the families of those who perished over Sakhalin. We are publishing it in a slightly abridged form.

"...For eight years, families of the victims in this tragedy—people from 16 countries, including Canada, Great Britain, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States—have been trying to find out the truth about this tragedy.

"The Soviet Government is a member of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). However, it has not made any information regarding the fate of the passengers available to the ICAO; neither has it produced the "black boxes." It took the courageous initiative of the investigation by IZVESTIYA journalists to shed light on the aftermath of this tragedy.

"Numerous letters have been sent by the families of the victims of the tragedy to many statesmen, including President Gorbachev. There were personal meetings on the highest level in regard to this tragedy; there were diplomatic notes from many countries... All of this either went unanswered, or encountered a wall of denials.

"We now know that this civilian aircraft that wandered into Soviet air space was not given help to return to its correct flight path. The aircraft was shot down as an unidentified object. The Korean airline has already been punished in an American court—for the disregard of flight rules by its crew. The pilots paid for it with their lives. The tragedy continues to cast a shadow on the relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. Therefore we appeal to IZVESTIYA to help us to have our loved ones returned—dead or alive; to have personal belongings and debris returned; to receive fair compensation for the grieving families—on a humane basis; to obtain the return of the "black boxes"; to make public all reports and all information related to the fate of the aircraft; to receive, in a conversation with your leadership,

an apology for the unjustified destruction of the aircraft; and to hold a memorial service with the participation of all the victims' families—regardless what country they are citizens of—at the site of the crash. (On 1 September, 100 relatives of the victims arrived on a charter flight from Seoul to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and took part in a memorial ceremony. From Holmsk, they were taken by motor ship Yuriy Trifonov to the Tatar Strait and to Moneron Island. There, funeral music flew over the waves... This is an important event: For the first time, Soviet officials admitted the victims' relatives to the site of the KAL-007 crash. One can understand the bewilderment of the authors of the letter, though: Why was only the Korean side permitted to take part in the ceremony?—A.I.).

"We are appealing," conclude the authors of the letter, "to President Gorbachev and President B. Yeltsin to support our cause—in the spirit of international understanding and harmony.

"[signed] Families of the KAL-007 victims."

We have already reported to our readers that IZVESTIYA intends to continue its investigation. Unfortunately, former and current (until the recent putsch) high-ranking military and the KGB leadership had been standing like a wall on the road to cracking the main mysteries of KAL-007—the ones that are concealed in the "black boxes" that were installed on the Boeing and were later retrieved from the bottom of the sea near Moneron Island.

Now the top echelon of the USSR military is being replaced. Perhaps the new people will, in a new fashion and without bowing to a falsely interpreted "honor of the uniform," have a fresh look at the eight-year old tragedy? Perhaps, the archives will finally be opened, and the results of investigations conducted secretly in 1983 by the competent organs and the military will be made public? [begin bold]In doing this, we will come closer to the truth officially,[end bold] since the lie of the Soviet version of the tragedy—at the time spread with the help of TASS, APN [NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY], and officials' press conferences—has already been disproved by the IZVESTIYA investigation, but is still considered a "state position."

The first question in this connection went to the new leadership of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. Chief of the General Staff, Major General Vladimir Lobov admitted that he is not too familiar with the circumstances of the destruction of the aircraft. However, the army general promised: He will study this issue, will familiarize himself in detail with the materials of the IZVESTIYA investigations, and will do everything possible to clear the "dark" spots of this tragic story. He also promised his assistance in the conduct of an IZVESTIYA expedition to Moneron Island, in the vicinity of which, at the depth of 200 meters, lies whatever is left of the remains of the gigantic jumbo jet. The editorial board intends to undertake the expedition and related underwater work this October.

Therefore, we can say: The IZVESTIYA investigation continues.

Nuclear Guarantee Needed for Improved DPRK-Japan Relations

*SK0509044891 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
0900 GMT 3 Sep 91*

[By station commentator Popov]

[Text] The fourth round of inter-governmental talks between Japan and North Korea to normalize relations ended on 2 September in Beijing.

Station commentator Popov writes as follows:

Before the talks many observers viewed that some issues that were not resolved in the previous talks will be resolved this time but that was not the case.

The issue of Japan's compensation toward the DPRK and the incident of the kidnapping of (Takuchi Yoko) whom Japan is claiming that North Korea committed, are not issues of priority but these were once again brought up at the talks, and as before no agreements were reached. Why was this so?

I would like to remind you that from the beginning of the talks between Japan and North Korea, it is clear that the talks were closely related to the overall situation on the Korean peninsula.

Observers view that dialogue between Tokyo and Pyongyang started under the influence of the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the ROK, and that this must play the role of a [word indistinct] due to the success in Seoul's policy toward the North. Because of this it is not a coincidence that the Beijing talks were held right after talks were held between the two Koreas. However, since North-South premiers talks were postponed to October this explains why there was not any progress in the Beijing talks.

I would like to talk briefly about the issue of nuclear safety on the Korean peninsula. This issue occupies a central position in the Tokyo-Pyongyang dialogue.

If the DPRK does not present a reliable guarantee that it will not carry out the work to build nuclear weapons within North Korea and if it does not start cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], we cannot expect to achieve any kind of progress in the Japan-DPRK talks.

The next talks are slated for November. By that time the two Koreas will have joined the United Nations. There is expectation that many issues on the Korean peninsula will be resolved due to the two Koreas' entry into the United Nations.

A draft agreement for signing the nuclear safeguards accord between the DPRK and the IAEA will be carried out and through this there is hope that dialogue between the two Koreas will be resumed.

I believe that the events that are to take place in the next two months will give answers to whether results can be achieved in the fifth round of Japan-North Korea talks.

Asian, American Companies Exhibit at Vladivostok Fair

*OW0409013991 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1830 GMT 3 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] More than 50 Asian and American companies are participating in the first international exhibition of the Asian Pacific region countries, Pan-Pacific Consumexpo-91, that opened in Vladivostok, the Far East, on Monday. Foreign companies, including Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Marubeni, and companies based in Hong Kong, South Korea, Thailand, and China put on display a variety of consumer goods, including video and audio equipment, cars, clothes, foodstuffs and catering equipment. The exhibition is intended to give a boost to the development in the Far East of a common economic structure incorporating the Soviet Pacific region.

Commentator on Suspended South-North Talks

*SK0409132691 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1100 GMT 3 Sep 91*

[Text] Today's issue of PRAVDA carries an article filed from Pyongyang about the situation on the Korean peninsula.

S. Tikhomirov, PRAVDA correspondent stationed in Pyongyang, writes: In the wake of the recent event in the Soviet Union, both Pyongyang and Seoul seem to have developed an opportunistic policy.

This is not confined only to bilateral relations with Moscow. It also concerns the prospects for talks between the two Koreas. The very complicated process of these talks is expected to become more tense this fall.

According to Sergei Tikhomirov, the postponement of the premier-level talk between the two Koreas is an indication of these tensions.

The premier-level talk should have been held in Pyongyang on 27 August but have been postponed until 22 October. Why?

The ROK believes that Pyongyang's position, which is bent on (?discussing) the event in the Soviet Union, is to blame.

PRAVDA says: In May 1985 Pyongyang had already begun to show indications of a negative attitude toward the Soviet Union. It never tried to hide its disapproval [that the coup failed].

As the foundation for relations began to collapse, relations between us [as heard] have become complicated. Our relations had been built on an identical ideology. If the event in the Soviet Union in August has been successful, it would have been an opportunity to improve relations between the two countries.

PRAVDA writes: Unlike the ROK, the North leaders went so far as to offer congratulations when tanks threatened democracy.

It is not important to say who stands in the way of the process of coordination on the Korean peninsula. Everyone is concerned about the talks between the two Koreas. There have been more serious and longer times between the two Koreas' contacts.

Tikhomirov believes: This time the two sides show an opportunistic attitude.

He also believes that the two sides can turn the hiatus into an opportunity of changing their attitude.

This has been an article by Tikhomirov, PRAVDA correspondent based in Pyongyang, on the situation on the Korean peninsula.

Uncertainty Inhibits ROK Credits to USSR

*PM0509143991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Sep 91 Union Edition p 4*

[Correspondent S. Agafonov report: "Seoul Is Not Reneging on Its Promises, But..."]

[Text] Tokyo—As is well known, the process of rapid rapprochement between Seoul and Moscow, marked by three top-level meetings in just a year, was based on a vast material subsidy, in addition to political accords and "good will" declarations.

As evidence of its sincerity and sympathy for its new partner, the Republic of Korea promised to grant the USSR various forms of credit totalling \$3 billion. Of that sum, \$500 million have already been transferred as a commercial bank credit, another \$1 billion, under the accord, was to be in the form of credit to "aid the success of perestroika," and the remaining \$1.5 billion was in the form of "linked credits" to finance the export of consumer goods and sets of industrial equipment from Korea. Talks on the latest batch of subsidies were due to begin in Seoul 30 August but have not begun yet.

There is nothing strange about it yet—the Soviet delegation has simply informed the partners of the postponement of the meeting until an unspecified date because of the complexities of Soviet life—but this enforced deferment of the talks, as far as one can judge, has pleased rather than upset the Koreans. This reaction is not hard to understand—it is not yet clear how the latest round of instability in the USSR will end, how relations between the center and the republics will shape up, and whether the center as such will be preserved at all—all these things require certainty, especially when it is a question of money.

Due tribute must be paid to the Korean side: Seoul is not reneging on earlier promises and is not expressing its intention to curtail the credit program agreed with Moscow. However, it has been stated by official spokesmen in the Korean capital that the program must be closely reexamined with a view to "making adjustments in accordance with changes in the situation in the USSR." The adjustments, in fact, are being proposed only in one sphere—the change of the addresses to which the Korean credits will go and of the areas where the injections of credit to the republics are to be made.

For the time being this is theoretical, and in practice, by all accounts, we should not expect new reports headlined "Credit Links Strengthen" before the actual situation in the Soviet Union is clarified. There is one more factor. One may presume even now that in the immediate future volumes of one-shot injections will be substantially reduced and subsidies, if they happen, will not go beyond the framework of financing Korean exports, and the main emphasis in trade and economic relations will switch to barter deals and contracts "on a compensation basis," which will be large in number but small in value.

This forecast is based not only on the sense of caution and desire to keep operations in a risky market to a minimum, characteristics typical of businessmen of all nationalities, but also on the financial realities of the ROK itself—the Seoul economy is currently experiencing a period that is neither the best nor the most stable, and South Korea has no money for credits to Moscow. The \$3 billion promised to the USSR would have to be found on the international money markets, in particular in Australia.

Borrowing from one party to lend to another is normal practice in principle. But only when there is confidence that the promissory note will be repaid on time and with interest. In the present difficult times no one can guarantee either the repayment date or the interest rate, and, indeed, who ultimately is to provide that guarantee—the center or the republics?..

Prospects of ROK-Soviet Economic Cooperation Discussed

SK0409145691 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean
4 Sep 91 p 3

[Interview with Dr. Georgiy Toloraya, director of the Secretariat of the Soviet-ROK Economic Cooperation Committee and adviser to the External Economic Relations Institute under the Soviet cabinet, by Moscow Correspondent Kim Sok-hwan on 3 September in Moscow]

[Text] During his 3 September interview with our newspaper, Georgiy Toloraya, adviser to the External Economic Relations Institute under the Soviet cabinet, said that foreign loans to the Soviet Union will be divided among the republics and will be repaid by the republics according to an economic agreement that will be signed. The Russian Republic will repay almost all of the foreign loans.

He also said: The \$3 billion loan the ROK has pledged must be given to the Soviet Union as soon as possible. However, given the possibility that there will be conflicts of interests among the republics, the ROK Government must consult not only with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations but also with each republic without fail.

Dr. Toloraya used to be in charge of ROK and North Korean affairs at the International Economy and Politics Institute (IMEPI) under the Soviet Academy of Sciences and has been appointed as director of the Secretariat of the Soviet-ROK Economic Cooperation Committee, which

was established in 1990. He also serves as adviser to the External Economic Relations Institute under the Soviet cabinet and gives advice on economic cooperation with the ROK.

[Kim] It seems to me that discussions on restructuring the union and the cabinet have been very chaotic. How do you think this will affect economic cooperation between the ROK and the Soviet Union?

[Toloraya] I think ROK-Soviet relations will be further developed. Soviet officials in charge of external economic affairs have been replaced on a large scale since the failed coup. I think this will affect the ROK very favorably. The Soviet Union maintained relations of cooperation with West European countries and Japan for decades. Its relations with the ROK span a mere two years. Therefore, officials who used to be in charge of external economic cooperation were familiar with cooperation with Germany and Japan. However, these officials have been replaced as a result of the failed coup, so this will provide a very good opportunity for the ROK.

[Kim] As the political situation has become complicated in the Soviet Union, many people in the ROK worry that our \$3 billion loan will not be repaid. I want to know what will happen to the Soviet Union's foreign loans if republics achieve independence. Who will pay back loans that the Soviet Union has received or will receive?

[Toloraya] It is natural for the ROK to worry because the Soviet Union is facing a very difficult situation. However, extensive discussions have been under way on this issue because it is very important. Laying aside political affairs, the republics will sign economic agreements among themselves and divide the debts of the central government. Almost all of the republics have agreed that this formula is reasonable, and I think that the issue will be resolved along these lines. Also, it is clear that the Russian Republic will assume almost all of the Soviet Union's debts.

[Kim] What do you think will happen to the loans the ROK has already made?

[Toloraya] I do not think the ROK's loans, and project loans (loans made for the construction of plants and other projects agreed upon between the two countries) in particular, will be readjusted automatically. The republics will compete among themselves for loans from the ROK. A plan that has been discussed so far is for the two countries to match the ROK's loans with a list of projects that the Soviet Union has presented.

The plan also calls for obtaining approval from the central government, as well as republic governments, for the projects that were agreed upon in this process. However, this has been halted because of the failed coup. As far as I know, the Russian Republic has been making a more detailed list of projects to get project loans from the ROK.

[Kim] Do you mean that it is necessary for the ROK Government to discuss the project loans not only with the central government but also with the governments of the republics?

[Toloraya] Yes. The ROK Government must have discussions not only with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations but also with each republic. I think that it must certainly have discussions with the Russian Republic. Some of the ROK's loans will go to the Ukrainian and Kazakh Republics, but almost all of them will go to the Russian Republic. Therefore, it is very important for the ROK Government to discuss the loans with the Russian Republic. I think it necessary for the ROK Government to know which republics need the ROK's commodity loans and to discuss this matter with those republics.

[Kim] Would you tell us how economic cooperation between North Korea and the Soviet Union is proceeding?

[Toloraya] Economic cooperation between North Korea and the Soviet Union has been very stagnant. The North Korean economy is facing difficulties because the Soviet Union's supply of raw material has not been smooth. This is all I know.

Moscow Views Situation on Korean Peninsula

*SK0509133391 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
0900 GMT 4 Sep 91*

[Text] An international seminar on Northeast Asian security also discussed the Korean peninsula problem. During his speech at this seminar, (Pak Chun-su), adviser on political affairs to the ROK president, said that recognition by the Soviet Union, the United States, Japan, and the PRC—the world's leading countries—of the DPRK and the ROK as sovereign states will be finalized in (?mid-1992). Our station commentator Sergey Petrov writes:

Recognizing the reality on the Korean peninsula is the first step to handling the Korean problem. Many things have taken place along this line. For example, the Soviet Union has diplomatic relations with both North and South Korea. Beijing exchanged trade representative offices with Seoul, and recent reports say that the PRC will normalize relations with Seoul as soon as the two Koreas enter the United Nations. Therefore, this issue will be resolved in the near future.

The process of normalizing Japanese-[North] Korean relations has been delayed for some time because of certain issues: Pyongyang's acceptance of nuclear inspection, Japan's payment of compensation for its damage to Korea during its colonial rule, and a series of other issues.

It is too early to say if the contact between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, in which the officials of these two countries' embassies in Beijing met, has yielded any concrete and substantial result.

Against this background, the remarks by (Han Che-pil), an ROK presidential adviser, appear realistic. That is, the Korean people's future will be determined by whether or not the world recognizes the reality that two equal states exist on the Korean peninsula.

I must point out the Soviet Union's position, in particular. During a speech at this seminar, (Aleksandr Vorontsov),

director of the Oriental Studies Institute under the Soviet Academy of Sciences, said: The Soviet Union has been particularly interested in the Korean problem. A key to concluding the process of relaxing tension on the Korean peninsula is dialogue between North and South Korea, and the Soviet Union is willing to extend all necessary assistance for dialogue between them.

Japanese Liberal Democrats Praise Heroism of Muscovites

*OW0409224691 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1900 GMT 4 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A delegation of Japanese Liberal Democrat leaders have begun a visit to Moscow at the invitation of the city's mayor, Gavriil Popov. The delegation's first official act was the laying of wreaths at the graves of those who died defending the Russian Parliament.

The leader of the delegation, former Japanese Minister of Construction and Member of Parliament, Tamisuki Watanuke, told an "INTERFAX" correspondent that the members of the delegation wanted to express their admiration for the heroism of the young Muscovites who had stood up for freedom.

During their stay in Moscow from 4th to 8th September the delegation is due to meet the Mayor of Moscow, Gavriil Popov, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and other leaders of both Moscow and Russia.

The basic aim of the visit, according to members of the delegation, is to make a direct assessment of the situation in the USSR after the attempted coup and to discuss ways of developing cooperation between Japan and the Russian Federation.

Kim Yong-sun Says DPRK Will Adhere to Socialist Road

*SK0509060591 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1100 GMT 4 Sep 91*

[From the "Asian News" part of the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] In an interview with Japan's paper NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Kim Yong-sun, secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea [WPK], stated that regardless of fierce events in the Soviet Union, the DPRK will move toward the socialist road without any wavering.

He emphasized that based on President Kim Il-song's chuche idea, the DPRK is constructing socialism. According to the words of the secretary of the party Central Committee, the person in charge of the economic, cultural, and defense fields is Kim Il-song's son, and Kim Il-song [as heard], the secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK, who is the official successor is currently personally guiding the party and the whole nation.

'Gigantic Step' Made for Cambodian Peace

91UF1139A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Sep 91 p 3

[Article by A. Golts in the "Commentator's Column": "Cambodia's Chance"]

[Text] It appears that the Thai resort locality of Phatthaya, whose involvement in international affairs was until recently restricted to periodic calls by American military vessels, will now lend its name to an agreement which will finally bring about establishing firm peace in Cambodia. Not so long ago, regular meetings of the Supreme National Council [as published] of Cambodia, as well as of the deputy ministers of foreign affairs of the states-permanent members of the UN Security Council, and Indonesia were held there. A representative of the UN secretary general also took part in the meetings.

As a result of the talks, a gigantic step was made in the cause of peace in Cambodia, a step which quite recently few even believed to be possible. I will recall that in early August, the situation in that country was such that a ceasefire was violated yet again, and bloody clashes occurred between the troops of the Phnom Penh government and the forces of the opposition. Meanwhile, an agreement is now being signed on reducing all armed formations by 70 percent. As far as the remaining contingents are concerned, they are going to be located in strictly delineated regions. As I see it, this is precisely what will provide genuine guarantees of compliance with the ceasefire agreement. This is precisely what will pave the way for holding elections in Cambodia.

To be sure, we must say that the preservation of a certain segment of military formations does not correspond to a previously developed UN settlement plan. The plan calls for unconditional and complete demobilization. Apparently, the striving of all sides to maintain at least a segment of their own armed forces testifies to a persisting lack of confidence in one another.

However, indications are that this is not the only deviation from the UN proposals. As far as we can judge, the Supreme National Council of Cambodia believes that representatives of the world community should not play a decisive role in the course of election preparations. Thus, a decision was made in Phatthaya that if differences of opinion develop between the sides, a final decision will be made by Prince Sihanouk, chairman of the Supreme National Council, rather than UN representatives. I do not think that this circumstance should be made into a serious problem. Most likely, this is a manifestation of the understandable aspiration of the Supreme National Council to demonstrate the sovereignty of Cambodia.

Unfortunately, a most significant issue, such as the system for holding elections, remains unresolved for now. However, in the opinion of a USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative, this problem may also be settled on the basis of a compromise now that crucial decisions have been made. There is every reason to hope that a solution will be found during a meeting between the Supreme

National Council and "the five" which is to be held in New York this month. In this case, there will be every opportunity to hold the Paris conference on Cambodia as early as this year; pertinent agreements could be signed in the course of this conference.

Several days ago, the Paris *LE MONDE* wrote that the world had to be changed to make a settlement in Cambodia possible. It is hard to disagree with this. Indeed, not only the Cambodian conflict but also the entire tragedy of Indochina was caused to a considerable degree by hostility and confrontation between the great powers. The United States, China, France, and the USSR were all drawn into the conflict, though at different times and to a different degree. We must admit honestly that attaining firm peace in Indochina would be impossible in the absence of a change in their approaches to world problems. It was precisely the normalization of Soviet-Chinese and Chinese-Vietnamese relations and the mutual understanding achieved between the USSR and the United States that got the cause of settlement in Cambodia off the ground. At present, the great powers set the goal of assuring peace rather than having particular groupings win. Right now, Cambodia has every chance to become an independent, neutral, and democratic state. This will signify not only the elimination of a long-standing national conflict, but also a fundamental improvement of the situation in all of Southeast Asia and in the Asian-Pacific region.

Toyota to Open Service Center in Vladivostok

OW0609010391 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2102 GMT 5 Sep 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Toyota, a Japanese carmaker which is setting up a network of service centers in the USSR, plans to open a service station, to be called Toyota Access, in Vladivostok.

With a total floor space of 9,000 square metres, the station will have car washing facilities and a parking lot accommodating 300 cars. It will accept payment in rubles for repair of Toyota cars, but spare parts will have to be paid for in hard currency. The time required for carrying out various repairs will be same as at Toyota centres in Japan.

Japan's Position on 'Northern Territories' Unchanged

OW0509170691 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1446 GMT 5 Sep 91

[Report by M. Mayorov and I. Porshnev from "Diplomatic Panorama"; following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The national Soviet daily *Izvestiya* on September 4 published a story by its Tokyo correspondent Agafonov about a conference held under the auspices of the Liberal-Democratic Party [LDP] of Japan and timed for another anniversary of what was called the "annexation of the South Kuril islands". The conference again brought up the

question of linking economic assistance to the Soviet Union with the solution of the problem of "northern territories".

A senior Japanese embassy official has told DP that to his knowledge the Japanese government's position on the question of "northern territories" has remained unchanged. The official doubted the fact that the Japanese government can make any decision on economic aid to Moscow in exchange for the return of four South Kuril islands. At the same time, the diplomat agreed that various Japanese public figures were for that linkage.

The embassy official he knew nothing [as received] of when the RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin will visit Japan, in December or January (that forecast was made at the Tokyo conference "Izvestiya" referred to). However, he pointed out that in the new situation there is a clear need for closer contacts between Japan and the Russian Federation. "I wouldn't be surprised if the Japanese government invites Yeltsin to visit Tokyo. It would be only natural to do so," the diplomat said. As long as there is no such decision it will be premature to discuss the possibility of Yeltsin's visit to Japan, he added.

The Japanese official described as a very difficult matter the possibility of Japan concluding a peace treaty with Russia, and not the Soviet Union on the whole. He said that in his view much would depend on future relations between the Russian Federation and the Centre.

The diplomat had no difficulty fielding questions about Japan's position on the independence of the Baltic republics. He agreed with a recent statement made by a Japanese cabinet minister, Mr. Sakamoto, expressing Tokyo's readiness to recognise the independence of the Baltic states.

The visit of the Japanese Government's special mission to the Baltic republics (at present the mission is visiting Latvia) is a step in this direction. The Japanese Embassy official said that the aim of the mission was clear - to inform the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania of the intentions of the Japanese Government.

As far as Japanese recognition of the independence of other republics, particularly the Ukraine, is concerned, the diplomat stressed that no decisions had yet been taken.

South Korean Delegation Heads for USSR

LD0609035191 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1300 GMT 5 Sep 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Prokhorov]

[Text] Tokyo, 5 Sep (TASS)—A South Korean government delegation led by Chang Man-sun, first vice minister of foreign affairs, took off for Moscow today, KYODO NEWS SERVICE reports.

During its eight-day stay in Moscow, the delegation intends to hold talks at which it will discuss with the Soviet side the progress made in implementing, and the prospects for implementing, the economic agreements already signed

between the two countries, specifically, the accord reached this January on granting the Soviet Union credits amounting to \$3 billion.

Chang Man-sun will convey to Boris Yeltsin, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic president, an invitation from President No Tae-u to pay an official visit to South Korea. The delegation will discuss the timing, agenda, and other matters related to the visit.

Commentator on Japanese Discussions on Providing Aid

OW0609113691 Moscow Radio Moscow in Japanese
1100 Gmt 5 Sep 91

[Commentary by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent Nikolay Tsevetkov, from Tokyo: "Will Japan's 'Milk River' Move Northward?"—read by commentator Solovyev; first name not given]

[Text] In view of the new Soviet situation following the abortive coup, the issue of economic support for the Soviet Union has been brought up in Japan once again.

In the course of discussing this issue, two approaches have been clearly indicated. The first approach reflects the tone of argument in some papers and magazines; it indicates sympathy toward the democratic shift in the Soviet Union and admiration for the courage of those Russians who had defended to the last the White House of the Russian Republic. People who tend to share the second approach are those who hold the exclusive right to decide on destiny. In the second approach, however, it is certainly not unsatisfactory to note such expressions that confirm the antitotalitarian tendency in the Soviet Union and the delightful hopes for the future.

Nevertheless, the government and top leadership of conservative parties are presently examining grounds for justifying the maintenance of the original cautious approach toward the issue on aid for the Soviet Union. An inventory of these grounds will result in three groups.

The first one concerns the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. It involves the following questions: Who should be helped? Who is the head of the Soviet Union now? Was there any head at all in the Soviet Union?

The second one concerns the most favorable factor in dealing with Soviet-Japanese relations. Above all, it involves the fact that a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty has not yet been concluded. Japan insists that it has no intention of signing this treaty before the Soviet Union definitely promises to return the southern Kurile Islands to Japan. As has been stated by official sources, unless the islands are returned, it will mean that Japan has violated the principle of not separating political concerns from economic interests.

Moreover, when viewed from other standpoints, there are still very important factors. It is true that an overwhelming majority of Japanese companies do not indicate interest in expanding business relations with the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet Union has not yet paid past debts in full. It

is most regrettable to admit that no proposals that will arouse genuine interests can be made.

Furthermore, another ground for argument is the issue regarding the so-called global character. This issue concerns the international responsibilities toward its partners, the industrialized nations, and toward the less affluent neighboring nations in the region. The Japanese Finance Ministry has made a frank announcement that its national treasury is presently empty.

In fact, Japan has contributed over \$10 billion to the Persian Gulf war alone, and it has continued its regular support for such nations as Bangladesh and the Philippines. When judged by the degree of seriousness, the situation of the Soviet people is much better than the situation in the most impoverished nations in Asia and Africa. In this connection, what remains for us now is to cherish a hope that we will be able to eliminate not just one but all of these obstacles, or at least to reduce them.

It is observed that the Western industrialized nations will soon decide on providing support for the Soviet Union. In that case, Japan will probably take the same steps with its partners.

Commentary Hails PRC's Cessation of Arms Sales to Cambodia

*OW0609223191 Moscow Radio Moscow in Mandarin
2200 GMT 5 Sep 91*

[Nikolayev commentary; from the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] Listeners, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on Thursday proclaiming that China will no longer supply arms to the Khmer Rouge and other opposition parties. Station Commentator Nikolayev says: The development is yet another sign that the flames of war in Cambodia will soon be extinguished. Recent constructive stances adopted by foreign forces embroiled in the conflict have created excellent conditions for promoting reconciliation among various Cambodian parties. After many negotiations, various Cambodian parties have completely accepted the plan jointly drafted by the UN Security Council's five permanent members.

Numerous recent meetings of various Cambodian parties and active negotiations by all pertinent nations have produced a consensus on the UN plan. Differences, however, still exist on an important but negotiable issue—the election procedure. Prince Sihanouk reportedly has proposed a compromise procedure. This indicates that a reconciliation treaty is likely to be signed at a conference scheduled to be held in Paris in October. The signing of a treaty will entail implementation and many other issues. A major development will be the gradually diminished likelihood of returning the genocidal Pol Pot regime to power.

For this reason, I think that China's decision to terminate weapons supplies to the Khmer Rouge is commendable. Moreover, I think that China's declaration of its decision prior to the Vietnamese foreign minister's visit is not

coincidental. It seems that Beijing wants to foster a good atmosphere for Sino-Vietnamese talks.

Moscow Radio Criticizes Japan's Clumsy Response to Coup

*OW0809121791 Moscow Radio Moscow in Japanese
1100 GMT 7 Sep 91*

[Text] Listeners! WORLD CHILDREN, a magazine in the Soviet Union, has published a report by Moscow Radio's Tokyo correspondent (Latwin Gorbunov). The report reads as follows:

A little past noon on 19 August, the Japanese Government made a big fuss trying to learn about the upheaval in the Soviet Union. The government made emergency inquiries to the United States and the Japanese Embassy in Moscow. As a result of the inquiries, the Japanese Government appeared to have drawn the conclusion that a situation, similar to that which occurred in the wake of the death of Stalin and the dismissal of Khruschev, and would continue for a long time in the Soviet Union. For this reason, the Japanese Government made unclear responses to the coup when the Soviet people increasingly voiced their opposition to the coup. British Prime Minister Major and German Chancellor Kohl were quick to criticize publicly actions taken by the junta. However, the Japanese Government saw the coup as an internal issue for the Soviet Union, and only issued an ambiguous statement that Japan would watch future developments. Some officials in the Japanese Government even said that Yannayev was a pro-Japan figure. A day and a half after the occurrence of the coup, Prime Minister Kaifu definitely described what occurred in Moscow as a coup. In making this remark he did not mention a word about the safety of President Gorbachev, and did not express his support for President Yeltsin of the Russian Republic. In Moscow, citizens voiced their support for President Yeltsin shortly after the coup was staged.

Japan was slow to announce the freezing of economic aid to the Soviet Union under the new leadership, and the announcement was made on 29 August [as heard] when what occurred in Moscow turned out to be a coup. Now, of course, Japan is echoing voices hailing the leadership of President Yeltsin and welcoming the restoration of democracy in the Soviet Union. Thus, Japan has reversed its attitude toward the coup. Anti-mainstream members in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] intend to make a political issue of these clumsy responses by the Japanese Government to the coup for the time being, because an LDP presidential election will be held in October to choose the prime minister. The anti-mainstream members are attacking Prime Minister Kaifu for lacking experience in international politics and leadership, and for taking an ambiguous attitude. Prime Minister Kaifu is sparing no efforts to defend himself.

Meanwhile, the Japanese Foreign Ministry is trying to allay public criticism against the government, claiming that the government must not respond hastily to complex issues. The chief cabinet secretary said that, unlike the

United States, which is far more capable at collecting information about the Soviet situation, Japan's information collection system is insufficient, thus shifting responsibility for the government's clumsy responses to the coup to the Foreign Ministry. [words indistinct] according to a YOMIURI SHIMBUN report, some officials in the Japanese Government have admitted that the Foreign Ministry

and other government ministries and agencies stuck to their conventional attitude toward the Soviet Union and failed to see the change brought about by perestroyka and glasnost, in the minds of the Soviet people.

This has been a summary of the report by Moscow Radio Tokyo correspondent (Gorbunov).

Ambassador on Talks with Pakistan, Mujahidin

PM0209141591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Aug 91 Single Edition p 3

[Interview with N.I. Kozyrev, chief of the Soviet delegation in Islamabad and USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs ambassador on special assignment, by Lieutenant Colonel R. Mustafin; date and place not specified; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction: "Afghanistan: Quest for Paths Toward Peace"]

[Text] Talks between a Soviet delegation and Pakistani leaders as well as Afghan mujahidin took place in Islamabad 11-12 August. A Soviet POW, 25-year-old K. Tashrifov, who was in the Afghan opposition's hands for seven years, was handed over to the Soviet representatives.

N.I. Kozyrev, chief of the Soviet delegation and USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs ambassador on special assignment, answers a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer's questions.

[Mustafin] Nikolay Ivanovich, what was the purpose of your trip to Pakistan?

[Kozyrev] The trip was a continuation of the consultations which began between the Soviet Union and Pakistan at the end of May this year in Moscow. Actually these were the first talks with Pakistani representatives since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Unlike the United Nations and the other countries involved in the conflict—the United States and Iran—prior to that our consultations with Islamabad were irregular. Furthermore, we have resumed our contacts with the Afghan opposition, which were started back in 1988 in Riyadh, when a meeting was held between mujahidin representatives and Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs.

The main theme of the Islamabad talks was the quest for ways of settling the Afghan problem.

[Mustafin] At what level were the talks held?

[Kozyrev] The talks were held at Foreign Ministry level. The Pakistani delegation was headed by Shakhriyar Khan [name as transliterated], Pakistan's first deputy minister for foreign affairs. Conversations were also held with Pakistani President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif, and A. Zaki [name as transliterated], general director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We also met with Afghan opposition representatives: Mokhammadi [name as transliterated], leader of the Movement for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan; grouping representatives Hekmatyar, Rabbani, and Mojadeddi; and Shi'ite groupings.

[Mustafin] How did the talks go and what questions did you discuss?

[Kozyrev] The main question that was raised by our side was about the need to start an inter-Afghan dialogue. A settlement in Afghanistan is impossible without that being set in motion. However fine the initiatives put forward by the USSR, the United States, or the United Nations may

be, they will remain on paper unless the Afghans themselves accept them. Pakistan agrees with this in principle. However, people there think that the mujahidin will not sit at the negotiating table with the Kabul government. And yet we agreed that there are possibilities for starting this dialogue. It is not obligatory to ensure that the Afghan opposition starts talks with Najibullah right now. There are various ways. For example, talks via intermediaries or short-distance talks.

On the question of a transitional period during which free elections should be held and a transitional organ set up, we proceeded from the premise that this organ must be invested with sufficient powers but it must not itself replace the government. In the opinion of the Pakistani representatives, this organ must have the widest functions of executive power. But that would mean the resignation of the Kabul government, with which we maintain diplomatic relations. We think that all sides must be on equal terms and must not be subject to discrimination when the elections are held.

[Kozyrev continues] Yet another rather complex question is that of a cease-fire and arms supplies. Our approach is to solve everything en bloc, as a package. Even assuming that the countries supplying weapons to Afghanistan—the Soviet Union, the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—stopped arms deliveries right away, the stockpiled weapons would enable both the Kabul government and the mujahidin to conduct combat operations for another two-three years. Therefore stopping deliveries will still not lead to an automatic cease-fire. Especially since, as of today, only the Soviet Union and the United States have so far declared their readiness to stop such supplies. We have not yet received a clear reply from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia about their readiness to stop arms deliveries.

Pakistan agrees with the need for a cease-fire, but is primarily stressing the cutting of military supplies.

[Mustafin] Does this mean that the talks here have reached deadlock?

[Kozyrev] No, that cannot be said. We understand how difficult it is to achieve a cease-fire overnight throughout Afghanistan. However, it is possible to begin with a selective cease-fire in some initially separate areas which are under the control of the mujahidin or the government, and then gradually extend these zones until they completely cover the country's entire territory.

[Mustafin] If you were to sum up the talks, how would you evaluate their result?

[Kozyrev] On the whole I evaluate the talks' results positively. While we basically set out our concepts on the solution to the Afghan problem in May, a good foundation for further progress forward has now been laid during in-depth consultations at expert level. The talks took place in a very favorable atmosphere, without mutual accusations. I want to note the mutual desire to meet each other half way and to work together. We are engaged in quests for constructive solutions. I think that at the next meeting, which will take place in Moscow in the very near future—

we have agreed on that—we will be able to concentrate on specific questions. Undoubtedly there has been progress.

[Mustafin] Nikolay Ivanovich, how did the talks with the mujahidin go?

[Kozyrev] The talks with them took place in a constructive atmosphere. We agreed to continue our contacts. However, the Afghan opposition's main demand is Najibullah's departure. The mujahidin think that they have now gained military superiority. In our view, military parity persists in Afghanistan and all attempts to solve the problem by violent methods will lead to a dead end.

[Mustafin] And the last question, one which worries very many people. I mean the fate of our servicemen who are still in the opposition's hands. Are there any moves on their release?

[Kozyrev] Pakistan has previously helped us to search for and release POW's. Pakistani representatives stated that they are not concealing any information from us about the fate of our people and that they will continue to help us. However, the matter is complicated by the fact that Soviet POW's are in the hands of various groupings on the territory of Afghanistan.

As you know, an interdepartmental working group has been set up under the auspices of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it comprises representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the KGB, and the Soviet Red Cross Committee. We are gathering information concerning POW's still in captivity. We have information that 12 men are currently corresponding with their relatives. First of all we are working to achieve their release. This does not mean that we have forgotten about the others.

Of course, we are grateful to everyone who helped free Kurbai Ali Tashrifov. However, we do not think that it was a gift. The release of POW's is a purely humanitarian question. For us the war in Afghanistan is over, we have left the country. And therefore all our people must be given the chance of returning to the homeland.

Indian Prime Minister Stresses Friendly Ties

LD0109094191 Moscow Central Television *Vostok*
Program and *Orbita* Networks in Russian 1500 GMT
30 Aug 91

[From the "TV Inform" newscast]

[Text] Narasimha Rao, India's prime minister, has assessed the establishment of democracy in the Soviet Union as a victory for perestroika and glasnost. He stated this in an interview that he gave Soviet Television on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the treat of peace, friendship and cooperation and the completion of two months in office for the Indian National Congress (I) government.

[Unidentified correspondent] Two months, the prime minister noted, is a short time for any government to talk about final results, but I can say with confidence that during these two months we have taken many cardinal

decisions. When we came into office, we encountered a situation that was close to being hopeless. Now the worst is already behind us. We are on the way to improving the economy. The prime minister also spoke about tackling other acute problems facing India including the problem of the Punjab.

Passing on to the issues of India's foreign policy, Narasimha Rao stressed the great importance attached by India to the development of friendly ties with the Soviet Union. A big event in relations between our countries, he said, was the recent 20th anniversary of the Soviet-Indian treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation. The decision to extend it for a further 20 years shows that no reservations or uncertainties exist between us.

Western Agencies Cited on Tehran Talks on Afghanistan

PM0409143391 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
31 Aug 91 Union Edition p 5

[*IZVESTIYA* press service report: "The Mujahidin Are Coming to Moscow"]

[Text] The development of events in the Soviet Union after the failure of the attempted coup d'etat establishes favorable grounds for the process of a political settlement in Afghanistan. This is the basic conclusion reached at a two-day meeting in Tehran that ended Thursday between representatives of Pakistan, Iran, and the Afghan mujahidin, UPI and AFP report.

The most important result of the trilateral meeting, recorded in an adopted joint declaration, is the mujahidin's intention to send a special mission to Moscow for talks with Soviet representatives. It is necessary to achieve a fair and peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem in which "only the Muslim people of Afghanistan will determine their own future."

The Tehran talks were the logical continuation of the similar trilateral conference in Islamabad last month, which according to Iranian Foreign Minister A. Velayati were a turning point on the way to a political settlement of the Afghan problem. Iran and Pakistan, the minister noted, will help the Afghan mujahidin to overcome the difficulties they have encountered over the last 10 years. It is Pakistan and Iran that are prompting the mujahidin to accept unconditionally the UN proposals on Afghanistan, which call on the USSR, the United States, and other countries reciprocally to halt arms supplies to the warring sides. As we know, this plan was supported by Moscow, Washington, and Kabul.

Following the Tehran talks, another meeting with the same participants is scheduled to take place in Islamabad at a later stage. Thus, as A. Zaki, general secretary of the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stressed, the process that has begun should be considered "irreversible, even despite the fact that we have not yet managed to bring together representatives of the entire Afghan opposition." On this point the Iranian newspaper THE TEHRAN

TIMES urged people to disregard the fact that mujahidin leaders such as Hekmatyar, Yunis Khalis, and Sayaf failed to attend the meeting.

Reporting on the meeting held in Tehran, the UPI agency also reminds us that in settling the Afghan problem the recent first contacts between Soviet and mujahidin official representatives in Islamabad were very important.

Afghan Talks in Tehran, Upcoming Talks in Moscow Praised

*BK0209162591 Moscow Radio Moscow in Urdu
1200 GMT 1 Sep 91*

[Vasant Georgiyev commentary]

[Text] The second round of tripartite talks between Pakistan, Iran, and the Afghan mojahedin on settlement of the Afghanistan issue have ended in Tehran. Our commentator Vasant Georgiyev writes:

The tripartite meeting was held in Tehran despite the absence of some Afghan resistance leaders based in Pakistan, including influential figures like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. A number of political observers feel that the meeting itself indicates a growing realization of the need to seek a settlement to the Afghan problem at the negotiating table. The outcome of the meeting testifies to this.

What happened in Tehran? First I would like to draw your attention to the fact that participants in the meeting ratified their positive stand toward the UN secretary general's peace plan. It may be recalled that the plan calls for an end to military activities and initiation of international negotiations with the participation of Kabul. The plan also urges stopping supplies of all kinds of weapons to rival parties. An important element of the plan is the proposal for the establishment of a coalition government in Afghanistan, including representatives of rival parties, which will be followed by the holding of free and general elections.

Some constructive decisions were made at the Tehran meeting. The communique issued on the outcome of the meeting said that the mojahedin are considering sending their representatives to Moscow for talks. The delegation, it has been proposed, will include representatives from Iran and Pakistan, the two countries where the Afghan opposition groups have their headquarters. It is appropriate in this context to reiterate that Soviet diplomat and special envoy Nikolay Kozyrev made direct contacts with the Afghan opposition in Islamabad on 13 August. The Afghan mojahedin delegations' visit to Moscow will be helpful in carrying forward the joint consultations for a solution to the Afghan problem. Moreover, an experts commission is expected to be set up and to make suggestions for taking further steps for settlement of the Afghan issue. In conclusion, I would like to express the hope that a fresh breakthrough in the process of a political settlement to the Afghan issue will be achieved soon.

Andreyev Comments on U.S.-Kuwaiti Defense Pact

*NC0309100391 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1430 GMT
2 Sep 91*

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary]

[Text] Dear friends, Kuwaiti Defense Minister 'Ali Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah has said that his country intends to sign a pact under which the defense of this emirate by the United States will be ensured. Our commentator Yuriy Andreyev writes:

The Kuwaiti defense minister has described this as a definite decision and said that he is to go to Washington soon to sign the pact. On the basis of this document, the United States is to deliver various weapons to Kuwait and will help it train its military cadre and carrying out joint training courses.

The White House will, therefore, practically undertake the duty of defending Kuwait. All Kuwait will have to supply is the necessary expenses.

This variant undoubtedly ensures the interests of the two sides completely. In other words, it allows the United States to strengthen its positions in the Persian Gulf region to a large extent. The pact actually envisages a permanent U.S. presence in the region the expenses for which will be paid by the Kuwaiti Government. Kuwait, in turn, will receive the necessary guarantees on its security and many of its defense problems will be solved.

The calmness of these events which are filled with accord is upset by the fact that the United States and Kuwait do not live in a vaccuum. Many of the Persian Gulf countries are not happy with the new Kuwaiti-U.S. pact. For example, Iraq immediately condemned the pact and called on regional countries to prevent its implementation. Apparently Iran is also adopting a strong stance. The Iranian leadership has repeatedly stated that it will not agree to a U.S. presence in the region under any conditions. Moreover, it seems improbable that Arab countries will reach a total agreement on the issue. It is not a secret that the number of U.S. opponents among the Arab countries is large. In short, a contradictory situation will emerge.

The official [word indistinct] of this U.S.-Kuwaiti step is to ensure security in the Persian Gulf. But it may actually yield the opposite results.

Some observers believe that a new knot of problems and difficulties is being tied in the region. The White House and Kuwait are blatantly trampling on the interests of a number of regional countries, and this will definitely have its repercussions in future developments.

Our commentator Yuriy Andreyev writes in conclusion: We should apparently not ignore the definite reality that at any rate true security in the Persian Gulf can be ensured only if it includes the interests of all its littoral countries. I think that this element is missing from the U.S.-Kuwaiti pact.

Slowdown in Emigration Attributed To 'Problems' in Israel

*LD0409115791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Sep 91 Union Edition p 7*

[Unattributed report under the general heading "Credits and Emigration"]

[Text] According to official statistics published in Tel Aviv, 8,700 Soviet immigrants arrived in Israel in August this year. This is the lowest monthly indicator in the past 6 months. The local press attributes the decline in immigration to the Israeli authorities' inability to ensure the effective solution of the housing and employment problems that the country's new citizens face.

Newspapers are carrying increasingly frequent reports on the catastrophic situation in which many immigrants find themselves when they have lost hope of finding any work at all and have no money to rent or buy apartments.

Pankin: No Change on Mideast Peace Conference

*TA0309063691 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew
0505 GMT 3 Sep 91*

[Interview with Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin by Gid'on Kouts in Moscow; date not given—recorded]

[Text] I intend to leave for the Middle East and Israel prior to the convening of the peace conference, perhaps even before October; there is no reason not to hold the international conference in October; the USSR will continue to serve as cochairman of the conference; and the Middle East continues to be an important issue for Soviet foreign policy, Foreign Minister Boris Pankin said.

[Begin Pankin recording in English] Our position has been expressed clearly, and I personally have confirmed yesterday in my conversation with Foreign Minister Hurd of Great Britain. [passage indistinct] direction of previously [word indistinct]. [end recording]

[Kouts translates the above and continues] Our position has not changed, and I confirmed that in my talk with British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. We will continue to operate in the same direction as previously,. Nothing has changed. Pankin said that he has not yet spoken with Secretary Baker and hopes to do so next week.

The breakup of the center and the republics will not influence Soviet involvement because the center will continue to deal with the main issues while the republics will deal with bilateral ties. On a personal point, the new foreign minister and former ambassador in Prague said: I had very good relations with your ambassador in Prague, and I hope our relations with Israel will continue to be so good.

Soviet Oilmen To Help Extinguish Kuwaiti Oil Well Fires

*OW0409011191 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1830 GMT 3 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The firm "Konversiya" and the Soviet Ministry of Oil and Gas have signed a contract with the Kuwaiti oil company, "Kos" to send Soviet specialists to help extinguish burning Kuwaiti oil wells. It is envisaged that 50 Soviet experts will fly to Kuwait in the near future. An "IF" [INTERFAX] correspondent was told that Soviet technology would be used to put out the fires. Details of the contract have not been released.

Effects Republics' Independence on Afghanistan Viewed

*OW0309205291 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1600 GMT 3 Sep 91*

[Report by M. Mayarov and I. Porshnev, from the "Diplomatic Panorama" program; Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Several republics in the Soviet Union, including Central Asian ones, have recently proclaimed their independence. Our correspondent has inquired at the South-West Asia Department in the USSR Foreign Ministry whether this will affect the Soviet Union's Afghan policy.

We are analyzing our Afghan policy, developing new forms of approach and aiming to achieve a peaceful political settlement in that country as soon as possible, said a high-ranking official in the department. It might take some time to draw conclusions from new developments, he pointed out and added that proposals were being prepared on all aspects of Soviet-Afghan relations. A rapid political settlement in Afghanistan has always been and remains one of the priority tasks for Soviet foreign policy, he emphasized.

He confirmed that the Soviet Union had repeatedly invited Afghan mujaheddin to start negotiations, and is ready to continue its dialogue with them. "We are not responsible for the delay," he said.

Afghan 'Rebel' Delegation to Hold Moscow Talks

*LD0509145591 Moscow TASS in English 1419 GMT
5 Sep 91*

[By TASS international news analyst Yuriy Tyssovskiy]

[Text] Moscow September 5 TASS—Afghan rebels decided to send a delegation to the Soviet Union for talks on ways to resolve the Afghan problem, Burhaneddin Rabbani, acting "minister of foreign affairs of the Islamic Interim Government of Afghanistan", told a news conference in Peshawar. He represents one of the largest Afghan opposition groups, the Jamiat-i Islami.

Representatives of all parties of Afghan rebels, including those who refused to participate in recent multilateral contacts in Tehran, will be invited to participate in discussing the problem, Rabbani said.

A third round of talks is yet to be held. Rabbani added that by laying emphasis on a political settlement, the armed opposition does not intend to give up a "military solution".

According to data that filtered into news media, there is only a couple of constructive proposals in the bag of a delegation that is being formed.

Peshawar-based delegates, relying apparently on blessings from Tehran and Islamabad, will urge Moscow to "remove the Najibollah regime" from the political arena and terminate all and any aid to Kabul, including humanitarian one.

It must be stated straightforwardly that the rebels and their patrons evidently fail to realise that the times when we resorted to "removing" unwelcome leaders of other states have gone never to return.

As far as the second demand is concerned, it can be said in all certitude that the practice of arms supplies to the Afghan Government will be reconsidered without undue haste or rash decisions and, undoubtedly, from the viewpoint of scaling them down.

I think that taken into consideration will be also the actions of the sponsors of the "Afghan resistance"—Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and others that continue to prop up, through the supply of funds and weapons, the Afghan resistance's intransigent policy of carrying on the fratricidal war.

As far as the problem of humanitarian aid is concerned, it must be taken into account that the Soviet Union, which was directly involved in the Afghan civil war, is aware of its responsibility for what was done on the territory of the

southern neighbour and will continue to give humanitarian aid in reasonable amount through the United Nations and on the basis of bilateral agreements.

The Russian leadership's quite reasonable point of view concerning the need to turn to mutual advantage the aggregate of Soviet-Afghan trade and economic relations is also known.

Afghan rebels' representatives should be also prepared to discuss the fate of Soviet people who still languish in captivity. This issue may again be raised at the talks in Moscow.

Diktat or blackmail in this respect are unacceptable. The problem is evidently of purely humanitarian nature, not political one, concerns the hard lot of innocent people and comes, in the final analysis, to a violation of universally recognised human rights. In this respect Peshawar should show the maximum of goodwill.

Firefighting Conglomerate Lands Kuwait Contract

*OW0609024391 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2102 GMT 5 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Soviet Union's Conversion conglomerate, together with the Oil and Gas Ministry signed a contract with Kuwait's oil company on firefighting operations at Kuwaiti oilfields. But no details of the contract were given. A team of 50 Soviet experts is due to fly out to that country soon. Soviet officials told INTERFAX News Agency that domestic technologies will be used in fire-extinguishing operations there.

**Dep Formin Nikolayenko's Southern African Tour
Summarized**

*PM1608141391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 Aug 91 Union Edition p 5*

[Unattributed report: "Through the Countries of Africa"]

[Text] From 6 August through 12 August USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.D. Nikolayenko made a trip to Kenya, the Republic of South Africa [RSA], and Zambia, also making a short stop in Luanda, the Angolan capital.

In Kenya and Zambia V.D. Nikolayenko had conversations with these countries' foreign ministers, W. Ayah and B. Mibenge, in the course of which questions of bilateral cooperation, collaboration in settling regional conflicts in Africa, and certain other international problems were discussed.

The main aim of V.D. Nikolayenko's visit to the RSA was to meet with Nelson Mandela, president of the African National Congress [ANC]. At the behest of the USSR president Mandela was given a verbal message from M.S. Gorbachev confirming the invitation to the ANC leader to visit the Soviet Union. N. Mandela accepted the message with thanks, stressing that he highly values the Soviet Union's traditional support for the just cause of the South African people.

In the course of V.D. Nikolayenko's conversations with N. Mandela, and also with RSA Foreign Minister R. Botha and other members of the South African Government, the opinion was expressed on all sides that there is no reasonable alternative to a political settlement in South Africa and that to achieve this it is necessary to put an end to violence and pursue a consistent policy aimed at the full elimination of apartheid. At the same time both N. Mandela and the RSA Government's representative confirmed their readiness in principle to renew the negotiating process.

Interest was shown by members of the RSA Government in boosting bilateral relations with the USSR. For his part the Soviet representative noted the important role which a democratic, nonracial South Africa might play in solving the severe economic problems of African countries and in the peaceful settlement of conflict situations on the continent. The sides expressed support for developing cooperation in these spheres.

At Luanda Airport a short conversation was held between V.D. Nikolayenko and V. de Moura, deputy minister for external affairs of the People's Republic of Angola. Questions were discussed concerning implementation of the internal Angolan settlement agreements signed in Lisbon 31 May this year.

**South African National Party Constitutional
Proposals Viewed**

*MB2908081691 Moscow Radio Moscow in Afrikaans
1700 GMT 27 Aug 91*

[By Aleksandr Fedorov—read by announcer]

[Text] The ruling National Party of South Africa has drafted a concept document with proposals for a new constitution for the country. Aleksandr Fedorov comments:

If the article in the South African newspaper RAPPORT is confirmed then it will be the most important step taken by the National Party in the history of its existence. Fedorov believes that the proposals are more important than the scrapping of the three cornerstone laws of apartheid. These acts governed the most important facets of society but did not affect the principles of the system of separate development. The proposals made by the National Party makes provision for elections based on a one man-one vote system, which according to most of the liberation organizations, will create the opportunity to bring about the demise of apartheid and to enable the building of a democratic South Africa.

Thus far the idea of a one man-one vote system was rejected by the National Party, as well as all the presidents and prime ministers of South Africa. However, it was evident that the black majority would not believe in Mr. De Klerk's commitment to end apartheid until this most definitive step was taken. The leadership of the National Party who earlier announced its reform program, has apparently decided now that they cannot hold back any longer. They realized that the course of constitutional negotiations was coming to a halt and that the situation in the black townships was worsening.

If the trilateral talks between the government, the African National Congress [ANC] and Inkatha has delivered any results, then it was only on the political level. However, it has become evident that the agreement would not be enough to stabilize the situation in the black townships and to prevent attacks from far right-wing organizations and the Conservative Party.

The National Party suggests that the post of president should be scrapped and replaced by a council comprising of three to five people, as well as the formation of a cabinet on a multiparty basis. Fedorov believes that the Conservative Party will depend on this and would actually find supporters among the white population. Neither the right-wing nor the left-wing is acknowledging Mr. De Klerk's contribution toward the dismantling of apartheid and his ability to relieve political tension. Nobody is denying the honesty of President De Klerk as a politician and as a person.

The Conservative Party who is opposed to the scrapping of the presidential post will argue that the proposed council to replace the post of state president will not be in a position to relieve political tension and remove the competition between parties and organizations. The National Party plans to present its proposals to the party's federal congress on 4 September. The document which has been prepared for one and one-half years also makes provision for proportional representation of parties with proven support and the creation of nine regions in the country, each governed by its own administration.

All this is planned for the future and this will be in the foreseeable future if the political parties across the spectrum acknowledges this new step by the National Party which will lead to the democratization of the South African society.

South Africa Provides Aid to Russians

*91P50282A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Sep 91 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "Humanitarian Gesture"]

[Text] A humanitarian aid party arrived yesterday by a special Aeroflot flight from Cape Town to the capital. More than 11 tons of free food, medicine, and clothing was brought from South Africa for Russians.

"This action first and foremost attests to the recognition of the special role of the leaders of Russia in opposing the unconstitutional conspiracy," observed G. Olivier, head of the South African interest section in Moscow, during the ceremony for handing over the cargo. As the representative of the secretariat of the president of Russia reported, the aid will be directed to state boarding schools and distributed among invalids and elderly Muscovites in accordance with the instructions of B. Yeltsin.

RSA's National Party Constitutional Proposals Viewed

*MB0609204691 Moscow Radio Moscow in Afrikaans
1700 GMT 5 sep 91*

[Aleksandr Fedorov commentary]

[Text] The discussion of the constitutional proposals by the National Party of South Africa during its federal congress in Bloemfontein, is the theme of Aleksandr Fedorov's commentary.

As expected, the forum was the most emotional of the former four congress's held after the National Party came into power in 1948. During the former congresses the main theme was: adapting for survival. This time they concentrated on: living by facing reality. This reality is that apartheid, which divides people by means of skin color, should be dismantled. The congress in Bloemfontein showed that this is not so easy to achieve and that the old stereotypes have sunk deep into peoples' subconscious.

All the participants in the congress apparently agree with the leader of the National Party, the president of South Africa, Mr. F.W. de Klerk, who termed the proposals on the new constitution for the country, as historic. The implementation of the principle, one- man-one-vote would give the black majority an opportunity to participate in the country's political processes. Other suggestions based on the principle of equal political rights are also important.

Fedorov says that it seems as if the National Party, that has worked for one-and-a-half years on the draft proposals, has been pondering over the question of satisfying the black population without instigating a third Boer war. He further says that it is surprising that the proposals have been

cautiously welcomed by both people from the right and the left. The left has found loopholes in the proposals without any difficulty and the right has decided to exercise massive pressure because they can feel the indecision of the National Party.

The African National Congress criticized the document discussed in Bloemfontein and described it as an unacceptable attempt to reduce the right of the black majority to rule the country to nothing. Fedorov says that several questions come to mind when examining the proposals. What will the consequence be of the proposal which allows for one of the two parliamentary houses to have a veto right? What effect will it have on the future of the country if the nine states are divided through wide autonomy? The political opponents of the National Party view these and other proposals as an attempt by the present government to weaken the influence of a future central government, of which the majority will definitely be black, as well as to block reforms brought about to undermine the economic influence held by whites.

In the country there are rumors that the proposals have been ready for a long time, since sometime after 2 February, when De Klerk delivered his speech in Parliament. Fedorov says the fact that these proposals are only now being released is a tactical move. The Nationalists wanted an idea of how the different levels in the community would approach their initiative. They believe that the proposals can assist in speeding up the conference on negotiations for a new constitution for the country in which all the main political parties will participate.

Whatever the plans of the Nationalists may be, one cannot help but agree with one of the oldest Afrikaner analysts, Wilhelm Kleynhans, when he says that these proposals are in the interest of the nation. The debates in Bloemfontein and the reaction to the congress in the country convinces one that the proposals on the new constitution does not have anything in common with the former system of apartheid.

Official Rejects Angolan Accusations on Fishing

*LD0609025291 Moscow TASS in English 1213 GMT
5 Sep 91*

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Korzun]

[Text] Luanda September 5 TASS—Fishing cooperation with the Soviet Union has lately been subjected to vehement criticism in Angola. Leaders of opposition parties and some specialists publicly denounce the concluded Soviet-Angolan contracts on fishing in offshore Angolan waters as "fettering" and "juridically unnatural." Some newspapers even blame Soviet fishermen for plundering the republic's marine resources.

"This criticism is obviously intended to neutralise the local population's dissatisfaction with the sharply decreasing supply of seafoods to the domestic market, since Soviet ships have stopped offshore fishing within the frameworks of the joint fishing expedition as of August 1, 1991," TASS

was told by Aleksandr Nosov, official of the Soviet Embassy's economic sector in Angola.

"Complaints against the destruction of Angolan fish resources were made before too, but they were never backed by any concrete facts, since the latter prove quite the opposite," the Soviet diplomat said. "Our specialists have organised and held seminars on the protection of fish resources for officials of the Angolan fishing ministry. Several Soviet specialists annually worked on contract for the national fishing research centre. During the 15 years of cooperation with the USSR Angola has received more than one million tonnes of fish, caught by Soviet fishermen. Moreover, they fished mainly non-export species, which Western and Asian fishermen refuse to catch. Most of the fish was supplied to Angolan consumers. The Angolan side bore minimum expenditures. It only provided Soviet ships with fuel and water. It also paid for the Soviet fishermen's airplane tickets. These spendings were covered by Soviet-caught fish on extremely easy terms—at prices calculated on the basis of one tonne of fish per tonne of fuel, whereas

this proportion, according to world standards, should have been at least 1 to 3. Of course, the Soviet Union did not stand to lose from this cooperation too, because it sold a part of its catch at world prices," Nosov stressed.

"True, our fishermen received subsidies from the state budget till recently," he said. "When these subsidies were discontinued due to ongoing reforms in the USSR, Soviet shipowners could no longer agree to the terms on which their relations with the Angolan side were based. They concluded more profitable contracts with other states. Nevertheless, Soviet organisations tried to offer Angolan authorities compromise versions. Unfortunately, several problems are not within the competence of the Angolan fishing ministry and have to be settled at a higher level, which could not be done so far.

"Efforts are now being made to restore disrupted ties. But the search for mutually acceptable solutions must proceed in a calm atmosphere, without groundless reproaches and accusations," Nosov noted.

NTIS
ATTN: PROCESS 103
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD, VA

2

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.